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ABSTRACT
Choosing between alternative economic theories has been a
difficult task throughout the history of economic thought. An
attempt is made in this thesis to offer an explanation of persistent
conflict within Positive economics.
In the first part, the validational procedure in Positive
economics is examined, and the place of the F-Twist controversy within
it is described. In an effort to define terms used in this contro¬
versy, an ambiguity is found that permeates the structure of terms
such as, assumptions, fundamental postulates, etc. In examining the
criterion of objectivity in Positive economics, namely empirical test¬
ing, more ambiguities are found stemming from the irresolution of the
Problem of Induction. These ambiguities are related to the pcsitiv-
ist distinction between theory and fact and to the elusive justification
of inductive inference. Finally, the reliability and objectivity of
empirical evidence is put in question.
In the second part, the Monetary controversy is outlined.
Initially the scene is set by accounting for the development of the
controversy within the context of the policy developments during the
post-war period. Then, the theoretical framework of the controversy
is delineated and it is found that Monetarists and Fiscalists belong
to the same theoretical framework differing only in the emphases they
put within it. Finally, the empirical evidence by either side is
examined and the conclusion is reached that it has proved indecisive
for choosing between Monetarism and Fiscalism.
In the last part, critiques of Positive economics are
reviewed, and various explanations of conflict in economics are
discussed. It is found that in most of these explanations, causal
relations are looked for, which attribute conflict to isolated
factors stemming from the defects of economics. An alternative
account of conflict in economics is propounded in which the logical
'matrix' behind persistent controversy is put forward. In this
account a diagram is drawn structurally tracing and logically con¬
necting opposing tendencies in Positive economics. Along with the
logical structure a historical framework is also given within which
the connecting relations are realized. The argument is put forth
that, as far as the F-Twist and Monetary controversies are concerned,
conflict in Positive economics cannot be resolved by empirical
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The object of this thesis is to understand the logic of
controversy within Positive economics. Yet controversy over alternat¬
ive interpretations of the phenomena studied is not a characteristic
peculiar to economics. Most sciences exhibit the same proliferation
of competing theories. What is, however, peculiar to economics
and perhaps to all social sciences - is the tendency for controvers¬
ies to remain persistently unresolved. One simply has to look to
controversies such as those between Historicists versus Marginalists
or Institutionalists versus Positivists, or to policy controversies
such as those over money and prices, or to theoretical controversies
such as those over capital, investment, consumption, perfect and im¬
perfect competition, to see that they have remained largely unresolved.
Although their intensity has fluctuated, controversies such as the
above have appeared in various forms and shapes throughout the history
of economics. For instance the Marginalists v. Historicists contro¬
versy reappeared in the form of the F-Twist controversy, or policy
controversies that raged during Ricardo's time have re-emerged and
have taken the shape of the Monetarist controversy. Whereas in the
physical sciences one may find indisputable criteria for choosing
between alternative theories, in economics there is even unresolved
conflict for these criteria. According to Clarkson, "The history of
economic thought is in part a history of a dispute over the criteria
to be employed when adjudging the validity of contending economic
theories." . Although one might find it urgent to study economic
phenomena such as capital or inflation, one encounters this phenomenon
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in economics whereby no irrevocable criteria can be established for
choosing between a Cambridge Massachussets and a Cambridge England
interpretation of capital, or between a fiscalist and a monetarist
interpretation of inflation.
Perhaps one might argue that controversy means progress,
2
and thus forms part of the scientific process . Yet, if compared
with controversies in the 'harder' sciences - where perhaps con¬
troversy may be associated with progress - controversies in economics
exhibit a permanence and stubborn persistence that has become a major
characteristic of all the 'softer' sciences. As Myrdal says "In
economics, on the contrary, (with natural sciences) all doctrines live
on persistently""^. Thus, one can speak of controversy as a scientific
tool bringing new knowledge, once there has been resolution and not
continuous theoretical stalemate. Scientific progress is the result
of resolved controversies, and not the outcome of perpetually conflict-
4
xng theoretical tendencies . Alternative schools of thought develop
within and without the orthodox Positivist-Neoclassical framework
creating persistent conflict. Each school professes to be the only
holder of the key to the truth, and yet no truth is established. It
may seem clear why controversies such as, for example, between Neo¬
classical and Marxian economics remain unsolved, since they pertain to
two incompatible and alternative paradigms. Different languages,
fundamental assumptions and methodologies account for the irresolution.
However, it is not at all clear why controversies within Positive
economics remain unresolved.
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In contrast to inter-paradigmatic conflicts, participants
in conflicts within Positive economics are agreed on how to resolve
disagreements. The common methodology stipulates that the empirical
testing of theories will sift the true from the false. According to
Lipsey "disagreements over positive statements are appropriately
settled by an appeal to facts''^. And indeed when controversy rages
in Positive economics empirical testing comes to the fore. In con¬
troversies such as, for example, the investment function and Monetary
controversies, empirical evidence has poured thick and fast. To no
avail however. Despite the accumulation of empirical evidence the
facts have shown favour to all sides. The irresolution of disagree¬
ments among economists has become, according to Myrdal, "proverbial"^.
The failure of Positive economics to resolve major conflicts has been
pointed out frequently by critics. For example Katouzian argues that
"The failure of Positive economics . . . is to be seen particularly in
the fact that no major economic hypothesis has yet been successfully
refuted"^.
The paradox is however, that despite the continuous
disagreement and the failure of empirical testing to decide between
competing theories, Positive economists are still faithful to the
doctrine that empirical testing will resolve the conflicts. "Yet we
have faith" says Bronfenbrenner "that most if not all such positive
g
disagreements will eventually be resolved" . It should have been
made clear to Positive economists by now that, according to their own
9
methodology , every hypothesis when confronted with counter-evidence
should be rejected. And yet empirical testing has been a methodological
4
hypothesis which has not been rejected although it has been tested
and contradicted. An attempt is made in this thesis to understand
this binding faith towards the methodology of Positive economics.
It is indicative of crisis in a discipline when methodological
discussion becomes relatively important"*^. Although most economists
would disapprove of discussions on methodology*""* they would, with few
exceptions, indulge in them with the excuse that "Methodological dis-
12
cussion, like calisthenics and spinach, is good for us" . It seems
that doubts about one's own philosophical principles have become a
staple diet of the economists who constantly feel the stability of
their paradigm shaken. As Kuhn notes "Only when they must choose
13
between competing theories do scientists behave like philosophers"
Thus, if this principle is correct then crisis has become a permanent
feature of economics, since methodological discussion has been in the
limelight from the times of Ricardo, Marx and Veblen to Friedman,
Machlup and Samuelson. Given the permanent theoretical competition,
it seems that there is always a need for the economist to turn into
philosopher.
But where does methodological discussion lead us? Does it
help the economist to resolve the crisis or make a rational (i.e.
reasonable) choice of contending philosophical and theoretical positions?
From what appears from the history of methodological discussion in
economics the answer is negative. Despite the number of articles and
books written on economic methodology, economists still disagree, and
still cling to their own 'correct' methodology while the crisis
5
continues. Methodology, Samuelson observes "is a field where . . .
14
every economist feels his ideas are as good as anyone elses"
Surely it is a contradiction when a discipline that emphasizes ration¬
ality as its fundamental assumption is found in such an irrational
position. It is indeed prima facie irrational to have unresolved
conflict among 'rational' Positive economists, who are supposed to
share the same methodology. Thus, it is important to the under¬
standing of methodological conflict to attempt to unravel the logic
behind this 'irrationality'. In so doing one comes closer to the
fundamental contradictions in Positive economics and to the explana¬
tion of controversy. It is therefore part of the purpose of the
thesis to examine this logic behind methodological conflict in
Positive economics and relate it to a particular economic controversy.
Although methodology has been a widely discussed topic in
economics, the subject of unresolved controversy has been relatively
very little studied. Besides Krupp and Myrdal who have dealt with
it somewhat explicitly"^, most students of economic methodology tend
to leave it in the background. The usual explanation given for
persistent theoretical conflict relates to the ineffectiveness of
Positive economics to overcome inherent value judgements^. Other
explanations relate to the nature of the socio-economic process which
eludes any kind of stable methodological procedure for the choice be-
17
tween alternative theories . Still other explanations of disagreement
in economics come from people who argue that economics is made up of
theories that are not falsifiable, and that therefore no belief can be
18 ^
refuted decisively . More recent explanations, taken after Kuhn,
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relate to the paradigmatic character of Positive economics, as a
factor deterring "empirical arguments ... in shooting down strongly
19
held beliefs" , In my opinion, however, these explanations offer
only a partial account of controversy, since they do not view the
continuation of conflict as a necessary outcome of the structure of
Positive economics, but rather as an outcome of its defects. For
example, Myrdal's explanation in terms of implicit value judgements
that hinder the resolution of controversy, or Krupp's explanation in
terms of elastic ceteris paribus clauses and different initial
strategies (see chapter 6), or Morgenstern's in terms of inaccurate
20
data , or, finally, Clarkson's in terms of the gap between abstract
21
economic theory and concrete empirical reality , are explanations
that refer to defects of Positive economics. Although these explana¬
tions may be valid in themselves, they are nonetheless only isolated
observations of a very complex problem. They do not cover a wide
space of the logical ramifications behind unresolved dispute in
economics. In contrast, by uncovering, as Samuels says, "the intel-
22
lectual matrix of the conflicts" , I feel that a better understanding
of the logic of controversy is achieved. Instead of trying to find
the immediate causes of conflict in economics, an attempt is made in
this thesis to unravel the combinations and permutations of the ideas
that form the structure supporting persistent controversy. Thus,
strictly speaking., no explanation (in the sense of causation) is given
here, but rather a description of the logical (necessary) and
structural connections behind irreconcilable conflict.
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As far as Positive economists are concerned, most of them
brush away the problem of disagreement by claiming that irreconcilable
conflict concerns Questions about value judgements about which "men
23
can ultimately only fight" , whereas conflict that concerns positive
24
judgements is in principle resolvable . "Much of the disagreement"
argues Bronfenbrenner, "is inevitable since it centers around economic
values and policy recommendations and involves normative rather than
25
positive economics" . However, it is difficult for Positive econo¬
mists to argue that the testing of the investment function or the
evidence from either large-scale models or single-equation tests
regarding the Monetary controversy, concerns value judgements (at
least explicitly). If this were so then what would separate positive
from normative judgements?
I feel it is important to bring the issue of persistent
controversy to the foreground for two main reasons: firstly, because
it sheds light on the whole structure of Positive economics and its
assumptions, and thus leads to a better understanding, and therefore
critique, of it. And secondly because it allows a synthesis of
philosophic and economic arguments in a way that renders them inseparable.
The inseparability of economic and methodological arguments is important
because of the proliferation of economic controversies and the lack of
established criteria for the choice between conflicting theories. One
cannot speak purely of an economic issue without considering the
2 6
alternative existing interpretations . And if this is true, then
automatically choice criteria have to be formed, which leads directly to
27
methodology . Yet, most economists would tend to take methodological
8
issues independently of economic issues. However, even if methodology
is not explicit, tacit criteria are in fact applied for choosing one
version of an economic issue over another. Given, therefore, perma¬
nent competition of theories within and without Positive economics
on almost any issue, it seems worthwhile to try to understand persist¬
ent conflict in economics. This puts the validational procedure of
Positive economics in a light that exposes the nature of both the
methodology and ontology of economics. By studying the structural
patterns that are behind conflict in economics, both methodological
and ontological factors arise. In this way the two levels are put
in a dialectical context. Importance is attached to one factor insofar
as it is structurally related to the other. They cannot be seen
separately, because both are defined only in relation to each other.
As Levi-Strauss says "The methodological integration of essence and
form reflects, in its own way, a more necessary integration - that
28
between method and reality."
In attempting an explanation of persistent conflict in
29 30
economics I have used two sources: philosophy and Structuralism
The first one helped me to identify the factors that constitute the
explanation, and the second helped me relate them. However I did not
intend to be either philosophically complete or structurally adequate.
Both sources were used in as much as they could contribute to the
study of the phenomenon. As the mathematical economist or the
econometrician borrows from mathematics or statistics to use in the
study of economic phenomena, so have I borrowed from' philosophy and
Structuralism to use in the study of phenomena in economics.
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The strategy with which I have decided to tackle the
problem, and which is also reflected in the structure of the thesis,
is to first describe the object of the research, which is the method¬
ology of Positive economics, then show an inconsistency in it, i.e. a
major unresolved conflict, constituting the phenomenon under study,
and lastly offer an interpretation of the logic behind the persistence
of the inconsistency.
In following this strategy I have separated the thesis into
three parts. In Part I, Chapter 1, I discuss the process of theory
validation in Positive economics and bring into the picture the issues
involved in the F-Twist controversy. The major conclusion that stems
from this chapter is that the definition and structure of fundamental
assumptions as used by Positive economists is ambiguous, allowing
polar interpretations of their function. In Chapter 2 I examine the
nature of the objectivity criterion for theory selection in Positive
economics, which is empirical evidence. In doing this I first discuss
in general the justification of this criterion, and its relation to
theory, and then in particular within the context of Positive economics.
Then I juxtapose this criterion to an objectivity criterion from an
alternative methodology, i.e. Marxism, in order to show the non-
universality of its application. Lastly I consider the nature of
this criterion and I conclude that besides being unreliable as an
accurate reflection of economic reality, it is also ambiguous as used
by Positive economists. Furthermore I add that this ambiguity stems
from the impasse facing the economist when attempting to rationally
justify it.
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In Part II I examine the Monetary controversy and its
irresolution. Chapter 3 gives an idea of the development of the
controversy and its dialectical relation to policy successes and
failures. From this I make the observation that at the policy level
both sides have found favour and disfavour. Chapter 4 attempts to
put the controversy into theoretical perspective and examine the
issues involved. From this examination I conclude that both sides
belong to the general neoclassical framework, differing only in
degree and emphasis. In Chapter 5 I present the evidence and the
empirical tests that have been used to support (or reject) either
the monetarist or the fiscalist position. From this presentation I
conclude that despite the issues being 'non-normative' in character
and despite the enormous amount of empirical evidence accumulated
during the controversy, the conflict still goes on with no decisive
step taken towards either direction.
This conclusion in turn leads me to Part III in which I
present an explanation of the persistence of the Monetary and F-Twist
controversies. First, in Chapter 6, I make a critical review of
some of the critiques levelled against Positive economics and also
discuss some of the arguments used as explanations of conflict in
economics. From this I find that although these arguments are
sufficient they are not, however, necessary explanations as they do
not cover the whole of the logic of conflict. I also make the
observation that although most of the critics are correct as far as
Positive economics is concerned, nevertheless as soon as they-attempt
to offer an alternative to it they are ambiguous. Finally, the last
chapter puts forward an alternative explanation, by reconstructing
11
step by step the logic and structure of Positive economics. In
doing this, certain observations and a diagram emerge depicting the
mechanism that nurtures and necessitates persistent conflict in
Positive economics.
I hope the reader will forgive the repetition of certain
obvious points. As I hope will become apparent while reading the
thesis, the repetition is necessitated by the nature of the explanation
which I am putting forward. Each component part of the explanation
is taken out of the structure of Positive economics and under differ¬
ent circumstances is given a different meaning. For instance, the
positivist dichotomy between analytic and synthetic statements is
analysed either in the light of the Problems of Knowledge, or in its
economic application, or in its function in creating controversies
in economics. In all cases the dichotomy and its meaning have to be
repeated so as to provide the basis for the explanation. Another
instance is the repetition of the point about the Problems of knowledge.
The point is so obvious, even to non-philosophers, that it needs little
mention, let alone repetition. However, the implications stemming
from these Problems are not brought to bear critically upon Positive
economics, but to furnish a context within which the phenomenon of
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The purpose of this part is to fulfil the first requirement
of the strategy delineated in the introduction of the thesis, that is
to describe the object of this investigation. In other words its
objective is to make an exposition of the methodology of Positive
economics and examine the role and status of empirical evidence in it.
In doing this Part I will be separated into two chapters.
The first chapter will outline the process of theory selection in
Positive economics and define the role of empirical testing as an ob¬
jectivity criterion. In addition it will attempt to show that the
F-Twist controversy, a controversy concerning the priority of testing
predictions rather than assumptions, is a conflict based on an
ambiguity which is structurally embedded within the methodological
paradigm of Positive economics.
The second chapter will examine the nature of empirical
evidence. In order to set the scene for this examination a general
account of the nature of empirical evidence and the Problem of Induct¬
ive inference will be presented. Following this a sketch of what
counts as legitimate 'facts' for Positive economics will be drawn and
the method and problems of constructing them will be outlined. This
chapter will also briefly describe some methodological assumptions in
Marxism and try to relate the status of empirical evidence in them.
In doing this it is purported to show that the emphasis on empirical
16
testing is an epistemological datum contingent to Positive economics,
and as such cannot claim universal objectivity. In order to do this
a different, and alternative, methodological paradigm has to be out¬
lined. By showing that an alternative and valid set of objectivity
criteria exist, the status of empirical testing will be attributed its
appropriate place, which is within the methodological walls of
Positive economics. Finally, in this chapter, various problems
concerning the validity, accuracy and reliability of empirical evidence
will be indicated.
At the outset the reader should be warned that what follows
is not a survey of writings and criticisms about the methodology of
Positive economics. It is rather an impression of what Positive
economics is all about as expounded in the writings of Positive
economists within the context of the F-Twist controversy. Further¬
more, the objective is not to criticize Positive economics as this
task has been successfully achieved by numerous critics'''. My object¬
ive here is rather to describe Positive economics as one methodological
paradigm among others, outline its assumptions and discover the
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CHAPTER 1:
THE PROCESS OF THEORY VALIDATION
IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS
I
A. EXPOSITION OF THE METHODOLOGY OF POSITIVE ECONOMICS
a. 'WHAT IS' ECONOMICS
The term 'positive', as Positive economists use it in the
context of scientific inquiry, refers to propositions that deal with
events in the world as they actually are. That is, "positive science
2
may be defined as a body of systematized knowledge concerning what is" .
The term 'positive' is employed in order to separate objective economic
knowledge from its normative, instrumental and practical implications,
and avoid any confusion and conflict stemming from the possible over-
3
lapping of these distinctive branches of inquiry .
Although the above definition of 'positive' appears to be
clear enough, it seems necessary to try to elaborate it as it does not
really ascribe any particular meaning to the term, but rather it re-
describes it in terms of the notion 'what is'. By 'what is' Positive
economists mean a set of propositions that describe events as they
actually occur. That is, as events are perceived by the economist
occurring objectively and free from bias. 'What is' denotes that the
observer can appeal to a reality that is outside his/her subjective
reality. It emphasizes the fact that phenomena or events may be
accounted in a 'value-free' manner. However, it is recognised by
4
Positive economists that although bias does enter in positive research ,
this bias is ultimately purged by the objectivity of empirical observ¬
ations. Thus, it is empirical evidence that renders a proposition
ultimately 'positive'.
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'What is' thus implies that there is a separate reality
from the reality of the observer"*. It is a 'reality', in the form
of relations among economic variables, that is always 'there', as a
physical reality, ready to be studied, observed, quantified and
ultimately controlled. The notion of 'what is' implies a self-
disciplined scientist who always sifts out the metaphysical elements
from his/her scientific observations.
In reference to this type of external objectivity, and in
anticipation of chapters 6 and 7, it is worth noting that the obvious
objections raised against such contentions, as for example, the
objections that the dividing line between the observer and the observed
is blurred^, or that economic variables, because they involve human
beings, cannot be controlled and therefore cannot be scientifically
7
assessed in the laboratory sense , or that observers of socio-economic
g
phenomena use value-loaded terminology , or that ideological bias
9
creeps in through the class orientation of the observer , can be
countered by some of the arguments used for safeguarding objectivity
in Positive economics
\
The positivist methodological framework rescues the Positive
economist from this type of objections. For instance the first
objection, i.e. the blurred relationship between the observer and the
observed, is countered by the argument to the effect that Positive
economics confines itself to the measurable and therefore to the
objective"^. Even though the observer might be subjectively biased,
19
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the appeal to quantified evidence demystifies his/her conjectures
(the notorious difficulty of quantifying economic reality is, however,
duly acknowledged, but it is not considered a problem in principle
13
different from the ones facing a physicist ).
The second objection, i.e. that economic phenomena consist
of unpredictable human beings, falls against the argument that Posit¬
ive economics does not deal with the bearers of the variables per se,
but only with the relations between them. As in physics so in
economics it is not the particles that are in question but their be¬
haviour and the complex pattern of relations stemming from it. The
task of the Positive economist is to formulate hypotheses about these
relations. The rationale behind this argument is that although
human beings are whimsical and uncontrollable, their behaviour can be
contained statistically, very much like the random behaviour (movement)
14
of particles in a container can be determined statistically
The third objection, i.e. that of using value-laden terminology,
is usually countered with a corollary of the argument of measurability.
It is contended that the testing and falsification of economic proposi¬
tions with empirical, quantified evidence, will ultimately reduce the
value-laden terms used in the propositions into positive ones. The
use of such terms as equilibrium or perfect competition are attributed
a linguistic-analytical function which helps order complex observations^.
Their significance is measured by the success they have in providing
empirically meaningful theories or predictions that can be tested with
quantified facts'^.
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Finally, the fourth objection, i.e. the class bias of the
observer, can be countered with the positivist claim that the independ¬
ence of the methodology used, i.e. testing theories with empirical
evidence, will provide the criterion which will separate the ideo¬
logical from the 'real'. Again it is empirical facts, acting as
arbiters of possible ideological grievance, that play the role of the
neutral, objective, and above suspicion criterion of 'truthfulness'
or 'reality'"^.
Setting aside for the moment other criticisms of Positive
economics, to be discussed at a later stage along with more detailed
analysis of the above objections, I can proceed to further examine
the meaning of 'what is* economic propositions.
Statements concerning 'what is' are distinguished from
statements concerning 'what ought to be'. The latter by definition
refer to value judgements. That is, they deal explicitly with choice
between objectives in contrast to the former which refer only to the
'possible' (the actual) and not to the 'desirable*: "Political
economy . . . furnishes information as to the probable consequences of
given lines of action, but does not [itself] pass moral judgements, or
18
pronounce what ought or what ought not to be" . According to this
view the economist is likened to the physicist who investigates the
atom but does not pass moral judgements as to the desirability of atom
bombs or the use of nuclear energy. Equivalently, the economist
studies the structure of the economy as 'it really* is and doe's not
get involved with the practical question of whether this structure is
21
desirable or not . However, once this kind of explicit valuation
is taken into account, problems arise when one takes into consideration
the existence of implicit valuations. By implicit valuations I mean
values that are not explicitly stated in terms of choices between given
objectives, but rather values that stem from largely unconscious bias
20
which influences the direction of one's scientific research
The major characteristic that sharply distinguishes positive
from normative statements is that "pure value-judgements cannot be
tested by empirical procedures and therefore cannot be admitted into
21
the body of Positive science"** , whereas "Positive economics , . ,
deals with statements that could conceivably be shown to be wrong
22
(i.e. falsified) by actual observations of the world" . The dicho¬
tomy is drawn thus: between statements that appeal to tastes and
subjective valuations and statements whose truth or falsity can be
established by an appeal to empirical evidence. Thus, 'positive' is
defined in terms of propositions that deal with 'actual' as distinct
to 'desirable' events, or with consequences of given actions, the
objectivity of which is determined by 'economic reality' as represented
by quantified empirical evidence.
Another implication of the term 'positive' refers to the
possibility of observing social phenomena in more or less the same
manner as the 'mature' sciences. Although Positive economists admit
that there is a difference in the nature of the phenomena between the
natural and social sciences, they claim that the difference is not of
a kind but of a degree. According to Samuelson "There are no separate
22
methodological problems that face the social scientist different in
23
kind from those that face any other scientist" . By this claim
Positive economists mean that economic propositions, whether these are
the conclusions of deductive systems or inductive generalizations
about regularities in the economic world, do not differ from physical
propositions, due to the important property that, unlike normative
propositions, they can be expressed in a positive manner so that they
can say something about observable reality and thus can be tested
24
with empirical evidence . In other words, according to this claim,
a sort of experiment may be set up in which theories or their predict¬
ions are tested through the comparison of the variables involved with
the results of the experiment, while other (external) variables are
25
held constant . This method, therefore, demands the operational-
ization of theoretical terms which will provide economic propositions
26
with the key to positive scientific testing
Needless to say that Positive economists realise the
difficulties facing the experimenter in the social sciences and the
consequent problems of unpredictability and uncertainty due to the
27
human factor . But they claim that this is not an obstacle to
experimentation as evolving techniques appropriate to human experience
will fulfil the necessary requirements for quantification and experi-
28
ment . Even though the conclusiveness and exactness of laboratory
experiments is lacking, it is believed that the results from the
application of methods devised for human experience, will serve as
approximations for establishing valid economic theories. In .this
way economic theory can claim to be as objective as the natural sciences
23
The vision of scientific procedure that emerges from the
above description of Positive economics is one which sees science
developing "in an endless relation of give and take . „ . (between)
factual work and 'theoretical'work, . . . naturally testing one
30
another (and which) will eventually produce scientific models"
In this vision although theory is important, the factor that is
assumed to be unquestionably the most decisive one, and the one
that determines scientific advance, is the one that "relates
31
questions to evidence"
b. THE MODEL OF SCIENTIFIC PROCEDURE IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS
This particular "give and take" between the "factual and
the theoretical", the inductive and the deductive, has been out-
32
lined in an illuminating article by Machlup . While talking about
verifiability in economics he structures the entire theoretical
33
and empirical apparatus of economics into two main parts : the
first, called Assumed and Deduced change, is situated at the begin¬
ning and the end of the structure. It has two separate functions:
to provide observational data of a change and its consequences, as
input to the second part, and to furnish conclusions derived from
the second part, in terms of probable empirical "deduced effects".
The second part includes the Assumed conditions which describe the
way in which the Assumed change operates in terms of technological
and organizational conditions. It further includes the Fundamental
Postulates of the apparatus, which are supposed to be fixed. These
fixed assumptions are the so-called ideal-types, such as, for example,
"rational man", "perfect competition", etc. Their character is
24
mostly a_ priori and their function mainly heuristic. Ideal-types,
as Machlup explains, may be both a priori and empirical. A priori
in terms of their abstract properties and their heuristic, analytic,
value, and empirical in terms of being representative of a real type
of action, assuming, in a Marshallian way, most of its 'relevant'
characteristics and abstracting from the rest (this point about the
dual nature of Fundamental Postulates is important because it sheds
light on the F-Twist controversy, to be discussed in the next section).
Moreover their validity is tentative, and they hold as long as their
explanatory and predictive function, in terms of the totality of
events they purport to explain and predict, is not replaced by more
general postulates that could conceivably explain more phenomena
with less assumptions, or predict better. This criterion, along
with the one that their validity should be tested indirectly (through
their predictions) against empirical evidence, according to Machlup,
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form the testing criteria of Fundamental Postulates . The first
and the last part of the apparatus, described by Machlup, are the
ones that should be independently and directly tested against empirical
data, since their terms are composed of inferences directly drawn from
experience. The second part, i.e. the Assumed conditions and the
Fundamental Postulates, should be checked only indirectly through their
predictive capacity. Thus irrespective of whether these assumptions
are 'real' or not, their validity holds as long as they generate
correct predictions.
Although for Machlup, and also for Friedman, the validity of
these assumptions is tested indirectly, it is not at all clear how they
25
are selected in the first place. Friedman, for example, would claim
that their heuristic value cannot be determined ex ante, but only ex
post through their predictive capacity. However, how can we have
correct predictions, proving the heuristic value of the postulates,
unless we have some initial assumption from which to deduce them?
Before predictions are derived there must be an ex ante choice between
35
alternative sets of Fundamental Postulates . For instance Grahl
argues that "the choice of a model is necessarily prior to the assess-
36
ment of its correspondence to the data" . I think that this is a
moot point in the methodology of Positive economics which, paradox¬
ically, illuminates the deadlock in the F-Twist controversy. However,
before I discuss the implications of this argument for the conflict
between Assumptionists and Predictionists in greater detail, I shall
try to elaborate on the model of scientific procedure in Positive
economics in order to set the perspective for the discussion of the
F-Twist controversy.
In Figure I, on p.26, I have attempted to construct the
process of theory selection in Positive economics in such a way so
as to accommodate both Friedmanian and Samuelsonian positivism. In
contrast to Machlup's model which emphasizes only indirect testing of
assumptions, my depiction of the procedure allows for both direct and
indirect testing. The point of this exercise is to indicate that,
despite differences concerning assumptions, the two versions of
Positive economics have a common denominator which is empirical,
quantified, facts.
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FIGURE I: THEORY SELECTION IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS: AS SEEN FROM THE
POINT OF VIEW OF BOTH ASSUMPTIONISTS AND PREDICTIONISTS
NOTE: a. I use the generic term model for borh cases, because levels E and
F are meant to convey the ideas of theory or hypothetical explana¬
tion, (as used by either Predictionists or Assumptionists), which
usually are component parts of the structure of a model. Simple
models are usually associated with Predictionists, who prefer a single-
equation depiction of the economy and great predictive capacity, while
complex models are associated with Assumptionists, who prefer large-
scale models describing the economy analytically and realistically.
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The top part of the diagram, A and B , constitutes the
37
source of information for the observer . A and B together
38
form the building blocks for the construction of economic hypotheses
The first source of information, A , consists of numerical data found
39
in official statistics, results from previous hypotheses , business
reports, responses to questionnaires and in general the results of
empirical investigations. This source of information, along with
more intuitive and qualitative observations, forms the foundation of
economic hypotheses. These hypotheses function as rationalizations
of uniformities in the observations of economic events, hence level D
in the diagram. The nature of the second source of information B ,
is largely priori (self-evident) and is the source that feeds the
observer with the theoretical assumptions and conditions that are
necessary for sifting out the complex empirical observations in A .
This source of information, through level C , helps the observer
design the appropriate models, in E or F , that will account for
the uniformity. Source of information B feeds level C with
40
assumptions that consist largely of aci hoc impressions , self-evident
41 42
experience , or normal-representative economic units . Koopmans
for instance claims that "the 'facts' of economic life are all around
us. Hence much of the factual background of economic life can be
43
presupposed without extensive examination or discussion"
Positive economists, depending on whether they are
Predictionists or Assumptionists, will either use these assumptions
as 'as if' and even 'unrealistic' constructs - the validity of which
will depend upon the conformity of their predictions with experience -
28
or use them as ideal-type theories that represent real conditions
approximately. Their validity will depend on their 'meaningfulness'
in producing the ideal conditions under which a hypothesis could be
44
tested
After observations, stemming from A , are ranked and
ordered through the assumptions in C , either a simple equation or
a complex model is constructed, which accounts for the possible
regularities encountered in the observed events. The next step is
to test these models against empirical evidence. Predictionists,
following Friedman and Machlup, draw the implications or predictions
and see whether the model is successful in predicting accurately.
If it is, then it is confirmed until a new model based on greater
simplicity, generality and predictive fruitfulness replaces it.
This also constitutes indirect testing of the 'as if' assumptions
in C . However, the success of the predictions of the model does
not establish the truth value of the assumptions in C , but only
confirms their heuristic value. On the other hand, Assumptionists,
following Samuelson, construct a complex model disaggegating most
sectors in the economy so as to approximate real conditions as closely
as possible, and provide an analytical picture of the economy. This
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model contains operationally meaningful hypotheses , which are tested
against empirical evidence. The confirmation of these hypotheses
establishes the validity of the model and serves as a direct criterion
for establishing the approximate reality of ideal-type or deductive
assumptions, such as the maximization-of-returns assumption. -
29
The common denominator of the two approaches, and the
unquestionable criterion against which predictions or hypotheses are
to be tested, is empirical reality A* . This is data independent, of A
(i.e. collected independently of A ) accumulated either from compiled
statistics or empirical investigations, in order to provide fresh
empirical ground for the testing of the proposed models.
The complexity of Figure I is justified by the complexity of
the Positive economic edifice constructed so as to safeguard object¬
ivity, secure scientific procedures and discard ideological
ramifications. However, in my view, there are two points in the
diagram which disrupt the scientificity of the procedure. Firstly,
level C in the figure provides a framework or a 'world-view' through
which to perceive the unordered observations. It is by analogy the
spectacles of the economist through which he/she views the world.
The assumptions contained in this framework form the foundations upon
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which the models are constructed . For example, in the case of
macroeconomic models, consumption and investment functions are struct¬
ured according to the fundamental assumption of diminishing returns.
Or in the case of simpler models, prices are related to the money
47
supply forming an hypothesis based upon the quantity theory of money
(albeit in the new empirical form given to it by Friedman), in which
if velocity is assumed constant then neoclassical conditions such as
perfect competitions and full employment are assumed.
Thus, a framework or an outlook is presupposed from which
models are generated. The moot point about the choice of the framework
30
is that Positive economists do not provide convincing ex ante criteria
for its selection among alternative ones, but only ex post empirical
criteria. For example they claim that since the framework chosen
works, then it is not necessary to look for another one. However,
if in the first place 'works' means predicts accurately, then there
is no assurance that there may not exist another framework that
'works', i.e. predicts, better. In the second place, if it means
•works for the purpose in hand', it is not at all clear why it works
better for the purpose in hand, since no other framework has been
tried other than the neoclassical framework. In other words, before
the framework is tested with empirical criteria, one needs to justify
the particular framework chosen among an infinity of alternative
frameworks. For instance a Marxist framework emphasizing dynamic
(historical-dialectic) disequilibrium states in society, and providing
different ideal-types about economic relations, would generate a differ¬
ent set of models or predictions, that would need a different kind of
evidence to be tested. And this brings us to the second weak point in
the diagram: level A* .
Does empirical data in A* represent 'reality' as a whole?
Marxists, for instance, would argue that this is not the case because
of the two-level reality assumed by Marxist epistemology. The one
pertains to a 'surface' and the other to an 'essential' reality.
Empirical evidence of the positivist kind, represents surface reality,
and if it is taken to represent the whole of reality then it obscures
and hides the essential one. For Marxism, as we shall see in the
following chapter, evidence comes from the unravelling of the essential
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part of reality and the idea of 'praxis', which contains a dialectic
between theory and socio-historical practice. Consequently, positiv-
ist observations of empirical reality are not and can not be considered
objective criteria for Marxist theories. Theory selection in Marxism
provides different criteria of objectivity. But even within positiv-
ist practice the quality, accuracy and the testing validity of
empirical evidence is disputed. However, these points are related
to the nature of empirical evidence, and their discussion will be
postponed until chapter 2.
The important characteristic to be remembered in reference
to scientific procedure in Positive economics is that, although
theories have an important role to play within it, it is empirical,
quantified and observable evidence that has the predominant function
of being the absolute criterion of objectivity. And this is so
irrespective of the position of the Positive economist in the F-Twist
debate.
B. CONFLICT BETWEEN THE A PRIORI AND THE A POSTERIORI
a. THE F-TWIST CONTROVERSY
Having acquired a general view of how Positive economics
works in selecting between alternative theories, we can now proceed
to discuss the methodological importance of the F-Twist controversy,
and with the help of the above analysis, try to situate the position
of the Assumptionists and the Predictionists within the Positive
economic framework. My purpose is to show that the irresolution of
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the controversy hinges upon a structured ambiguity situated in the
positivist definition of 'Fundamental Postulates' or 'assumptions'.
An indication of the importance of this methodological
conflict in economics is its long and persisting continuation.
Going as far back as the late 19th century we can see that methodo¬
logical controversy was raging between the English and Austrian
Marginalists and the German Historical school, the so-called
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'Methodenstreit' . Then, as now, the issues were about the role
of theory and abstraction in economics. In fact the 'Methodenstreit'
never ceased and was carried on in America between Institutionalists
and Positivists. The clash between theoretical generality and
empirical relevance underlied the 'empty box' controversy in the
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'30s, mainly in the Economic Journal . In this controversy, behind
the discussion of neoclassical issues such as the representativity
of the firm, the returns to scale and perfect and imperfect competi¬
tion, lay the methodological issues of the degree of theoretical
abstraction and empirical relevance. Although by the '40s some of
the issues in the above controversy seemed to have been settled and
imperfect competition became part of the economic orthodoxy, remnants
of the debate still lingered in the pages of the American Economic
Review, with the protagonists being Machlup and Lester discussing the
relevance of Marginalism^. While this debate was largely economic
in character, the explicit methodological content of the discussion
increased. The issues of theoretical versus purely empirical eco¬
nomics became, yet again, prominent with the appearance of Friedman's
article on "The Methodology of Positive Economics". This rekindled
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the old controversy and brought to the foreground issues concerning
the epistemology of Positive economics***. From then onwards method¬
ological conflict became an everyday feature of every major economic
journal all over the world. Especially the conflict took a definite
methodological form concerning theory and realism, what was later
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dubbed by Samuelson as the F-Twist controversy
The major controversial issue in this debate concerns the
extent to which we need to test economic assumptions directly.
Friedman says that we do not; the testing of the predictions gener¬
ated from these assumptions is sufficient to guarantee the heuristic
validity of the assumptions. Assumptions, according to Friedman,
need not have a one-to-one correspondence with empirical reality, but
they should be couched in terms of 'as if' principles, simplifying
reality and most of the time unconnected to it. In his words,
the relevant question to ask about the "assumptions" of
a theory is not whether they are descriptively "realistic",
for they never are, but whether they are sufficiently good
approximations for the purpose in hand. And this question
can be answered only by seeing whether the theory works,
which means whether it yields sufficiently accurate predict¬
ions ... To be important ... a hypothesis must be
descriptively false in its assumptions; ... in general,
the more significant the theory, the more unrealistic the
assumptions . . .53 (Hence the name 'F-Twist').
On the other hand, Samuelson declares that 'false' assumptions,
in the above sense, cannot generate valid predictions. Accordingly,
assumptions have to be checked for their empirical relevance before
predictions are drawn, i.e. assuming simplicity, consistency and
generality, assumptions should also contain terms that correspond to
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reality: "the validity of the full consequences of a theory implies
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the validity of the theory and so of its minimal assumptions" . In
other words, a theory containing false assumptions cannot generate
consequences that are either logically or empirically valid.
The issue, i.e. should assumptions be tested or not, seems
to be clear. Friedman wants to test predictions whereas Samuelson
wants to test assumptions. But is it? In order to answer this
question I have first to examine what is the meaning of assumptions,
predictions, hypotheses and theories, within the context of the
distinctions made between statements such as, for example, logical-
conditional statements, empirical-correlational hypotheses, primitive
and secondary propositions and Fundamental Postulates"'*'. Also I
shall briefly review the criteria of the truth conditions for these
56
statements
Firstly, logical-conditional statements are comprised of an
antecedent clause p and a consequence q implying a logical
relationship. The proposition 'if prices are given to the firm and
there is perfect competition, then the firm will choose, ceteris
paribus, the output that maximizes its profit' is an example of the
proposition of the form 'if p then q , assuming p and ceteris
paribus conditions'. For the consequence to follow from the antecedent
there are certain logical-deductive laws that define how
we establish the logical truth of a logical-conditional state-
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ment . That is, if the p is true then q is
antecedent
35
necessarily p is false,
true, and if q is false then In a sense the
consequence of such statements is already implied in the antecedent
and is drawn out by logical rules.
On the other hand, hypotheses involving terms describing
events in the empirical world are called empirical-correlational
hypotheses. Although their form resembles the form of logical-
conditional statements, it differs in that the ps and qs are
empirically interpreted. This can make a great difference as it
implies that the truth conditions for this type of hypotheses follow
different rules. The terms in these hypotheses represent, in a
symbolic manner, occurrences of events in the 'real', i.e. empirical,
world. The relationship between any two events of this kind is con¬
sidered associational. This is so because inference for these
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hypotheses follows inductive rules . Inductive rules obey laws
that are characteristic of the empirical realm. Since empirical
reality is assumed as consisting of contingent events causally, i.e.
mechanistically, unrelated, the representational form of these events
should be associational. In other words, since in the empirical
world there is neither inductive nor deductive assurance that even q
will occur when p occurs, the only assurance one can depend on is
probabilistic; and this implies that the relationship between events
p and q is one of a degree of association. An economic example
of this kind of hypotheses is the restatement of the Quantity Theory
of Money by Friedman in terms of an empirical function relating the
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demand for money with certain empirically defined variables '. From
this an empirical hypothesis (or prediction) follows correlating a
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measure of the supply of money with the level of prices. The terms
in this hypothesis are empirically defined and their link is probabil¬
istic. The truth condition for these sentences is simply empirical
evidence. However, as Clarkson points out, while pleading for an
empirically testable consumption function, all terms within an empiric¬
al hypothesis (or prediction) have to be empirically defined and
confirmed^. In other words, if one wants to find out that the rise
in money systematically precedes the rise in prices, then one first has
to find out that indeed the money supply and the price level rise. In
cases where this is not true, i.e. one of the terms is not confirmed,
one cannot have antecedent clauses that are heuristically (i.e. have an
'as if' value) or descriptively false, for the truth of the statement
depends on all its terms being directly confirmed by experience.
Another distinction relates to protocol or basic sentences^.
These sentences contain terms that are directly linked with the world,
i.e. the terms represent experience in a one-to-one correspondence. A
basic sentence is different from an empirical-correlational hypothesis
in that it does not require any previous theory to act as framework or
62
background . Whereas an empirical-correlational hypothesis is form¬
ulated with concepts and implications borrowed from an antecedent
theory, e.g. the money-prices association bases itself on the Quantity
Theory of Money and ultimately on the neoclassical theory of value, a
primitive sentence is 'purely' experiential and independent of any
6 3
theory . For example the statement that, while demand is kept un¬
changed, the price of meat fluctuates with changes in trade union
policies, is assumed to relate to an observation that is supposed to
37
be generated from experience and not from theory. The scope of this
sort of statement is limited to the observations contained in its
terms and its extent covers the particular phenomenon in question,
having no general implications. The truth conditions for these
statements are the same as for the empirical-correlational hypotheses.
In contrast, secondary or theoretical sentences, as Massey
asserts, "though tied semantically to experience, do not enjoy the
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same direct relation thereto that characterized the basic sentences"
The terms contained in these sentences though referring to actual
events, are abstract entities and cover a wide and general domain.
The Keynesian theory of employment or the neoclassical theory of
consumer choice are cases in point. In both theories although the
terms involved describe an event occurring in the actual world, they
are constructed from a general and abstract point of view, approxi¬
mating and simplifying reality and bypassing all kinds of minor
observations. One cannot expect, for example, that the specified
consumption or investment functions in the Keynesian theory should be
rejected because a particular entrepreneur does not borrow when inter¬
est rates go down, or that a consumer does not act as specified in an
indifference map. As Nagel affirms "a theoretical statement having
this form is not proved to be false by showing that the specifications
in the antecedent are not embodied in some given spatiotemporal region"^.
In other words, the antecedent clause of such statements amasses the
dominant and general characteristics of a phenomenon and abstracts
from the less important ones. However, this does not mean that the
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assumption of a theory is in any way unrealistically false, i.e. that
there is no element at all in the real world denoting a maximizer of
economic returns. Theories are based upon general and simplified
observations related indirectly to reality and ordering its complex
manifestations. The truth conditions of such statements, as well
as of Fundamental Postulates, are empirical evidence directly testing
their predictions and indirectly their antecedent assumptions. (This
is one issue that divides Positive economists into an Assumptionist
group who want to test assumptions directly, and Predictionists who
want to test assumptions indirectly.) The important point to note
about these statements is that these assumptions approximate reality
and are true, i.e. have a bearing on reality. According to Nagel
"statements containing such terms [i.e. theoretical] cannot possibly
explain or predict the course of actual events, unless a sufficient
number of theoretical terms (but not necessarily all of them) are
co-ordinated with observable traits of things"^
However, in my view the difficulty with abstraction and
simplification in these statements, as in the case of Fundamental
Postulates, is that one does not know, at least a priori, the criteria
by which one is supposed to select the most important and leave out
the less important aspects of a phenomenon. Is the political aware¬
ness of the entrepreneur, or the knowledge about the nature of a
commodity, or advertising, important characteristics or not? Some
67 , , , 68 T
people argue that they are and some that they are not . It is
difficult to select between the two approaches because under different
criteria we have different definitions of importance. ~ Moreover we
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cannot, take the pragmatist position and argue that the most important
characteristics are the ones that work, because we need to select
some characteristics from an infinite array before we put them into
the pragmatic test. Besides, theories of the firm that are labelled
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'organizational' seem to be working as well as the neoclassical ones
The most important category of statements, as far as the
F-Twist controversy is concerned, relates to what has been commonly
called Fundamental Postulates. A collection of such postulates has
the significant property of structuring the context or the perspective
from which theories and hypotheses are generated, hence, what Melitz
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calls "generative assumptions" . These assumptions are what Weber
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called "ideal types" , or Robbins the "generalizations" of economic
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theory . Irrespective of whether one is a purely empirical or a
purely theoretical investigator, one always shapes one's empirical
hypotheses, or one draws one's theories, from the pool of such state¬
ments. For example, in the case of Neoclassical economics there are
certain assumptions such as 'rationality' and 'scarcity' that form the
pillars supporting the whole theoretical system. If 'irrationality'
of economic behaviour and 'abundance' is assumed, then the forcefulness
of the theories of the firm and of demand is greatly diminished.
The problem with these assumptions is their truth conditions.
Are they logically true (i.e. tautologies, empty of empirical meaning),
and therefore abide by the rules stipulating the truth conditions of
logical-conditional statements, or are they assumptions partly, submerged
in abstraction and partly in experience, in which case the validational
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procedure is different? As we shall see in the course of the section,
there is ambiguity as to the meaning and use of the term 'assumptions'.
If we take for instance the proposition "man is economically
rational because of scarcity" are we assuming that the proposition is
(a) only an ideal construct approximating reality, or (b) "descript¬
ively false" and used for heuristic purposes, or (c) a Marshallian
"representative" or "average" tendency, or lastly, (d) as Robbins
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claims, a "self-evident" universal proposition ? Whatever our answer
be to the above question, in each case there is an ambiguity which has
been an important factor in causing the persistence of the F-Twist
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controversy
If we take each one of the four cases we shall see that in
all of them always there are two elements involved: one purely logical
and one purely empirical. The purely logical concerns abstraction and
analytical function and the purely empirical concerns an ontological
(anthropological) statement about man in society. An ideal-construct,
for instance, contains an element of logical abstraction and an element
of empirical reality. 'Rational economic man', though extreme and
general, refers to a particular situation where one can envisage a
'real' rational economic man. This duality is also manifested in
'descriptively false' propositions whereby although one omits 'the
particular' details of an event, such as that some men may be economic¬
ally irrational, nevertheless one refers to the 'real' essence of this
event which may be remotely distant from manifest 'reality'. "The same
applies to Marshallian representativity. One represents in an average
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and abstract sense the manifestations of a 'real' tendency. Similarly
in the case of 'self-evident' truths, 'self-evident' refers to the
obviousness and generality of the proposition, which if not true for
a particular 'spatio-temporal region', still applies to most cases.
This characteristic is common to all four cases and it can be sub¬
sumed under the following idea: in all cases it is assumed that, on
the one hand although not all aspects of human activity are rational
it can still be considered that economically (in a fundamental sense)
man is rational, in order to derive, in conjunction with scarcity,
marginalistic hypotheses about changes and their effects (the logical
part), and on the other hand it is assumed that although there are
variations and degrees of rationality, man is ultimately a selective
animal, one that makes constrained choices (the ontological 'real'
part).
However, if the structure of such assumptions is comprised
of two antithetical elements, assumed versus real rationality, ideal
versus anthropological rationality, then to which one should truth
conditions be addressed? Do we need to empirically justify the
realism of the assumption that man is indeed ontologically rational?
And if we do not, what justifies the selection of this particular
postulate as opposed to any other one? For example, why can we not
replace the 'rationality' principle with the principle of a Marxian
'mode of production', or any other principle incorporating 'irrationality',
e.g. psychoanalysis, as a Fundamental Postulate? To say also that the
selection of the principle is justified a posteriori,i.e. through its
predictions or explanatory power or analytic capacity, is to simply beg
the question, because one is not given the criteria according to which
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the principle was selected among an infinity of potentially predictive,
explanatory and analytic principles. Also if the objection is that
the economist is not omniscient or that he/she cannot use all possible
alternatives at once, then why did he/she select the particular principle
of economic rationality, and why did he/she (presumably orthodox
economist) not use any other alternative principle since the emergence
of Neoclassical economics?
On the other hand, if the selection is done according to
purely logical principles, then the statement (according to positivist
principles) is tautologous, i.e. logically necessarily true, deductively
conceived, and it does not matter whether it is empirically unrealistic.
Man may not in reality be as portrayed in Neoclassical economics, but
the conception that emerges from the postulate of 'rationality' allows
the logical manipulation of theories, following deductive rules and
analytical procedures, and permitting their test only indirectly through
their predictions. As Friedman contends their value is heuristic and
their format "as if".
But is this the case? Are fundamental postulates purely
logical? If this is the case, then their terms can be exchanged by
other terms, with the same logical value, implying the same logical
relationship. For example, the proposition "if A=B=C then A=C " may
be easily converted to the proposition "if D=E=F then D=F ", without
making any logical difference. If this is the case, then why is
'rationality' a term always in the limelight while others are not?
Moreover, could the neoclassical set of terms be exchanged with any
other set of terms without making any logical difference? In other
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words could the term 'rationality' be exchanged without altering the
fundamental structure of the neoclassical system? I think not,
because Neoclassical economics focuses on 'rationality' as a real
situation, and justifies it with an appeal to ontological reality. But
if this is so then we have to turn to Fundamental Postulates contain¬
ing both logical and ontological elements, in which case the truth
conditions are again ambiguous. That is, should such an assumption
be empirically realistic or theoretically unrealistic? If both,
then one needs criteria to decide between the realism and the unreal-
ism of the assumption. In other words, one needs criteria in order
to demarcate how representative or approximate or descriptively false
of reality is the assumption. Are all men, some men, or none,
rational?
In my opinion this ambiguity provokes a dichotomy that splits
the economists between opposing camps supporting either the realism or
the unrealism of Fundamental Postulates. In fact, as has been noted
by Nagel and Massey, and as we shall see next, even within each camp
economists are ambiguous concerning the meaning of Fundamental
Postulates.
Having, therefore, distinguished between various kinds of
statements in Positive economics, and having indicated a clue towards
the understanding of the methodological conflict within, the paradigm,
I can now proceed to examine how Positive economists define and use
the meaning of Fundamental Postulates, in connection with this, conflict.
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b. THE REALISM OF THEORY AND THE THEORY OF UNREALISM
because we do not know the truth . . .
we make falsehood as much like truth as
we can. _
Plato, Republic
The fundamental question in this section is whether Friedman
and Samuelson are consistent in their use of the terms 'assumption'
and 'theory'. If they are not, my hypothesis will be that the
inconsistency derives from the above-mentioned ambiguity in the
structure of the term 'assumption'.
Does Friedman really mean that assumptions should be
unrealistic? And that the more unrealistic assumptions are, the
more fruitful they are in terms of the predictions they generate?
It is obvious from his remark that "the more significant the theory
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the more unrealistic the assumption" that, at the limit, the more
we abstract from empirical reality and we construct theories that
diverge from it, the more we can generate correct predictions about
empirical reality. At the limit, completely false theories, e.g.
that the earth is flat or that individuals act independently of each
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other's economic decisions , would generate the greatest number of
78
testable predictions
However, Friedman qualifies this seemingly paradoxical
consequence, i.e. false assumptions-correct predictions, by saying
that "the relevant question to ask about the 'assumptions' of a theory
is not whether they are descriptively 'realistic', for they never are,
79but whether they are sufficiently good approximations ..." . But
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what does Friedman mean by "assumptions"? From the context of what
he says he means Fundamental Postulates, in the sense described in
the previous section. For if he meant the antecedent clauses of
basic sentences or empirical-correlational hypotheses or theories (he
could not have meant logical-conditional statements because of the
objections raised in p.42), he would have had to concede to the
objection raised by Samuelson, Nagel and Melitz to the effect that
(empirically or logically) true consequences stem from true premises.
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Consequently if Friedman means Fundamental Postulates by "assumptions" ,
then there is sufficient leeway within the structure of these postulates
to allow him the implication of the 'unrealism' of assumptions.
The key words in the above quotation by Friedman are
"descriptively false", which means that for the purposes of theoretical
understanding and generality, reality is reconstructed ideally with
terms used either to approximate empirical description or reorder it
so as to give meaning to empirical phenomena. The maximization
principle (implying rationality) is a case in point whereby although
one does not encounter any real economic agent actually maximizing
profits or utility, reality is somehow represented approximately.
This principle, along with the rest of the abstract neoclassical
principles, provides the framework which, according to Friedman, can
be used to generate testable predictions.
However, the question remains whether the principle is truly
false or simply an approximation of true reality, and an ideal- construct
implying a divergence from reality at the limit? If we follow
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Friedman's theory of 'unrealism', the epistemological abstraction
(ideal-construct) is that 'false' assumptions (in an ideal sense)
generate potentially true predictions. For Friedman a good 'false'
assunption is differentiated from a bad one if it "works, which means
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whether it yields sufficiently accurate predictions" . However, as
I have already pointed out, we cannot know before the predictions are
generated, which 'false' assumptions to select.
Friedman answers by referring to the other side of
Fundamental Postulates, namely the one relating to the approximate and
ideal-type truth of assumptions. An assumption, according to this,
may be only descriptively false, meaning that its reality is embedded
in a remote empirical corner, abstracting from the inessential and
selecting the 'true' essential. Thus it seems that Friedman, although
he takes for granted that the assumptions will involve hypotheses such
as perfect competition or that every economic agent is a maximizer,
nevertheless thinks that these assumptions should also be tied to
actual rather than fictitious conditions. For example, independent
utility functions or perfect competition or economic maximizers might
not exist but it can be assumed as if they exist by way of approxima¬
tion, for the purposes in hand. 'By way of approximation' means
that there is some real entity which one simplifies by idealizing it.
Thus, apart from the indirect truth conditions stemming from
the testing of predictions, assumptions have a sort of direct truth
conditions, confirming the choice of the 'real entity', which-rely on
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"evidence of a very different kind" . For example evidence such as
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"intuitive plausibility" " , or that "a judgement may be required before
any satisfactory test . . . has been made, and, perhaps, when it cannot
be made in the near future, in which case, the judgement will have to
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be based on the inadequate evidence available" (my emphases), or
evidence of the nature that "unless the behaviour of businessmen in
some way or another approximated behaviour consistent with the maxim¬
ization of returns, it seems unlikely that they would remain in
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business for long" . These are some of the evidence or criteria
that Friedman uses for the a priori selection of assumptions.
However, there is a sort of ambiguity and inconsistency in
Friedman's epistemological dicta concerning assumptions in economics.
The ambiguity refers to what I have called the 'strong and the weak
axioms of the theory of unrealism'. The 'strong axiom' refers to
the choice of assumptions on the basis of prediction tests, and the
'weak axiom' to the choice of assumptions on the basis of largely
'intuitive', 'common-sense', 'self-evident' knowledge. While Friedman
feels secure when he talks about the 'strong axiom', because he knows
a
that what matters is predictive capacity irrespective of the realism
of assumptions, he feels less so when he realizes that assumptions must
somehow be selected and justified a_ priori, in which case he needs the
'weak axiom'. The reason he has to do so is that he has to believe in
some sort of ontological truth for his assumptions because they concern
human action. While with inanimate objects the "as if" formula
acquires a purely explanatory and analytical function (like Friedman's
leaves behaving "as if" they are maximizing their position in-relation
to the sun) with no real purposive action attributed to the object,
48
with human action the "as if" formula has both a fictitious, due to
the ideal form given by the theorist, and a real dimension, due to
8 6
the actual purposive action of human behaviour . Clearly the ambig¬
uity referred to as the 'strong and weak axioms of the theory of
unrealism', is due to the looseness of the definition of the term
'assumption', which does not contain a precise criterion as to the
realism or unrealism permitted in constructing economic postulates.
- On the other side of the controversy Samuelson reproaches
Friedman for his theory of unrealism, and insists on the reversal of
the two axioms. Namely that the strong axiom should be the realism
of assumptions and the weak axiom should be the testing of predictions.
As Samuelson claims "the whole force of my attack on the F-Twist . . .
is that the doughnut of empirical correctness in a theory constitutes
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its worth, while its hole of untruth constitutes its weakness"
But before I examine Samuelson's position vis a vis the ambiguity
involved in the definition of Fundamental Postulates, I shall firstly
examine what he means when he employs the term 'assumption'.
Paradoxically Samuelson uses the term 'assumption' in the
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same way Friedman does . Why is he then insisting on testing the
premise before testing the conclusion? If he was claiming for this
only, then by 'assumption' he would have meant logical-conditional
statements whereby conclusions are already implied in the premises,
or primitive-basic sentences whereby both assumptions and conclusions
require empirical confirmation. However, Samuelson does not mean
these kinds of statements when he says that "Every theory . . .
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distorts reality in that it over-simplifies" , therefore implying
90 91 92
that 'assumptions' may 'idealise' or 'abstract' or 'approximate'
in which case by 'assumptions' he really means Fundamental Postulates
More exactly he means1those conditions that function as parameters in
given system, and act as the Fundamental Postulates of the system.
That is "values [of unknown variables] emerge as a solution of a speci
fied set of relationships imposed upon the unknowns by assumption or
hypothesis ... we assume implicitly amatrix of conditions within
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which our analysis is to take place" . This matrix of conditions,
according to Samuelson, boils down to the principle of maximization.
Meaningful, i.e. refutable, theorems are deduced largely from this
94
principle . "Many of these stability conditions rest implicitly
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upon maximizing behaviour" . Having said that he goes on to argue
that this principle can be used as an assumption "even though it is
admittedly not a case of any individual's behaving in a maximizing
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manner" , because, as he puts it in a different context, "to say
'Galileo's ball rolls down the inclined plane as if to minimize the
integral of action or to minimize Hamilton's integral', does prove
to be useful to the observing physicists, eager to formulate
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predictable uniformities of nature"
But then, if assumptions, or conditions, can be formulated
in an 'as if' manner, or act as ideal constructs, or approximating
realities, exactly as Friedman prescribes, where is the controversy?
How does Samuelson differ from Friedman? Why should Samuelson answer
by claiming that he is "objecting to the requirement that a usefully
realistic theory must be completely accurate? Who seriously thinks
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otherwise?" Or that his "own position never rejected approximating
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concepts" , but that "the validity of the full consequences of a
theory implies the validity of the theory and so of its minimal
assumptions"'"". Thus, although Samuelson accepts 'descriptively
false' assumptions diverging from empirical reality, he differs from
Friedman in that he admits only plausible rather than false assumptions.
However, it has been shown that Friedman also finally, but not
decisively, accepted the intuitive plausibility of assumptions.
Is the controversy then only a verbal misunderstanding?
I think not. The controversy is about a substantial issue borne from
the dichotomy implied in the definition of Fundamental Postulate.
If, as indicated above, a Fundamental Postulate is a sort of assumption
containing terms that are considered, in a sense, both true, i.e.
plausible, approximate, evident; and false, i.e. ideal, as if, descript¬
ively false, unrealistic, then the ambiguity and tension resulting from
the imprecise specification (a specification which, however, as we shall
see in chapter 7, is inherently imprecise due to an ambiguity in the
whole of Positive economics) of the criteria under which such a postu¬
late may be said to be realistic or unrealistic, allows the possibility
of incompatible interpretations and therefore controversy'"'.
In my view although in both sides of the debate economic
assumptions and their properties are defined more or less in a similar
way, nonetheless the split between unrealistic abstraction and realistic
plausibility, produces a tension that keeps the controversy unresolved.
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Again at the limit, i.e. at the point where the opposing factions
argue about the significance of false (and not only descriptively
false) assumptions versus the significance of empirically true (and
not only approximately true) assumptions, the tension becomes more
clear-cut. For example, reviewers of the controversy refer to the
102
opposing schools as "extreme a_ priorists" and "ultra-empiricists"
However, these extreme positions, although closer to older methodo¬
logical conflicts, do not apply in the case of the F-Twist controversy.
In the latter a more balanced position is taken and the tension is
significantly contained within the limits of having to find an appro¬
priate (and most of the time unstable) equilibrium between theory and
experience.
Having said that, it must be remembered that despite
differences displayed in the controversy concerning, as Samuelson puts
it, "the relationships between observable reality and the various
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assertions made by the scientific theory" , the truth remains that
the controversants are united in their positivist epistemological
belief that, although theory is important, it is always empirical
facts that have the last word. In the words of Friedman "Only factual
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evidence can show whether (a theory) is 'right' or 'wrong'" , and of
Samuelson's "Let experience tell the final story"^ .
To be able to see whether indeed "factual evidence" or
"experience" constitutes the ultimate judge of Positive economic
theories, we have to examine its status in practice in its role as a
resolver of a major economic controversy. This, however, will be the
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task of Part II. In the meanwhile we have first to examine the
nature of empirical evidence and experience in general and as used in
economics, and second to juxtapose a different epistemology (embracing
a different and perhaps alternative set of Fundamental Postulates)
which defines a different status and role for empirical facts.
C. CONCLUSION
The continuing persistence of the F-Twist controversy has
been a puzzle to many students of economic methodology^^. Although
different kinds of explanation may be given for the stalemate*^, it
seems to me that a plausible one relates to the ambiguity and result¬
ing tension, that characterises the definition and structure of
Fundamental Postulates, and their use in Positive economics.
However, as I shall attempt to show in Part III, this
tension is not only situated in the Fundamental Postulates of Positive
economics, but is part of a larger tension that springs out of a fund¬
amental dichotomy running through the epistemological and economic
assumptions of Positive economics as a whole. This dichotomy, produc¬
ing a major tension, is necessitated by the positivist epistemological
decision, in the face of the Inductive and Deductive problems, to make
a complete breakdown, or thorough separation in the categories of
theory and reality, between an abstract and a concrete, an imaginary
and a real.
Consequently, the ambiguity in the definition of Fundamental
Postulates cannot be resolved because it is a structural one, inherently
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"For what can be imagin'd more tormenting than to
seek with eagerness, what forever flies us; and seek for




THE NATURE OF EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
A. INTRODUCTION
In the preceding chapter I presented the structure of the
methodology of Positive economics and focused on the place of theory
in it. This led me to examine the nature of theory in Positive
economics. The conclusion of this examination was that there are
two fundamental interpretations of the nature of theory within Positive
economics: one unrealistic and one realistic. A consequence of this
division is, as we saw, the F-Twist controversy. The irresolution of
the controversy led me to the observation that the conflict is due to
an ambiguity in the meaning and use of the term 'Fundamental Postulate'
or 'assumption'. I further hinted that this ambiguity is irreconcil¬
able because it is dependent upon a fundamental contradiction
structurally embedded in Positive economics. This contradiction
arises out of the positivist split between, what I shall call in chap¬
ter 7, epistemology (the conception of the world) and ontology (the
world itself).
However, postponing further discussion on this issue until
Part III, I shall now turn to examine the nature of the other half of
the structure of Positive economics, namely empirical testing and evid¬
ence. In Figure I of the previous chapter, we saw that the upper part
of the diagram shows the construction of theoretical models, while the
lower part shows the place and role of empirical evidence. As mentioned
in the above paragraph, Positive economists of both sides are
characterised by an ambivalence in deciding whether the nature of
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assumptions (behind models) should be purely theoretical or purely
empirical. The general tendency is in favour of the theoretical
with some anchorage in empirical reality. However, despite this
agreement there are no precise criteria offered for determining the
exact proportions of theory and experience in the formation of
assumptions, with the consequent ambiguity producing rival interpret¬
ations. As we shall see in this chapter, this ambivalence or
ambiguity characterises also the nature of empirical evidence, this
time manifested in a reverse manner. In this case it is the
empirical part of the dichotomy that plays the prominent role.
Facts are mostly empirical but they need theories in order to acquire
meaning. In addition, empirical evidence is couched within proposit¬
ions that contain theoretical terms. For example the proposition
that money lags behind income though referring to the empirical
presupposes terms such as 'money' and 'income' the meaning of which
depends upon an assumed theoretical paradigm. The exact proportions
2
of experience and theory in empirical propositions are also ambiguous
and alternative interpretations give rise to controversies within
Positive economics, such as for example the Monetary controversy.
An important point to note is that in addition to the reversal of the
ambiguity, empirical evidence differs from theory, according to Posit¬
ive economics, in that it is supposed to reflect reality and thus to
offer the sole criterion of accepting or rejecting a given theory.
In other words, the status of empirical evidence vis a vis theories
is assymetrical: empirical evidence tests theories but not the other
way around.
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The whole idea expounded above can be presented schematically.
In Figure II I have summarised the validational procedure shown in
Figure I and I have connected it to the ambiguities arising from the
dual nature of its terms. The left-hand side of the diagram represents
the model of scientific inference in Positive economics, and the right-
hand side shows the definitions (and ambiguities) of its parts. I have
used capital and small letters to signify the relative prominence of
•empirical' and 'theoretical' in the structure of assumptions and
empirical evidence. Furthermore, I have depicted the interrelations
that exist between the two structures. The one manifested in the
connection between 'EMPIRICAL' and 'THEORETICAL', with the former play¬
ing the leading role, and in the connection between 'empirical' and
•theoretical' with the latter playing the leading role. In other
words, in the former case it is experience that renders a theory
ultimately valid, whereas in the latter case it is the 'theoretical'
that gives meaning to experience while the 'empirical' grounds theory
to the earth.
FIGURE II: AMBIGUITIES IN THE STRUCTURE OF THEORY AND
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS
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Having therefore accounted for the 'theoretical' part of
Positive economics, I now_turn to examine the nature of the 'empirical'
part. In doing this I shall first examine its justification, i.e. the
philosophical problem of justifying induction. This examination will
provide the context wihin which to discuss the ambiguities stemming
from the definition of empirical evidence in Positive economics. In
addition, it will provide some hints as to the fundamental contradict¬
ions in Positive economics. Furthermore, I shall discuss the
positivist proposition of the independence between theory and evidence
in a general, i.e. philosophic, and in a specific, i.e. Positive
economic, way. Lastly, I shall comment on the question whether the
representation of reality by empirical evidence is, firstly, logically
sufficient and, secondly, actually reliable.
B. INDUCTION
a. THE PROBLEM OF INDUCTION ,
Perhaps the most relevant and fundamental question to ask
concerning scientific validation in Positive economics is whether it
is logically justified. We saw in the previous chapter that this
procedure consists of testing economic theories with empirical evidence.
In other words Positive economists are continuously confronting proposi-
§
tions containing theoretical terms with propositions containing empirical
terms. They carry on this procedure by assuming that it is justified
and permitted to draw valid inferences from empirical to theoretical
propositions. But is it?
To some people this question might seem remotely distant from
any practical and 'real' economic issues, and therefore irrelevant.
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However, how can Positive economics claim rational (as opposed to
metaphysical) status unless it has explicit criteria that render the
produced economic knowledge logically valid? Perhaps one could argue
that even though physics has not justified induction, nonetheless it
does enjoy scientific status. But as we shall see, the Principle of
Induction involves an assumption which stipulates uniformity in
3
nature , and at least prima facie, it seems that this assumption is
4
truer in physics than in economics . In consequence economics is
faced not only with the problem of justifying induction, but also
with the problem of justifying the legitimate application of induction
on economic phenomena. Difficulty in using induction in economics is
manifested in problems such as identification-specification and
ceteris paribus clauses*'. Additionally, if Positive economics is to
claim that it is an empirical science, it needs more than others to
justify induction. If it propounds that theories ought to be tested
by empirical evidence, then it has to bring positive evidence to sup¬
port this proposition. If it does then it has first to solve the
Problem of Induction before it accepts the procedure. If it does not
then it must accept the metaphysical nature of the proposition, since
it is couched in 'ought' rather than in 'is' terms. But if meta¬
physical propositions are meaningless according to Positive economics,
then obviously Positive economics must be itself meaningless. It
seems therefore highly relevant and urgent for Positive economics to
have a justification of induction. As Culbertson emphasizes,
"Evidently our methodological problems bring us to head-on confrontation
with the basic problem of empirical studies, the problem of justifying
induction . . . Yet, this seems not to have been achieved."^.
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The question therefore is important and relevant for any
system of thought that attempts to acquire valid knowledge. As
Hollis and Nell confirm, "we would . . . have to have a solution to
7
the Inductive Problem without which no theory can be tested at all" .
Even more, it would not be an exaggeration to say that the Problem of
Induction is important and relevant not only to science but also to
everyday life. As Russell points out,
The general principles of science, such as the belief in
the reign of law, and the belief that every event must have
a cause, are as completely dependent upon the inductive
principle as are the beliefs of daily life ® .
The Inductive Principle refers to inferences that go from
particular to general propositions. The Problem of Induction refers
to the justification and validity of such inferences. If we define
particular propositions as those propositions containing terms that
relate to members of a given set of events and general propositions
as those containing terms that relate to the whole, then the Problem
of Induction can be stated thus: what guarantees that what holds for
members of the set will also hold for the whole set? In the words of
Hollis and Nell, "We must be justified in projecting the sample into
9
the population" .
The difficulty with justifying induction is in the kind of
evidence that we seek in order to make the justification. If we seek
empirical evidence we are obviously begging the question, because we
are trying to justify induction with induction. If we seek theoretical
evidence then we either refer to a general law proving induction or to
a logical principle rendering induction self-evident. If, however, we
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take the case of the general law as proof, then there is neither
a priori evidence (as this would involve a petitio principi) nor
empirical evidence (as this would involve the Problem of Induction)
that guarantees that the general law will hold in the future^. If,
in turn, we take the case that logical principles guarantee induction,
then we find that there is also nothing to guarantee the truth or the
self-evidence of logical principles. As Russell confirms, "induction
is an independent logical principle, incapable of being inferred either
from experience or from other logical principles"^'''. The consequence
of this impasse is that since the Problem of Induction cannot be solved
by a priori or empirical arguments, then we cannot know why we do what
we do. As Joan Robinson appropriately puts it, "Why do I believe
12
what I believe about what is that makes me believe it?"
This, however, creates problems for the Positive economists
who want to be rational (i.e. to know and have reasons why what they
do is valid) and test theories with empirical reality. To alleviate
this burden therefore an implicit assumption is made in order to justify
induction. This assumption relates to the uniformity of the world.
By it we assume that occurrences in the past hold in the future because
the world remains unchanged. Belief in this assumption involves a
theoretical antecedent that states that "everything that has happened
or will happen is an instance of some general law to which there are no^
13
exceptions" . However, besides difficulties involved with the truth
of the proposition itself, there are difficulties with trying to see if
it is a kind of legitimate evidence that may justify induction: As
previously, if the proposition is taken to be true according to empirical
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evidence, then this creates an infinite regress as far as the Problem
of Induction is concerned. If it is taken to be true a priori then
another infinite regress is created since we would need another a priori
proposition to support the initial one. If, on the other hand it is
taken to be a synthetic a_ priori proposition, then it goes against the
positivist position that analytic and synthetic propositions are clearly
14
distinguished . As far as the intrinsic validity or the self-evidence
of the proposition is concerned, it is not at all clear how we can find
criteria to say that because a law held in the past it would also hold
in the future, because this would merely reassert the Problem of
Induction. Moreover this belief involves more problems in the social
sciences whereby the difficulty of finding immutable laws is notorious^.
As Russell says,
The man who has fed the chicken every day throughout its
life at last wrings its neck instead, showing that more
refined views as to the uniformity of nature would have
been useful to the chicken 16 .
Other approaches to the Problem of Induction, such as induction
by enumeration or by elimination, also seem to have failed, because
irrespective of how many instances one has found confirming a correl¬
ation, or how many disconfirmatory instances one has eliminated, there
are neither logical nor empirical reasons to justify the generalization
17
that the same association will occur in the future
It follows from the above that once we cannot know with
certainty that what has occurred in the past will also occur in the
future, the only way to hold such a belief is to attach to it, in
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Keynes' words, "a rational belief of the appropriate degree" , i.e. a
probability. In other words, since we cannot know demonstratively
that a conjunction of two events, or a theory incorporating it, will
hold true in the future, we assign to it a probability or a likelihood,
warranted by the evidence, that it will do so. Evidence of the kind
that since, for example, in most instances it has been found that
changes in money precede changes in .income, then it is reasonable to
argue that in all probability money will precede income in the next
instance. However, in offering probability as a solution to the
Problem of Induction there arise the following two difficulties:
Firstly, our belief that the frequency of a conjunction of events con¬
stitutes evidence for its probable recurrence, is a belief supported
by evidence of the type that 'this method has been shown to work in
the past'. This, however, being close to the pragmatist.solution,
introduces a circularity in the argument that prevents it from being
used as a solution to the Inductive Problem. Therefore, and this is
the second difficulty, since this belief cannot be inductive it has to
be deductive, i.e. theoretical. As Strawson puts it, "It is an analytic
proposition that it is reasonable to have a degree of belief in a state-
19
ment, which is proportional to the strength of the evidence in its favour"
But this reduces the justification of induction to deduction, and as
Braithwhaite says, "The doubt as to whether we have any reason to rely
upon inductive procedure ... is not a sensible doubt to be allayed by
20
postulating a 'supreme major premise'" . To assimilate induction to
deduction, however, requires the justification of the certainty and
validity of the deduction, in which case one could bring neither inductive
nor deductive evidence. It seems therefore that if the idea of
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probability cannot be supported by empirical evidence, because of the
Problem of Induction, then we have to turn to a theoretical assumption
21
that might provide some fundamental certainty from which to start off
According to Barker,
Unless something is certain, nothing can be probable.
There must somewhere be a bedrock foundation upon which
we can build. Unless some basic evidence is certain,
we shall have at best only a web of relative probabil¬
ities hanging in air, insufficient to establish that
any hypothesis really is rationally credible. 22
Keynes' purpose in his "Treatise on Probability" was "to give prior
23
probabilities that would justify inductive inference" . That is,
Keynes attempted to establish a logical relationship between empirical
24
and theoretical propositions that is embedded in human rationality
It follows, therefore, that a statement involving
probabilities is based upon an assumption which turns out to be theo-
25
retical . Accordingly, if we were asked to justify the truth of
this assumption, we would have to find criteria that would be able to
26
solve the regress created were we to justify it by further assumptions
27
Thus it seems that probability presupposes the Problem of Induction
As Keynes himself in the end admits,
In my judgement, the practical usefulness of those modes
of inference, here termed universal and statistical induct¬
ion, on the validity of which the boasted knowledge of
modern science depends, can only exist - and I do not now
pause to inquire again whether such an argument must be
circular - if the universe of phenomena does in fact
present those peculiar characteristics of atomism and
limited variety. 28
Thus since probability involves a_ priori justification, it cannot be
accepted by the thorough-going empiricist who must justify induction
73
by induction, unless he accepts the validatory powers of theory and
logic.
It would take at least one more thesis if I were to continue
reviewing all the possible solutions that have been attempted in order
to tackle the Problem of Induction. Different people in different
29
ways have offered different solutions to the puzzle . Indicative of
the confusion and ambiguity created by the Problem of Induction and
the variety of solutions attempted is the following quotation by
Lazerowitz, who having reviewed the various positions concludes that,
Some practiced philosophical thinkers are convinced that
there is a problem of justifying induction . . . Other
practiced thinkers are equally certain that there is a
problem . . . while others think it is unreasonable to
ask for ... a justification of induction . . . Still
other philosophers are undecided about whether there is
a problem . . . some think it has not yet been solved.
Others are persuaded that it has been solved, but they
are not decided on what the solution is. 30
Sufficient however for my purposes in this section is to
indicate that the problem is (a) fundamental, and (b) if not un-
solvable, at least ambiguous. Firstly, it is fundamental because it
presupposes the rationality, i.e. the logical justification, of any
system of thought, and secondly, it is ambiguous because it eludes any
type of justification. The consequence of these two characteristics
of the problem is a contradiction facing a system of beliefs, such as
Positive economics, that wants to be rational and yet cannot find a
rational way for justifying why it believes what it believes. This
contradiction, as we shall see in chapter 7, generates problems, such
as rival definitions of what has to be theory and evidence, that have
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to be solved if the system is to be at all viable. The 'solutions'
31
to these problems - which I would rather call mediations , because
they are not unambiguous solutions but only concessions (conscious or
unconscious) to the contradiction; hybrid forms of terms involved in
the contradiction, that enable the system to establish itself as
viable - form the building-blocks of the entire edifice of any system
of beliefs. However, as these building-blocks are ambiguously formed,
they offer themselves to ambiguous interpretations and thus to polar
views and unsolvable conflict.
Finally, the ambiguity in the justification of the Principle
of Induction lends itself to problems regarding the nature of evidence
and particularly the nature of empirical evidence. That is, there are
difficulties in being able to assign the status of valid evidence to
a particular proposition, and difficulties, in the case of empirical
evidence, to decide what constitutes observations of empirical phenomena
and what does not. In what follows I shall try to review some of these
problems, relate them to the Problem of Induction and then, in the
following section, see how they affect Positive economics.
b. EVIDENCE AND OBSERVATION
If we assume, for a moment, that the Problem of Induction has
been solved and that we are now justified to make inductive inferences,
then the question arises as to what we can legitimately call inductive
and what not. In other words what logical criteria are there to tell
us how to discriminate between propositions that are purely empirical
and propositions that are purely theoretical?
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As far as the positivist syndrome, well placed within the
physical sciences and economics, is concerned, undoubtedly there are
such criteria. The empirical should relate to the observable and the
theoretical to the unobservable. According to Carnap the language of
science is divided into two parts:
The observation language and the theoretical language
[where] the observation language uses terms designating
observable properties for the description of observable
things and events [and] the theoretical language [uses]
terms which may refer to unobservable events . . .32.
Observation of an object is possible through our sense experience of
the properties of the object. In a sense the object emanates data of
which we become aware through our senses, while the object itself
33
remains unknown . According to Russell awareness of these sense
data is direct and does not involve any inference. In other words,
we do not need any previous knowledge or any intermediate process with
34
which to become acquainted with sense data . In short, our awareness
35
of sense data can be neither true nor false, it is simply there
However, is the perception of sense data the same as the
observation of an object? According to Ryle we must make a conceptual
36
distinction between sensation and observation . Sensations entail a
direct awareness of the epiphenomenal properties of an object, which
comes to us by experiencing it, whereas observations entail some kind
of question we have put forth about something which we want to find out,
thus involving previous judgements implying truth and falsity. As
Ryle suggests, "to be observing something the observer must also at
37
least be trying to find something out" . In addition observation
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differs from sensation in that it also involves description. When
we are observing an object we are describing its properties or its
external behaviour. If this is so, then, according to Russell,
"Knowledge of things by description . . . always involves . . . some
38
knowledge of truths as its source and ground" . In consequence,
if observations imply (a) a judgement of that about which we are
39
making our observations , and (b) a judgement of the truth of a_
priori statements needed for describing a state of affairs, then it
is very difficult to support the claim that propositions containing
observational terms are distinct from propositions containing theoret¬
ical terms, let alone support the claim that the former propositions
40
test the latter
In view of such difficulties many proposals have been put
forth offering criteria that could enable one to distinguish between
observables and unobservables. For instance, Spector in reviewing
some of these proposals, quotes Hempel who brings forth as a criterion
of valid observation the "degree of agreement . . . different observers,
by means of direct observation" can assign to their "observational
vocabulary" which includes "subjective impressions, inter-subjective
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sense-data and finally gross physical objects and their properties
No doubt many other criteria could be proposed in terms of which the
42
independence between theory and observation could be safeguarded
However, according to the critics, most of these criteria seem unsatis¬
factory. Feyerabend, for instance, does not ascribe any "special
content" to observational statements. He claims that,
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If there is a difference between them and other
statements, then this difference is provided by the
psychological or physiological or physical
circumstances of their production. 43
Or Hayek claims that "the properties possessed by the concrete
objects" do not necessarily belong to these objects, but they are
44
created by the classificatory function of the brain . The point of
these criticisms is that the objectivity designated to empirical
observations is weakened by the fact that the process of making
observations is inferential and derivative, and thus includes judgements
and subjectivity. According to Barker,
The whole notion of direct observation is an
extremely hazy one. In the nature of the case, it
will be impossible to draw any sharp and definite
distinction . . , between what is and what is not
directly observed; insofar as a distinction is.so
drawn as to be plausible, it will be indefinite;
and to make it more definite would be to drav; a
line that would be implausibly artificial and
arbitrary. 45
Consequently, the much needed independence between theories and
observations for the positivist validation procedure is broken. What
remains is a dependence which prevents empirical observations from
being used as evidence for the validation of theories. However, some¬
one could argue, as Nagel does, that although empirical observations
are dependent on theories this does not mean that a particular theory
should be included among the set of theories upon which observations
46
are supposed to depend . This criterion, however, leaves much to be
desired since, firstly, it does not tell us how we shall know whether
the particular theory to be tested is or is not among the theories
that determine the observations, and secondly, according to Kuhn's
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theory of the paradigmatic nature of science, it is difficult to
separate a theory from the observations, since the latter are per¬
ceived from the point of view of the paradigm that furnish the
theory in question. Thus Nagel's criterion cannot be sustained
as a valid criterion for separating between theory and observation.
This brief review of the difficulties encountered in
empirical observation was not meant to be exhaustive and offer a
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comprehensive account of the different stands in this controversy ,
but merely to point out that empirical observation, and hence empirical
evidence, is not a straightforward matter, as Positive economists pre¬
sent it, but one which involves many problems. These problems coupled
with the ambiguities due to the Problem of Induction, contribute
directly to the explanation of conflict in Positive economics. In
fact the theory-fact problem seems to be directly linked to the Induct¬
ive Problem. That is, an empirical proposition containing observational
terms needs something other than another empirical proposition to support
its logical status and validity. It needs a proposition that would
include a_ priori judgements and thus theory. Hence, logically,
empirical observation is dependent on theory, and the independent
48
status of empirical evidence is put into question . In assessing
the relation of these problems to conflict in economics I shall examine
how these difficulties affect the structure of Positive economics and
produce inherent tensions.
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C. INDUCTION AND POSITIVE ECONOMICS
a. THE PROBLEM OF JUSTIFYING INDUCTION IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS
Even if Positive economists are not explicitly aware of the
existence of the difficulties created by the Problem of Induction, the
assumption of rationality behind the testing procedure they use
obliges them to justify the choice of such a procedure. The most
common and widely favoured justification is the pragmatist one. This
justification rationalizes the procedure by stating that the success
of the Principle of Induction in the past is a sufficient criterion
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for its success in the future . Since, in other words, the correl¬
ation between money and income is indeed found to project well in the
future, this proves that induction works well. If a theory has pre¬
dicted well in the past it will also predict well in the future, thus
justifying induction. Success of the predictions of an hypothesis
with observed phenomena increases the probability of its success with
unobserved ones, and this makes the hypothesis a preferable one.
The important assumption for Friedman is "whether the theory works,
which means whether it yields sufficiently accurate predictions""^.
However, there are two logical points that seem to go
against this position. Firstly, if we assume that a theory is success¬
ful because it works, then we cannot produce any argument to sustain
the belief that it will go on working. We cannot do this because if
we brought more empirical evidence to support the hypothesis, that
would not be more than blatantly repeating the problem afresh. The
hypothesis works well because it works well. But what logical
assurance do we have that it will go on working well? The answer is:
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let us wait and see. If the hypothesis does not work well for
unobserved cases then we shall reject it and choose another one. But
the answer really evades the question because even if the hypothesis
works well in the future there is nothing to guarantee that in a fresh
instance it would go on working. The confirmation of the hypothesis
does not render the hypothesis valid^. Secondly, the procedure it¬
self, i.e. testing hypotheses by confirming their predictions with
experience, cannot be justified by saying that it has worked in the
past because this would mean that the pragmatist position is justified
52
by appealing again to the pragmatist position . It seems therefore,
that the belief in testing hypotheses with predictions is nothing else
but a faithful expectation, with neither logical nor empirical criteria
53
to support it . A contradictory position it seems for someone such
as a Positive economist who does not accept the validity of faith and
metaphysics.
Furthermore, if the Positive economist is pressed to defend
the argument, he/she would have to turn to a position admitting theories
the role of the guarantor of future predictive capacity. Thus Lipsey
says,
Some sequence of events, some regularity between two or
more things is observed in the real world and someone
asks why this should be so. A theory attempts to
explain why ... a theory enables us to predict as yet
unobserved events. 54
But what does this position amount to if we take into consideration
that, firstly, a theory cannot justify induction as this would imply
that the Deductive riddle has been solved, i.e. a better theory was
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found to validate the initial theory, and secondly, that if inductive
criteria are insufficient to validate a theory (due to the Problem of
Induction), then how can we choose between alternative theories, when
in fact Positive economics describes theories as tautologous and
empty, acquiring meaning only through their application to experience^?
Any simple and logically consistent theory can be as good as any other
since by being labelled tautologous, its terms can be replaced by
another set of terms without altering the tautologous relationship.
For instance, if we cannot be justified in supporting the Quantity
Theory of Money on the basis of its predictive capacity, since we do
not know why we should do this, then the relationship MV=PT can be
AB B
replaced by any other tautologous relationship such as AB=—without
making any difference whatsoever. The upshot of the argument is that
once a Positive economist thinks of theories as empty he cannot use them
as guarantors of the continuation of a given conjunction of events into
the future^.
Similarly, the two arguments implied in the positivist
position to the effect that a hypothesis is validated either by confirm¬
ing its predictions with experience or by succeeding in not being
disconfirmed by counter evidence, seem also to impose the Problem of
Induction anew, without coming closer to a solution. If by confirm¬
ation is meant the number of successes a hypothesis has had in making
correct predictions, then the mere quantitative addition of confirm¬
atory instances will not alter the qualitative nature of the problem.
That is, even if we have 100 per cent of the cases for a particular
hypothesis being confirmed, this will not guarantee its confirmation in
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the future . The Phillips curve is a case in point whereby although
Phillips, Lipsey and other empirical researchers found instances con¬
firming the hypothesis, it proved that in the next instance the inverse
% 58
conjunction of price and unemployment rates did not hold . If, on
the other hand, by confirmation is meant failure of the hypothesis to
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be contradicted , in which case the hypothesis is tentative and sub¬
ject to continuous testing, then a different problem arises. According
to this position, taken after Popper, a hypothesis is scientifically
validated, if it is falsifiable. This methodological assumption is
quite popular among Positive economists who claim that "Positive
economics . . . deals with statements that could conceivably be shown
to be wrong (i.e. falsified) by actual observations of the world"^.
Although Popper's theory of falsification does overcome the problems
of confirmation, it does not however provide a satisfactory solution
to the Inductive Problem^. The Problem of Induction arises because
confirmation does not guarantee the re-occurrence of the hypothesis,
whereas falsification implies that the non-recurrence of the hypo¬
thesis is evidence for its refutation. However, the occurrence or
the non-recurrence of an hypothesis is calibrated in terms of propos¬
itions that contain empirical observations of events. Popper in
fact modifies the vulgar empiricist tradition and accepts the theory
dependence of empirical observations. However, despite this modifi¬
cation he is still faced with the problem of justifying the validity
of these propositions containing the observations. Why should a
particular observational proposition claiming the non-recurrence of
an hypothesis be more valid than one opposing it? Clearly, to invoke
theory as a selection criterion would be circular for Popper who
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considers theories as refutable conjectures. Also to invoke another
observational proposition would be again circular, since the Problem
of Induction is reasserted. Thus, in fact, Popper's solution of the
Problem of Induction presupposes it in a circular and arbitrary
fashion^.
Thus, if the above are true and confirmation and falsification
are logically unattainable, then Positive economists find themselves in
a limbo since they cannot justify the rationality of the methodology
that in fact expounds rationality as the fundamental building block of
scientific knowledge. The contradiction is, of course, latent and
manifests itself in the rationalizations that Positive economists make
in order to cover it. For instance, Positive economists try to hold
on the distinction that separates analytic or theoretical from synthetic
or empirical propositions. They claim that because of this independ¬
ence and because empirical evidence is more trustworthy than theories
as it is the outcome of observing reality - the former ought to test
the latter. However, as we shall see, due to the Problem of Induction,
this distinction is not clear, and in practice (i.e. in the definition
Positive economists give of empirical evidence) mixed ideas mediate for
the contradiction implied in designating empirical evidence as a
reliable and justified criterion of validation.
Thus, there arise two questions: firstly, do Positive
economists in theory and practice follow the prescribed dichotomy be¬
tween theory and fact, and secondly, irrespective of the position taken
by Positive economists, can this dichotomy be sustained in economics?
In the following section I shall attempt to comment on these questions.
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b. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE AND POSITIVE ECONOMISTS
The methodological premise of distinguishing analytic from
synthetic statements is important because it renders empirical testing
and Positive economics according to Coddington's account of it, "a_
consequential activity, i.e. an activity having definite and un¬
ambiguous implications for the theory in question"^. It seems
therefore essential for Positive economists, (a) to define the terms
analytic and synthetic, and (b) to show that the distinction holds
true. Having seen in chapter 1 that the analytic part of the distinct¬
ion has not been unambiguously defined, I now turn to examine whether
the synthetic part is clearly postulated.
What do Positive economists mean by a synthetic proposition?
According to Coddington's account of Positive economics, it is "some¬
thing which is variously referred to as 'facts', 'evidence', 'experience'
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or 'observation'" . All these terms serve to denote reality against
which theories ought to be tested. The questions that arise, however,
from such a definition of reality are: (i) do the terms represent
reality, and (ii) do Positive economists use these terms unambiguously?
The question whether empirical facts represent reality will be tackled
in section C within the context of a Marxist critique of empiricism.
Also the question whether empirical facts represent reality reliably
will be tacked in section D. But first I shall discuss the question
of the ambiguity of empirical evidence.
The strong aura of empiricism that pervades Positive- economics
suggests that synthetic propositions contain pure empirical facts that
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are independent of the theoretician using them. When Positive
economists proclaim the independence between theory and facts they do
that because it is essential for the validity of empirical testing..
However, are they unequivocal with this distinction when they define
'empirical' and relate it to the 'theoretical'? From their methodo¬
logical writings it seems they are not. For instance, although they
would claim that theory is "a set of tautologies" or "analytical fil¬
ing system" and that "Factual evidence alone can show whether the
categories of 'analytical filing system' have a meaningful empirical
counterpart"65, thus implying the independence between the two, they
would also try to qualify it by saying that "A theory is the way we
#6
perceive 'facts', and we cannot perceive 'facts' without a theory" ",
Another example of this inconsistency comes from Samuel son who, on the
one hand argues that "Every science is based squarely ©n induction
on observation of empirical facts . , , deduction has the modest
linguistic role of translating certain empirical hypotheses into their
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'logical equivalents'" , while on the other hand he argues that "how
we perceive the observed facts depends on the theoretical spectacles
we wear ... To a degree we are prisoners of our theoretical
68
preconceptions" (my emphasis).
But are these qualifications tenable for Positive economists
who cannot afford any sort of interdependence once the consequential
activity of testing is propounded? Either empirical facts are theory-
free and may test theories, or they are theory-laden and may not test
theories. Therefore it seems that Positive economists are inconsistent
in claiming the methodological validity of the empirical testing of
theories and the independence between theory and fact, which is needed
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for that methodology, and yet acknowledging the necessity of using
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theories to interpret facts . Nonetheless, this inconsistency is
mediated by the positivist. idea that theory plays a very small,
linguistic-analytical, role. Thus, Positive economists in defining
facts and their relation to theory, produce a structure that is the
reverse of the structure of assumptions, as defined in the previous
chapter. Whereas assumptions are mostly theoretical with some
empirical correspondence, facts are considered to be mostly empirical
with some connection to theory (thus the emphasis in 'degree' in
Samuelson's quotation; see Figure II on p.65). As with the defini¬
tion of assumptions so with the definition of facts, there is an
ambiguity stemming from this inconsistency. The ambiguity refers to
the lack of criteria for determining the precise content and proportion
of the EMPIRICAL-theoretical mixture (see Figure II) in the definition
of empirical facts. How much theoretical should the interpretation of
empirical facts be? The consequence of this ambiguity is to contribute
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to the irresolution of the Monetary controversy . As we shall see in
chapter 6, the conflict goes on, among other reasons, because there are
no precise criteria for determining the extent of the theoretical in
empirical evidence. With every different definition of the specific¬
ation of the variables in the models used, the empirical world appears
differently. For instance, the Andersen-Jordan tests have been
corrected and respecified by their opponents on the basis of different
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definitions producing different empirical results . Also the direct¬
ion of the lag in the notorious money-income correlation has been
contested on the basis of a different theory postulating a different
72
relationship and direction . Thus, empirical facts test theories but
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once some dependence is acknowledged then the ground is open for
rival interpretations of facts.
However, why do Positive economists feel the need to modify
or qualify the absolute independence between theory and fact? Had
they postulated a purely 'theoretical' theory and a purely 'empirical'
fact, Positive economics and empirical testing would have logically,
but perhaps not practically (due to problems of data reliability and
reality representation, to be discussed below), worked perfectly, and
persistent controversies might have been resolved. In my opinion
the modification of the independence assumption is necessary because
of the existence of the Problem of Induction. How could Friedman,
or any other Positive economist, justify his belief that the money-
income correlation would hold in the future because it held in the
past, unless a theory was provided, in his case the restatement of
the Quantity Theory of Money, that would rationalize the occurrence
and thus render the recurrence of the conjunction theoretically
plausible? According to Friedman, "Every empirical study rests on
a theoretical framework . . . That framework is the quantity theory
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of money" (an empirical study being a potential empirical fact).
Ideally a Positive economist would want science to work in terms of a
perfect dichotomy between theory and fact, with the latter testing the
former. But the uncertainty that springs from making generalizations
from the particular necessitates the introduction of theory. The
question is how much and which theory? Once £i posteriori criteria of
prediction are not logically valid, as this would beg the Induction
Riddle, a^ priori criteria become necessary. But for the Positive
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economist £ priori criteria for determining the degree and choice of
theory are meaningless unless accompanied by empirical confirmation.
However, since the latter cannot be done, as it would repeat the pro¬
cess, then an element of arbitrariness is inserted in the testing
procedure of Positive economics. The consequence is unresolved con¬
flict. If Positive economics postulated a different epistemological
paradigm embracing a different role for theory then, to a certain
extent, the arbitrariness might have been resolved. But then that
paradigm would not have been Positive economics.
The crux of the argument presented in this section is that
unresolved conflict in economics emerges from an ambiguity in the
definition of facts, that arises from an inconsistency due to the
irresolution of the Inductive Problem. In Figure III I have depicted
the argument diagrammatically so as to present, in a step-by-step man-
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ner, the structured contradiction within Positive economics















Once the ideal methodological distinction is postulated,
Positive economics is faced with a riddle which needs solution if the
methodology is to be logically justified. However, the irresolution
and the elusive character of the riddle necessitates the logical
reconciliation of the distinction. The consequence is a definition
of 'synthetic' in terms of a hybrid form containing some 'theoretical'
and some 'empirical'. The ambiguity implied in this definition of
empirical evidence results in tension and unresolved conflict"^. As
we shall see in Part II the Monetary controversy is an example of
such a conflict. While everyone in the controversy agrees as to the
nature of the test for choosing between the two theories, there is
widespread disagreement as to the nature of the evidence that does
the testing. The form that empirical evidence takes corresponds to
different theoretical conceptions, definitions and specifications.
c. THE INDEPENDENCE AND REALITY OF EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
Having answered the first question asked in the end of
section C.a., I now turn to the examination of the second one. Assuming,
for the moment, that the analytic-synthetic distinction does not encounter
all these logical difficulties and ambiguities and that it holds true
logically and unambiguously, the question then is, does it in fact hold
true in practice, as far as economics is concerned? In what follows I
shall try to examine the actual problems facing the distinction in cases
such as the identification-specification problem and the use of ceteris
paribus clauses.
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As we have seen, the methodology of Positive economics
assigns to theory a vacuous role. Theories are supposed to be fig¬
ments of the imagination of the theorist that become 'real' once
they are tested with the facts. But what are the facts? How is
reality defined according to Positive economics? Reality according
to the latter is defined by the empirical world immediately observ¬
able to us. The only thing real is empirical data. Theories are
only "filing systems". From this Positive economists conclude that
since reality is empirical facts.and theory is independent of it,
then empirical facts should test theories. Thus the important
assumptions are, (a) that empirical facts can be independent of
theory, and (b) that empirical facts represent reality.
However, besides the logical difficulties we have already
encountered concerning the independence of fact from theory, there
are also actual difficulties that are related to the identification
problem. Firstly, when we collect a set of data that are supposed
to relate to a particular section of the empirical world, how do we
know that this set of data in fact relates to this section? And
secondly, when we are looking for a particular pattern in the empirical
world how can we distinguish between the variety of forces that cause
this pattern?
Regarding the first difficulty, when we have a collection of
data that are supposed to reflect macroeconomic behaviour, how do we
know that a particular series of numbers represents income or~
expenditure, investment or savings? This knowledge cannot be given
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by the facts because these are presumed to be the facts. What we
need, therefore, is some previous grounds to lend support to our
belief that these data can be legitimately grouped into the categories
of income, expenditure, savings or investment. In other words, the
empirical world is delineated with the help of theories. "Theory
indeed", Mollis and Nell say, "even plays a part in determining what
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are the facts to be considered" , and if this is so then in practice
the independence of empirical evidence cannot hold true.
Regarding the second difficulty, Positive economists are
faced with harder problems. Suppose we wanted to measure a savings
and investment relationship or a money and interest relationship.
Then, we would confront the classic problem of identification, whereby
a scatter diagram of these relationships would not tell us whether
what we are looking at is a savings or investment function or, in
77
fact, both . If in a system savings are dependent on income and
interest rates and investments are dependent on the same determinants,
then solution to this system would produce points in a diagram that
would represent equivalently a savings or investment or a 'mongrel'
function. What is needed, and what is done in practice, in order to
separate these functions is some additional specification postulating
a greater variability of one function relatively to the other. The
inclusion of additional variables that seem to be a priori significant
also contribute to the identification of the relationship. Other
restrictions such as specification of random disturbances or non-
linearities are important identification conditions but they are also
dependent on theory. As Klein confirms,
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In effect, this is an £i priori restriction on the
specification of the model. If we have reason to
believe that one disturbance is more variable than
another . . . then we have an identifying
restriction on the system.
There is no doubt that facts do emerge, but they are dependent on
theory. But someone could argue that this is only a conceptual prob¬
lem and in practice the theory-fact distinction can be maintained.
But, as Klein observes, identification is an important problem and it
is not only conceptual but "a definite problem in the interpretation
of equations computed from observations which are themselves the out-
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come of the mutual interplay of such equations in the market process"
An argument could be that the a_ priori theorizing necessary for identi¬
fication can be tested a posteriori with the application of the model.
However, as we have seen, this argument cannot be supported since there
must be a choice of theory before the model is tested. Moreover, the
application of the model implies a set of data upon which it applies,
in which case the identification problem reappears.
Another actual difficulty that vitiates the theory-fact
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distinction relates to ceteris paribus clauses . This time-honoured
difficulty arises because in an ever changing, complex world we cannot
distinguish 'economic' from 'psychological', 'physical' or any other
kind of facts; or decide between significant and insignificant influ¬
ences, unless a previous theory gives us good reasons to support the
belief that some forces are held constant while others vary. Thus
again theory plays a fundamental role in rendering social facts
distinguishable and in guiding the observation of the flux of social
phenomena. But if this is so then facts are theory impregnated and
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thus illegitimate for Positive economics. Thus, this means that
empirical facts cannot test theories, as they are theory laden. And
this also applies to neoclassical theory. But then why do Positive
economists use Neoclassical economics, as opposed to any rival theory,
as a perspective that distinguishes relevant from irrelevant forces?
Moreover, if the neoclassical spectacles order the observable world
into the relevant and economic, then one cannot use the latter to test
the former, as it is dependent on it. Also the 'neoclassically'
observed facts cannot test an alternative theory offering a new
perspective, since they will always be biased in favour of the
neoclassical perspective.
Since, therefore, both logical and actual problems impede
the application of the theory-fact distinction, it cannot be maintained
that the activity of testing theories with empirical evidence can be
deemed as 'consequential'. I emphasize actual in order to distinguish
it from the logical difficulties presented in the previous section that
referred to the Inductive Problem. However, the two types of difficult¬
ies are in fact related. The actual problems facing the analytic-
synthetic distinction are nothing else but manifestations of the logical
ones. If the logical problems stem from the irresolution of the Problem
of Induction, then the actual problems are a repetition of the Problem
in a changed form. In the case of identification and ceteris paribus
clauses, the Problem asserts itself in terms of a difficulty in justify¬
ing with more empirical facts the determination of empirical facts. If
we cannot know how to distinguish between a demand and a supply function
in a set of empirical data, we cannot bring more empirical data to help
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us as this would merely double the difficulty. As in the logical
case, what Positive economics needs is a theory to render the data
plausible, comprehensible and relevant. However, since facts are
theory-laden, empirical testing cannot be used to select between
alternative theories, and thus Positive economics is untenable.
As far as the second assumption is concerned, i.e. that
empirical facts represent reality, it seems that it is an assumption
that in the face of criticism from alternative epistemologies cannot
be sustained. Empirical facts play a 'consequential' role in theory
testing for Positive economics, because they are supposed to represent
reality. The logic behind this assumption is in congruence with the
wider positivist principles which define reality as that which can be
81
observed . Anything that cannot be observed and cannot be rendered
in observational language is thus labelled metaphysical and so 'unreal'.
Entities such as 'purpose', 'consciousness', 'essence', belong to the
domain of the unobserved and therefore to the unreal. Positive
economists trust empirical observation because it is in this way that
concrete reality is perceived. Thus man's behaviour cannot be defined
according to what goes behind this behaviour (e.g. consciousness)
because the latter cannot be seen and commonly observed. Hence,
positivist theories of man depend on external behaviour and its patterns
or regularities. This also applies to economic behaviour. The deter¬
minants of economic phenomena are not defined in terms of 'hidden' or
'inner' properties that cannot be ascertained in any way other than
speculation. But they are defined in terms of their external-properties.
Accordingly, the unit of economic measurement is not value but price as
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it is formed in the market. Economic quantities and magnitudes are
determined not by any invisible process or structure but by such
'visible' (i.e. quantifiable) units as supply and demand, that ulti¬
mately depend on prices. Even such processes as 'subjective utility'
or social welfare are looked at with suspicion, and 'revealed prefer¬
ences' or social costs and benefits take their place. The latter are
not considered metaphysical because they can be measured with price.
Thus price is the focal concept which is determined in the market, and
the market is a phenomenon the behaviour of which can be commonly
observed.
However, the definition of reality in terms of empirical
observables constitutes an assumption based upon the belief that the
phenomenal is identical to the real. And this belief, in turn, is
borne within an epistemology that propounds sense-observations as the
8 2
predominant feature of reality . But what is the justification of
this assumption? Why should one rely on sense-observations and
empirical measurements? Why should the phenomenal be more real than
what is behind phenomena? If what is behind phenomena cannot be
observed with the 'naked eye' that does not mean that its existence
cannot be ascertained through abstraction and logic. And if Positive
economics justifies this assumption because it has worked for Physics,
it cannot claim that it has also worked for economics. The abundance
of unresolved controversies, continuous disagreements and the ill-fame
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of economics testifies to the opposite of this justification . Con¬
sequently, the assumption of the supremacy of empirical evidence in
representing best reality is a belief the justification of which depends
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on a logic that is defined within a philosophical school, namely
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Positivism . But to see whether this logic is sufficient for justi¬
fying the assumption we have to examine an epistemology that propounds
an opposite logic, a logic, that is, that accepts non-observable
entities as real, namely Marxism. This logic, as we shall see, also
contains a critique of this empiricist theory of reality.
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Reality, according to Marxism, is a process . It is a
historical-dialectic movement that requires a structural analysis
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rather than only an epiphenomenal one . Marxism assumes a multi¬
dimensional reality the various levels of which are interconnected
and dialectically opposed. Thus, sense-perceptions constitute one
level of reality that either opposes (or falsifies) another deeper
level, or simply reflects it. However, for Marxism, sense-perceptions
are not the level of reality that determines all others, simply because
these sense-perceptions are objects that are dissolvable to more
essential and thus unobservable entities. As Marx says,
The concrete is concrete because it is the concentration
of many determinations, hence unity of the diverse. It
appears in the process of thinking, as a process of con¬
centration, as result, not as a point of departure, even
though it is the point of departure in reality and hence
also the point of departure of observation and conception. 87
It seems, therefore, that Marxism accepts the appearance of reality in
terms of observables, but defines its determinants in terms of un-
observables. In consequence, the method of reaching this 'essential',
unobserved, reality is "only through the criticism and reconstruction of
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sense-perceptions by logical reasoning" . However, sometimes reality
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appears to the observer so as to conceal the underlying level of
reality. The observer thus perceives the appearances as real, when
in fact they may falsify reality. According to Godelier, "it is not
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the subject who deceives himself, but reality which deceives him"
But not al1 appearances are deceptive; processes that go on the surf¬
ace of reality may be a reflection of a deeper reality. For instance
the circulation of commodities is a process that reflects and is deter¬
mined by the process of production that goes underneath it. The
methodology for Marxism is to understand the surface processes, analyse
them, find their determinants and then logically reconstitute them.
In this the total structure of reality is understood rather than only
a small part of it. And this is where the critique of empiricism
becomes relevant.
Since Positive economics directs its observations to
sense-perceptions (i.e. measurable events), which constitute appear¬
ances, it represents either an insufficient or a distorted outlook of
reality. "Vulgar economy", as Marx argues, "sticks to appearances
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in opposition to the law which regulates and explains them" . In
effect, therefore, economic reality is composed of two levels: of a
surface reality pertaining to circulation and exchange, i.e. the market,
and an inner reality pertaining to a set of production relations, i.e.
capital versus labour. Thus, "exchange value, generally is only the
mode of expression, the phenomenal form, of something contained in it,
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yet distinguishable from it" . If Positive economics, therefore,
"sticks to appearances" only, then it expresses reality either one-
sidedly or falsely. For example the examination of competition,
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prices, supply and demand, etc., is a sufficient description of
reality as it appears to the observer. Although this reality is a
true one, it is, nonetheless, only a partial reality;
I
This positing of prices and their circulation etc.
appears as the surface process, beneath which, however,
in the depths, entirely different processes go on . . .
It is the phenomenon of a process taking place behind
ItT^
Accordingly, if Positive economics takes the surface reality as the
only reality then, evidently, it represents reality partially and
insufficiently.
In addition, the phenomenal representation of reality poses
the problem of a deceptive or a false representation of reality. For
example, a deceptive account of reality occurs when Positive economics
takes the exchange between capital and labour as an equal one: labour
offers its services to capital in return for wages the level of which
is determined by demand and supply. However, according to Marxism,
labour offers more labour-time than is necessary for the production of
goods sufficient for its survival and reproduction; the rest of the
labour-time is surplus labour-time that is entirely appropriated by
the capitalist. Thus the appearance of an equivalent exchange is
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deceptive because it hides an exchange of non-equivalents
According to Marx,
This phenomenal form [wage-form], which makes the actual
relation invisible, and indeed, shows the direct opposite
of that relation, forms the basis of . . . ail the
mystifications of the capitalistic mode of production, of
all its illusions as to liberty, of all the apologetic
shifts of the vulgar economists.94
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On the other hand, an epiphenomenal representation of reality may be
false also due to the interpretation of appearances as natural and
objective. This, according to Marxism, is an outcome of mistaking
relations between people and classes for relations between things,
that are assumed to be natural and everlasting. Hence the apolo¬
getic character of Positive economics, which considers, according to
neoclassical principles, exchange and the market as the primary
determinant of every economy, irrespective of time and place, and so
justifies capitalism as the highest representative of this principle.
This mystification occurs because relations between commodities appear
as relations between things, whereas they are really relations between
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people and classes . This type of mystification is called 'fetish¬
ism' and, according to Marx, it is
. . . peculiar to bourgeois Political Economy, the
fetishism which metamorphoses the social, economic
character impressed on things in the process of
social production into a natural character stemming
from the material nature of those things.96
However, this means that Positive economists are deluded
not because they are ideologically biased - in a narrow sense - but
because reality deludes them. The sense-perceptions and the observ¬
ations of Positive economists are real, i.e. there is a one-to-one
relationship between observations and phenomena, although they contain
a part of reality that is in itself delusive, i.e. unequal things
appear as equal, because they appear as material, are taken to be
natural. "If then", according to Geras, "the social agents [and the
Positive economist j^s_ a social agent] experience capitalist society as
-100
something other than it really is, this is fundamentally because
capitalist society presents itself as something other than it really
is" .
i
Consequently, according to the Marxist critique of
empiricism, in its attempt to define reality in terms of observables,
Positive economics commits the fallacies of defining it, (a) partially,
and (b) falsely. Hence, if the critique is correct, any scientific
procedure that validates theories in terms of a partial and false
reality is bound to be partial and false in itself.
To summarise the major points made so far in this chapter:
firstly, I emphasized the importance and relevance of the Problem of
Induction and showed how its irresolution affects the rationality of
Positive economics. Secondly, I indicated the general problems
involved in the observation of the empirical world and hinted as to
the difficulty of maintaining the analytic-synthetic distinction
believed by Positive economists. Thirdly, I showed how the Problem
of Induction affects the structure of Positive economics and how it
renders the definition of empirical facts ambiguous. Fourthly, I
examined whether the analytic-synthetic distinction holds in actual
practice and found that the dichotomy breaks down once problems of
identification and ceteris paribus conditions are brought into focus.
Fifthly, I showed that logical and actual difficulties in the positiv-
ist analytic-synthetic distinction are related to the Problem of
Induction. Lastly, I examined a critique of empiricism from-the
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point of view of an alternative methodology and concluded that
empirical evidence represents reality falsely and insufficiently.
Having examined issues related to the nature of empirical
evidence, and having found that empirical evidence is dependent on
theory, that it is unjustified methodologically and that it repre¬
sents reality partially and falsely, I now turn to investigate whether
it represents reality reliably (i.e. accurately).
D. THE RELIABILITY OF EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
Though the purpose of this chapter is to show the structure
of economic facts from a definitional point of view, it is still worth¬
while mentioning the extent to which economic facts are represented
reliably. The sometimes extraneous or sometimes essential error
creeping in economic data contributes to possible bias. However, in
considering this bias in relation to theory selection it does not seem
to be as important as the structural inconsistencies mentioned earlier.
An ambiguous definition of what is to constitute economic evidence
for the choice between rival theories seems to be more important in
contributing to perpetual disagreement, rather than even a considerable
error in the statistics. When an economic decision at the govern¬
mental level is based upon economic data, then inaccuracy of the
statistics may make some difference to the decision taking. For
instance, if foreign trade statistics show such an error as to produce
a balance of payments deficit instead of a surplus for a particular
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month , then government decisions will be wide of the mark. But as
far as theory testing is concerned, more long-run evidence and repeated
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observations are needed. In this case even if a considerable margin
of error occurs, the results may play only an approximative role
sufficient for the distinction between rival theories. A correlation
of the money supply with income, for example, would span over a con-
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siderable period, and though it would incorporate errors , this
would not prevent Friedman from claiming the confirmation of his
theory. The difficulty with this correlation is theoretical and
implies a difficulty in the specification, thus impairing the exact
stipulation of the direction of the lag of the correlation. As we
shall see, most criticism against the money-income relation stems
from theoretical, definitional and methodological difficulties rather
than errors in the data***'"'. Thus, in the case of theory testing,
even if allowances are taken so as to render economic evidence
relatively free from error, there are still conceptual, structural and
inherent problems that render their interpretation ambiguous.
However, even though the inaccuracy of economic data may
not seem as vital for the resolution of controversies, when compared
with structural inconsistencies, it is worth noting that the unreliable
representation of economic facts does contribute to the difficulties
relating to the choice between rival economic theories. Errors of all
kinds, from lack of precise economic concepts (and thus measurements)
to hiding of information, render the task of theory choice cumbersome
and the results unreliable**"**. As Morgenstern argues, "Whenever an
economic argument is being made ... the matter of the accuracy of
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. . . data arises . In what follows I shall briefly review some
of the sources of error in economic data.
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As we have seen in chapter 1 scientific procedure in
Positive economics can be broken into four fundamental steps:
data-model-computations-comparison with reality. To appreciate the
role of error in relation to this procedure I shall quote a passage
from Morgenstern in which he indicates that,
Each one of [the steps] has its own sources of error:
the initial data are available only with a certain
degree of accuracy (which it may be impossible to
determine), the model is an idealization of reality,
the computations can produce errors that are added to
those existing at the start. The numerical result
with all its cumulative errors will be compared with,
and 'checked' against, a 'reality' that is again only
revealed up to an (unknown) error factor. This is
then hopefully called 'verification'.103
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Economic models are supposed to be based on. observations
These observations are believed to represent reality. Given, how¬
ever, the complexity of reality observations need to be designed.
In physics data are collected through the direct observation of the
scientist. In contrast, in economics observations are made according
to data collected by people and organizations that most of the time
have different purposes and ideas^^. In consequence, the economist
cannot, in principle, control the accuracy of the data. If, for any
reason, there is distortion in the data, then the observations based
on these data will carry on this distortion. Any discrepancy between
reality and the collected data will lead to biased observations.
Granted that there is something which is called 'reality'
and granted that empirical data represent it, can we, howeverj be
certain that these data represent 'reality' reliably? Divergence
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between data and reality may be caused by a variety of factors. For
example data that deal with the economy as a whole are collected by
governmental organizations, individual firms and various other agencies.
As Friedman reports on his estimation of the money stock, "The basic
data used . . . were not collected especially for this purpose but,
like most statistical raw material, were largely an unintended by¬
product of governmental activities"^ . In regard to governmental
statistics, economists base their observations on data collected at
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different times and places and for different objectives. The
error inherent in these data may not affect the objective of the
governmental organization, but it may affect the realism and the
sophistication of the observations made by the economist. Signifi¬
cant distortion in these data may arise from various sources. For
example, data on income, expenditure, savings, etc., are collected
in an ad hoc manner without taking account of problems of conceptual
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classification . Governmental agencies follow standards and con¬
ventions that do not necessarily reflect the finesse and abstraction
of theoretical categories. More often than not these conventions
are used for purposes of expediency with no proper regard given to
definitional and classificational problems. According to Coddington,
"Economic statistics are the result of the bureaucratic compounding
of enormous quantities of fragmentary and even ambiguous pieces of
109
information" . Uncertainties and ambiguities of this kind may
result in data revealing completely distorted situations. As
Coddington reports differences of growth rates between what had
actually happened and what was reported were found to be of the
magnitude of five to six per cent*^. However, more frequently
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distortions are much smaller and more subtle, but they tend to become
bigger once computations are carried on. The result is a cumulative
increase of error. One cannot rely on the argument that errors will
cancel out as the number of observations increases, unless there is
evidence produced to confirm this ^. The classical assumption of a
normal distribution of errors, with zero mean and constant variance
cannot hold in the case of misclassifications as "there are reasons
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to believe that the composite error may have a non-zero mean"
Thus, operations on data compiled with wrong or ambiguous classifi¬
cations will tend to magnify errors and bias will ultimately creep
in.
Another indication of the inadaquacy and inaccuracy of
government statistics is that they are often revised, some almost
month by month. Revision may take a long time and differences be-
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tween preliminary and final estimates may be significant (not
withstanding the fact that final estimates may also contain large
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error ). In a study made by Denton and Kuiper, it was found that
bias in the estimation of parameters results from differences in
revised data. According to their results "variations in parameter
estimates are generally much greater between different sets of data
than between methods of estimation""^*'. Furthermore, national
account statistics are not compiled by following statistical sampling
techniques but rather depend on answers from tax-returns, that may
include false answers, or they are the by-products of administrative
record-keeping, which may be conducted ambiguously. And yet'the time
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series, so often used by economists particularly in the Monetary
controversy, depend upon these statistics**^. Besides the error
from inisclassification that enters into the time-series data, there
is another problem fading statistics compiled over time, in that
decisions taken over a particular time interval may change, the quality
of a product may differ, the degree of industrial concentration may
vary, etc. The result of this instability in economic phenomena con¬
tributes to measurement problems and consequent error. Although
improving techniques partially take account of this factor, nonetheless
because of the uniqueness of economic phenomena, according to
Morgenstern,
processes substantially changing in time are measured only
once and cannot be measured more often. Thus the errors
remain uncorrected and in extent unknown with each
observation. No way of their elimination then exists . . .
Problems also arise when statistics are compiled from private
business organizations. There errors may result from possible falsifi¬
cation of information. For example, for reasons of competition, or
from fear of tax-authorities, business firms tend to distort the report
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of data . This is especially true in price statistics whereby firms
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tend to hide the true price of purchases and sales . An additional
difficulty with price statistics is the existence of non-price compet¬
ition and the consequent measurement problems. Distortion might arise
from monopoly practices, price discrimination, variations in quality
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and other non-price elements . As far as wages are concerned, vari¬
ous fringe-benefits, or policy factors may also distort statistics on
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the price of labour . Also statistics based on questionnaires may
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be distorted due to false information, ambiguous stipulation of the
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questions or, as Morgenstern says, because of pessimism or optimism ,
or due to the inclusion of concepts and ideas that produce different
images from the ones expected by the investigator.
Finally, an additional source of error occurs through the
summation of statistics taken from different phenomena when no quali¬
tative differences are taken into account. Statistics derived from
micro-variables are aggregated to give a statistic of a macro-variable.
However, in this process bias arises due to possible functional inter¬
relations between the variables. The assumption of independence
between economic units, although it may be valid for purposes of
abstraction, cannot hold true for the complex and continuous reality,
Whereby "macro-variables are functionally related to the micro-
variables, the micro-variables to each other, and the macro-variables
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to each other" . Also aggregation or sectoring may be based on
criteria that change from country to country, or from period to
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period . The consequence is that statistics based on aggregate
movements may include bias (which according to Morgenstern becomes
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more inclusive through summation ) that may distort 'true' (surface)
reality.
In reviewing various sources of error in economic data I did
not intend to cover all possible factors of distortion. Obviously
other major causes of bias exist and are as important. For instance,
definitional problems are significant since they may yield different
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sets of data for the same period or place , or problems of quantifying
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hazy economic concepts , prohibit the undistorted correspondence
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between numerical data and 'reality' . However, sufficient for the
purposes of this chapter was to indicate that empirical testing in
economics has to rely on data that do not enjoy the precision, adequacy
and reliability of the data in experimental sciences.
Although the unreliability of empirical evidence is a
relatively significant factor in contributing to the difficulties facing
the validation of economic theories, nonetheless these difficulties are
greatly enhanced when one takes into consideration the structural in¬
consistencies embodied in the methodology of Positive economics. As
noted in the beginning of this section, in a given economic controversy,
as will be seen in the following chapters, structural reasons related
to theory and methodology seem to play a more significant role in the
persistence of the controversy, rather than the inadequacy of empirical
data. The reason is that in the case of theoretical conflict the
inadequacy of data faces both members of the conflict equivalently.
Either member has to deal with equally unreliable observations. Exclud¬
ing forgery of data, two rival economic claims confront equally inadequate
evidence. Although inadequacy of data may lead to unreliability of the
theory being supported by the data, both theories are potentially equally
unreliable, given the data. The choice then has to be made according
to these inadequate, unreliable and approximate data. Thus, although
unreliable data weaken the positivist position of empirical testing,
nonetheless inherent difficulties with this methodology stem mainly
from problems and contradictions within the procedure itself.
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E. CONCLUSION
In this chapter I have attempted to describe certain logical
and actual inconsistencies that arise from within the structure of
Positive economics. In examining the nature of empirical evidence I
have indicated that the problem of justifying induction produces a
logical impasse. Where induction forms the corner-stone of scientific
validation, this impasse creates problems that need to be solved. In
the case of Positive economics the distinctions made in order to over¬
come these problems are, however, inapplicable. They constitute only
ambiguous mediations between the logical impasse and the actual prac¬
tice of acting as a Positive economist (i.e. testing theories empirically).
Furthermore, the ambiguous character of these distinctions infiltrates
the definition given to empirical evidence by Positive economists, with
the consequence of persistent polar views, such as in the case of the
Monetary controversy.
In addition I have examined the definition of reality within
Positive economics from the point of view of an alternative methodology
and have found that reality in Positive economics, being a surface
reality, is partial and deceptive. Finally, I have indicated that
apart from structural incongruities in the nature of empirical evidence,
and even within the domain of 'surface reality', there are also actual
inadequacies characterising the evidence itself. Not only, therefore,
does empirical evidence represent reality ambiguously and deceptively
but also unreliably.
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Having, therefore, examined the structure of the
methodology of Positive economics, I shall now turn to examine how
this methodology works in practice. In what follows I shall des¬
cribe the Monetary controversy and see whether empirical evidence
and testing have, in fact, been able to resolve the conflict. This
examination will constitute Part II of the thesis. In Part III
I shall critically review some of the criticism levelled against
Positive economics, and then I shall put forward a full explanation
of the persistence of disagreement in Positive economics.
Ill
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I V E ECONOMICS
"What generates in me a great deal of scepticism
about the state of our discipline is the high
positive correlation between the policy views of
a researcher . . . and his empirical findings.
I will begin to believe in economics as a science
when out of Yale there comes an empirical Ph.D.
thesis demonstrating the supremacy of monetary
policy in some historical episode - and out of








The purpose of this part is to provide a testing ground of
the Positive economic claim that empirical facts ought to discriminate
between valid and non^valid theories. Having seeh in the previous
part that Positive economic methodology finds difficulties in fulfilling
logical and actual criteria for justifying this claim, I shall now
examine whether, in fact, it works in practice. If it is shown that
the controversy persists despite the accumulation of empirical evidence,
then one may argue that neither in theory nor in practice does
theoretical conflict find resolution in appealing to empirical evidence.
I have choSert the Monetary controversy as a case study for
the following reasons: in the first place it is a major controversy,
and an example par excellence of the application of empirical testing
to rival economic claims. In Other wOrds it is an ideal case for
seeing Positive economics in action. Th the second place there are
twO distinctively opposed groups each one embracing a particular hypo¬
thesis that purports to aCCOunt for the Same phenomenon, namely the
determination of macroeconomic aggregates and the delineation of the
relative impact that various policy instruments have upon these aggreg¬
ates. Moreover, both Sides offer a great deal of empirical evidence
that is supposed to furnish sufficient proof Of the truth of either
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hypothesis. In the controversy one can also find a multitude of
types of evidence, starting from single-equation tests and structural
models, to qualitative judgements. In the third place both groups
belong to the paradigm of Positive economics. They are supposed to
apply the same principles of validation assigned by the methodology
of Positive economics. However, their interpretation of this methodo¬
logy is different. As has been shown in chapter 1 ambiguities in the
structure of Positive economics produce conflict as to the appropriate
interpretation of theory and fact, viz., Predictionists versus
Assumptionists. ' Although the resulting F-Twist controversy manifests
itself also in the methodological rivalry characteristic of the Mone¬
tary controversy, nonetheless the broad purpose of both Monetarists
and Fiscalists is to test their theoretical claims with empirical
facts.
The aim of Positive economists is to construct theories out
of observation and test them with empirical facts. One test of
Positive economics, therefore, is the extent to which its supporters
follow its rules and do not diverge from them, as this would imply
that either the rules are not functioning properly, and therefore need
adjustment, or that economists adhere to their own private methodology
while disregarding the rules. In this latter case Positive economics
would have only nominal value without any real consequence. The
point about the Monetary controversy is that although in theory econo¬
mists are willing to follow strictly the rules stipulated by Positive
2
economics (and they think they do ), in practice they adjust them in
order to suit their purposes. As we shall see the Monetary controversy
is a testimony against the pure methodological claims of Positive
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economics. Empirical evidence is mixed with value-judgements and
testing procedures are impregnated with rival definitions and theoret¬
ical specifications. There has been almost no case in which one
group accepted the evidence of the other with no methodological or
theoretical qualifications. It seems, therefore, that Positive
economics finds difficulties in offering an unequivocal and objective
methodology able to resolve theoretical conflict. As we shall see
in Part III these practical difficulties are manifestations of the
logical difficulties discussed in Part I, which combine and are
structured in such a way so as to render any attempt to resolve the
Monetary controversy, within the walls of the paradigm of Positive
economics, virtually impossible.
In studying this controversy I shall briefly sketch out its
post-war development in relation to the fluctuations of economic
activity and policy, so as to acquire a view of the link and dialectic
effect between the success and failure of a policy measure and the
stimulation or justification it gives to the theory reflecting it.
Then I shall indicate some of the differences and particular character¬
istics of each hypothesis and possibly clarify some misunderstandings
involved in the conception one group has for the theoretical framework
of the other. The analysis will be concentrated only on those differ¬
ences that seem to be consequential on the outcome of empirical research.
In addition, I shall try to differentiate between theoretical and
empirical issues and narrow down as far as is possible the grounds upon
which the battle is fought. The scope of the analysis, however, will
be quite wide referring generally to the major differences, disregarding
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the less important ones and leaving aside the intensive analysis of
each particular issue. Finally I shall examine the kinds of evidence
advanced by both sides and try to see whether there exists a set of
clearly defined and presented evidence that is accepted by both sides
and which can be definitely called an economic fact, be commonly
accepted, and be able to become the arbiter between the opposing
hypotheses.
Having made such an examination I hope to bring out the
idea that the Monetary controversy provides an appropriate experiment,
the results from which can be used to test the methodological hypo¬
thesis of Positive economics that empirical evidence furnishes








ECONOMIC POLICY AND THE DEVELOPMENT
OF THE CONTROVERSY
A. POST-WAR MACROECONOMIC POLICY
Although the Monetary controversy dates back to Ricardo and
the Bullionists and passes through the Currency and Banking schools
conflict in the 19th century and through the Economic Depression, its
growth takes enormous proportions during the period after the Second
World War. This period, namely from 1950 to 1970, offers two types
of evidence one of which was not available to the older disputes.
The first one concerns the outcome of various policies, the success
or failure of which were taken to justify the truth or falsity of the
theories behind the policies - common to old and new discussions -
and the second one concerns the accumulation of 'hard' empirical
evidence, i.e. data produced through econometric analysis. This
latter development, prima facie at least, seems to have been a decisive
turning point in the scientific effort to find criteria of choice be¬
tween the alternative hypotheses. However, it became eventually
apparent that the power of this new type of evidence was not proved
to be as decisive as it was thought it would be. The controversy,
despite the accumulation of empirical evidence from both sides, still
remains unresolved.
One might argue, however, that the Monetarist controversy
cannot be properly called persistent, since efforts to resolve it have
started only recently. It is only 15 to 20 years that there has been
continuous empirical assessment of the conflicting theories (though
strictly speaking empirical testing started with the use of the Oxford
Institute questionnaire evidence on business investment behaviour,
by the Radcliffe Committee]. It follows, therefore, from this argu¬
ment that given time the development of new tests and empirical
techniques will lead to the eventual resolution of the controversy.
Nevertheless, this argument applies only to the post-war controversy
and relates only to the particular empirical form associated with
the Monetarists and Fiscalists. It disregards the fact that the
controversy is not new. That it goes back to Hume and Ricardo,
and passing through the Banking and Currency Schools, it reaches
Keynes, Robertson, and Pigou, up to the Macmillan and Radcliffe
Committees. Although the form of the debate has changed, and now
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there is massive empirical evidence, as well as theoretical
sophistication of the issues, the result remains the same: there
are always two views concerning the role of money. And neither
the ad hoc judgements used by earlier economists, nor the more
'scientific' empirical evidence used now, contributed much towards
a definite choice between the alternative views. Of course
nobody Knows whether the controversy will go on persisting. The
point, however, is that since the emergence of the Oxford Institute
survey evidence of the interest-elasticity of business expenditures,
empirical testing has been shown inadequate to resolve the debate.
The hope that it will resolve it, therefore, constitutes only a
judgement of faith and neither a logical nor an empirical argument.
One might argue, however, that the monetarist view is more acceptable
now. Although it is granted that the Monetarists have gained some
ground in the debate, this does not mean, from what seems in the
empirical literature, that their tests are more conclusive. This
is not true according to Keynesians (see F Modigliani "The Monetarist
Controversy, Or Should We Forsake Stabilization Policies", American
Economic Review, 1977]. This can be ascribed more to inflation,
stagflation and the inadequacy of demand management policies, in
the face of adverse conditions. Though, for instance, money now
is taken more seriously (something that was undisputed by sophisticated
Keynesians - see Chapter 5 below], academic economists still persist
in their conflicting views, and still produce a great deal of empirical
evidence to support either the relative importance of monetary or
of fiscal policy (see e.g. J L Stein Ced], Monetarism, Amsterdam,
1976, B Friedman "Even the St Louis Model Now Believes in Fiscal
Policy", Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, May 1977, and K Carlson,
"Does the St Louis Equation Now Believe in Fiscal Policy?", FRB
of St Louis Review, February 1978], In my opinion, the debate
about money persists because it concerns the fundamental assumptions
of economics. It concerns the nature of the economy, i.e. the
flexibility and stability of the market mechanism, and the role of
money in it (neutrality of money, money as 'veil', etc]. Different
views are involved about the role of uncertainty, perfect knowledge
of economic agents, the price system and the optimization process.
These same views that were at issue during the debate between Keynes
and the 'classics', have re-emerged and have been incorporated (in
a more quantitative and empirical form] in the views of Fiscalists
and Monetarists. The former view the economy as inherently unstable
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and intervene to stabilize it, the latter view the economy as
sufficiently stable to guarantee the proper functioning of the 'free'
market. The conflict thus persists despite the qualitative and
quantitative evidence, because methodological and ideological positions
are continuously used to interpret and qualify the evidence. Alter¬
native interpretations of the ambiguous definitions of theory and
fact within Positive economics allow such interpretations. Furthermore,
as we shall see, these ambiguities are built into the conceptual
structure of Positive economics in such a way as to permit economists
in using, on the one hand, empirical testing as the only criterion of
choice, and on the other, in persistently interpreting it to suit
their particular ideological positions.
For the moment I shall leave this latter type of evidence
aside until chapter 5 and first give a rough account of the development
of monetary and fiscal policy in the period from 1950 to 1970, as this
will set out the historical perspective and context through which to
look at the controversy. The choice of this period is significant
because it contains the most important turning points that account
mainly for the apparent failure of Keynesian policy and for the con¬
sequent 'counter revolution' of Monetarism3 partly brought about by
the success of monetary policy1*. The increase in the intensity of
the controversy is tied up to the rise of Monetarism as a separate
school, according to its new version given by the Chicago school and
Friedman. Monetarism became more apparent with the economic events
around the middle and late '60s especially in the United States. I
have put the emphasis on events in the American economic scene because,
firstly, it is the country where Monetarism grew and intensified the
controversy, and secondly, because it is the country where the greatest
part of the debate literature is being written.
In accounting for the chronological development of the
controversy I separate the post-war period into two sub-periods,
firstly from 1950 to 1960, and secondly from 1960 to 1970.
a. 1950-1960
This particular sub-period is considered to be less important
than the one following it; yet it is significant because it saw the
emergence of an independent Federal Reserve System in the United States,
reflecting the need for an official implementation of Keynesian policy,
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and because it included the peak of the rise of Keynesian5 macroeconomic
thought and policy, the "high-tide" of Keynesianism as Johnson puts it6.
This peak has its causes in the apparent7 success Fiscalism enjoyed
during the interwar period. Before the Great Crash Monetarism was
considered a very potent and effective theory, and "... with respect
to the early 1930's, it can be said that the United States in the past
has relied in large part on monetary policy as its major instrument
for achieving price stability and high employment"8.
However, the climate of the aftermath of the Depression,
i.e. the interpretation of the ineffectiveness of monetary theory due
to very low levels of interest rate, and the publication of Keynes'
"General Theory" in 1936, brought about the collapse of the Quantity
Theory and the emergence of an era of macroeconomic thinking based
upon the Keynesian explanation of economic reality. This was accent¬
uated by the fact that national economies immediately after the Second
World War enjoyed a relatively high economic growth believed to be
attributed to the application of Keynesian theory9. However, under¬
lying inflationary tendencies, and some 'voices' crying in the
'wilderness of Keynesianism' (mainly Friedman's10) becoming eventually
heard, started to discredit the Keynesian thesis.
The mark of this period was the publication of the Radcliffe
Report in 1959, which reflected both the peak and the trough of
Keynesianism. The peak because it offered an extreme - and un¬
sophisticated - Keynesian policy disregarding the control of changes
in the money supply, and the trough because of the immense criticism
that it received for its extremity. In fact, due to the overdue
neglect of monetary policy, its proposals - at least for the academic
economists - were relatively neglected. It was alleged that its
propositions were contradicted by the empirical facts11.
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In effect the Radcliffe Report heralded the beginning of
the downfall of Fiscalism and the intensification of the controversy.
Although the Radcliffe Committee acknowledged the relative importance
12 i
of Monetary policy it nevertheless, by following a strong Keynesian
tradition, emphasized the importance of fiscal policy and assigned to
money a secondary and mostly accommodating role. The Report reflected
a strong scepticism at the time of the effectiveness of monetary policy.
It emphasized the liquidity of the economy as the key variable for
monetary analysis and policy and thus represented the disbelief of
traditional Keynesianism towards money. In addition it supported the
view that the investment function was interest inelastic and that
therefore the connection between money and economic activity was weak.
In consequence, money could not be used as a major policy instrument.
The channel of influence was considered to be liquidity. Through
the latter, and the interest rate, monetary actions were supposed to
influence the level of demand. Since liquidity was determined by
the 'willingness' of financial institutions, it could frustrate the
effects of monetary actions. Finally, a causal connection between
money and prices was disputed on the basis of, according to the
13
Radcliffe Report, "unlimited velocity"
This, however, stimulated a great deal of criticism on
the part of the Monetarists. Firstly, they claimed that the Report's
contention about the interest inelasticity of investment could not be
accepted as it was based on casual evidence of questioning business-
14
men about their beliefs of what determines their investment behaviour
Secondly, they contended that velocity was not proved by empirical
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evidence to be unstable. At the least the issue is controversial
And thirdly, they criticised the concept of liquidity in terms of its
immeasurability. The use of the concept of liquidity could not be
justified as it was impossible to pin it down empirically and there¬
fore test its validity;
it is clearly quite impossible in principle to measure
'liquidity'. No refutable theoretical propositions
can be formulated in terms of liquidity. The pure
Radcliffe theory can never be tested.16
But how is it that Fiscalists, who supported the Radcliffe
views, could ever adhere to such casual evidence; is it that Fiscal¬
ists at the time did not espouse the positivist principle of empirical
testability? Fiscalists argued that the Radcliffe Committee based
its propositions on general experience because it did not have any
other choice. At the time the Report was compiled there was a lack
of quantitative information. As Dicks-Miraux says,
... a note of protest should be raised at the unwarranted
complaint about the Radcliffe Committee's lack of
quantitative evidence. At the time, the data which
the Committee had available to it was indeed sparse;
... it did not reject a quantitative approach out
of choice.
Nonetheless it was true that the Radcliffe Report rejected
the quantity theory on the basis of liquidity, and what it implies
18
for the role of money . Later Fiscalists, however, did not accept
the rejection of Monetarism and the validity of Fiscalism on the basis
19
of the Radcliffe Report . As we shall see, they also provided
quantitative evidence for the support of their thesis. People
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belonging to the fiscalist tradition, adhere to the methodology of
Positive Economics and support the validity of empirical testing.
Accordingly they formulate their theoretical propositions so as to
be empirically testable. They use empirical testing as a criterion
of validation as Monetarists do. The only difference is the method
of extracting empirical evidence. Fiscalists prefer complex- v
structural econometric models, whereas Monetarists prefer simple-equation
estimates.
Perhaps, then, the accumulation of empirical evidence should
have persuaded Fiscalists that the Committee's views were extreme.
Indeed, the connection between monetary actions and economic activity
was now cast in terms of the influence that money has on interest
rates; also price expectations were viewed as an important factor in
evaluating policy actions. Yet the main conclusions were not far re¬
moved from the Radcliffe Report. Monetary policy, although featuring
with some importance, was still considered as secondary to fiscal
policy. Money could not be used as a discretionary policy instrument,
20
and that is very close to what the Radcliffe Report maintained
Although this time the evidence was considered respectable, the contro¬
versy was not stilled. There were always qualifying statements from
both groups regarding the acceptance or rejection of the evidence.
b. 1960-1970
For many economists, belonging to both sides of the controversy,
this particular sub-period presented itself as a test case or -as an almost
21
precise experiment in which the conflict could have been resolved
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In most other periods one could not evaluate the relative merit of
each policy, since both groups assigned the effects to their own
policy. If, for example, there was an expansionary fiscal policy
and money supply was growing at an accommodating pace, then Monetar¬
ists would say that, had monetary policy not been easy it would have
been doubtful whether fiscal policy would be successful. It was
the same for Fiscalists, had there not been a change in government
expenditure or taxes, the impact of a change on a monetary total
22
would have been doubtful . However, some people would argue for the poss¬
ibility of discrimination between the effects of each policy in some
periods. Fand, for instance, says that, ". . . it is only in such
singular periods - as in 1966 and 1968 - when the monetary aggregates
and the full-employment surplus move in opposite directions that we get
23
any real test of their relative effect" . For Monetarists, the 1968
tax-surcharge seemed to have been the most evident proof of the fail¬
ure of Keynesianism to combat inflation or apply correct policies.
On the other hand, for many Fiscalists this interpretation of the
particular instance needed qualification and by no means represented
24
evidence against their theory
To begin with, around 1962 fiscal policy seemed to have
relatively stablised the economy. This was achieved through depreci¬
ation allowances and the implementation of investment tax credit.
Through this success the potential of fiscal policy seemed to have
25
been enhanced . Meanwhile, monetary policy played a passive, minor
role allowing only for a steady increase in the money supply of about
26
three to four per cent . This feeling of fiscal success was
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accentuated by the introduction of the 1964 tax-cut for the purposes
of stimulating the economy according to the prescriptions of Keynesian
theory as applied by the Kennedy administration and Walter Heller.
"The capstone of postwar policy for putting the U S economy more or
less permanently into the full-employment orbit was, of course, the
27
great tax cut of 1964" . Although the period from 1964 to 1965
seemed to have been a textbook example of the success of fiscal
28
policy , Monetarists insisted that this particular period did not
prove the effectiveness of fiscal policy, neither did it discredit
29
the monetarist thesis
Despite the monetarist criticism, however, 1964 to 1965 was
generally considered a low point for Monetarism. This period was
the test case of Keynesian policy and it was considered successful.
But the joy was not going to last for long; the so-called
'credit-squeeze' produced a 'mini-recession'. This slackening of the
economy was associated with monetary restraint and eventually people
came to recognise the effects of monetary policy as an independent
instrument. In addition, because government expenditure at the time
was stimulative whereas the money supply fell, the importance of the
30
role of money in affecting the economy was clearly seen . This
recognition resulted in an 'easy money' policy with the purpose to
stimulate the economy. The success of monetary policy was widely
recognised - "... This episode" says Klein "was the first in the
era since World War II in which monetary policies were predominant in
31
shaping economic movement" . This policy success, along with the
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failure of the British 1967 devaluation, contributed to the beginning
of the downfall of Fiscalism and the emergence of Monetarism as a
32
"counter-revolution" . The consequence was that, although Fiscal-
ists began to accept monetary policy, they did not agree with the
implicit discrediting of fiscal policy; thus the controversy was
33
highly intensified
The 'high-tide' (this time of Monetarism) continued to grow
with the time when the American government in June 1968 passed a law
for a massive tax increase in order to 'cool off' the overheated
economy. The purpose of the tax-surcharge was to reduce aggregate
demand according to the policy implications of Keynesian theory and
gradually bring down the price level. However, it did not prove to
be successful - it was also considered bad timing due to the fact
that the effects of the policy coincided with the escalation of the
34
Vietnam war and the consequent expansion of government expenditure
Monetarists attributed this failure to the relatively easy money
policy and the decrease of the discount rate in August 1968. The
result, at least according to the Monetarists, was that since prices
continued to increase fiscal policy was ineffective, and that monetary
changes had the most effective impact. According to Darryl Francis,
This evidence, . . . i.e., the failure of fiscal restraint
which began in mid-1968 - a time when money continued to
increase at an excessive rate - ... demonstrates that
monetary actions measured by changes in the money stock
should receive the main emphasis in economic stabilisation^.
(For the development of the Policy instruments in this period .see
Figure IV.)
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FIGURE IV: POLICY INSTRUMENTS
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Many Fiscalists, however, challenged this view mainly on
three grounds. Firstly, they argued that either the tax was tempor¬
ary and according to modern consumption theory, postulating the
Permanent-Income hypothesis, any temporary tax-change should have
36
only a minor effect on aggregate spending . Secondly, they claimed
that the conception of the Keynesian model as a tax-change-aggregate
demand relationship was too naive and that the effect should be
37
studied within a structural model proper . And thirdly, that at
least certain categories of spending were affected by the imposition
38
of the tax-surcharge
In so far as the Monetarists criticised the Fiscalist's
failure of predicting the movement of the price-level, Fiscalists
argued either in terms of the inflationary expectations people held
offsetting the tax-effect or in terms of, as Klein argues, estimation
errors. In fact they claimed that although fiscalist models tended
to underestimate price changes it was also true that monetarist models
39
did not predict price movements accurately either . In conclusion
Fiscalists in fact never admitted the 'decisive' proof of the test of
40
fiscal policy within this period
Despite this defence of Fiscalism it can still be maintained
that for most economists the 1968-1969 period was interpreted as the
turning point in the ascent of Monetarism. Most Fiscalists started
to think of Monetary policy as an effective instrument, although only
41
secondary to budget manipulation
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These periods, therefore (1964-1966 and 1968-1970) are
considered to embody two presumably fairly exact experiments to which
both schools can refer for the truth of their theory. Surely some
economists could refer also to other periods; yet the above two
periods are accepted by both groups as being clear-cut examples and
indications of the effectiveness of their own policy.
It is along these lines that the controversy developed.
Economists waited for the time whereupon they could interpret the
success or failure of a particular economic policy as evidence for
the support of their own theory and a rejection of the other's. For
the Fiscalists, on the one hand, the 1964 success of the fiscal
i
stimulus was considered a doubtless proof of Fiscalism. An accommodat-
42
ing monetary policy was considered important , but this was a far cry
from what Monetarists thought monetary policy to be. For Fiscalists
it was rather obvious that a non-discretionary exercise of monetary
policy, in the form of a steady increase in the money supply, as
43
Monetarists indicated, would prove inapplicable . What was needed
was control of aggregate economic activity through fiscal management;
and the 1964 expansion verified this view. It also proved that what
Monetarism proposed was indefensible. As Heller says,
... surely, the monetary policy prevailing at the time (which
allegedly did the whole job) had no such power. The tax
cut was the critical motive force . . . Both in the
breach and in the observance, fiscal policy demonstrated
its potency during the 1960 's.44
Moreover, in discussing evidence for the truth of Fiscalism he says that,
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... even apart from the impressive correlation between
fiscal activism and high employment, we have also
had a series of experiences on the firing line in
which the predicted consequences of specific fiscal
actions . . . became the actual consequences.45
For the Monetarists, on the other hand, the 1966-1968 period
46
was considered a dramatic experiment and a decisive proof of their
thesis. The fact that, in the first part of the period, fiscal
policy was stimulative while there was a monetary restraint producing
a 'mini-recession', coupled with the case, in the second part of the
period, where monetary ease produced inflationary pressures, showed,
for them, beyond any doubt, the correctness of the monetarist proposit¬
ions. It also showed that Fiscalism was ineffective.
There are two important pieces of evidence supporting
the monetary view. One is the mini-recession experi¬
ence following the monetary restraint of 1966 . . .
The other one is the failure of fiscal restraint which
began in mid-1968 - a time when money continued to
increase at an excessive rate.47
The difficulty, however, was that although everybody accepted
success of policy as evidence of the truth of their hypothesis, it was
only the opposing group that presented failure of policy as evidence
for the refutation of the hypothesis. For failure indicated that, for
either group, things had not remained the same. According to Heller,
In 1966-68, Vietnam escalation coupled with initial
Presidential hesitation to ask for a tax boost and
later Congressional delay in enacting one, led to
the opposite result . . .48
On the part of Monetarists Friedman argued that,
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so far as I know, there has been no empirical
demonstration that the tax cut had any effect on
the total flow of income in the U.S. There has
been no demonstration that if monetary policies
had been maintained unchanged . . . the tax cut
would have been really expansionary on nominal
income.^9
However, as far as 'proving' the theories was concerned, as was shown,
'things' were interpreted as if they had remained the same. Monetar¬
ists and Fiscalists, being members of the same neoclassical paradigm,
and aspiring to positivist principles, use ceteris paribus clauses to
qualify their theories. Yet these clauses must equally apply to
both cases of verification and refutation. Nonetheless, economists
in the controversy used them exclusively to qualify the opponent's
criticisms while disregarding them in their exclamations about the
truth of their theories. The application of ceteris paribus, in
order to be consistent must equally apply to successful theories.
As Coddington says, "why a theory 'works' is just as problematic as
why it fails to work"^. 'Things', in a case whereby a theory is
verified must also be shown to have remained the same; otherwise the
proof of the theory may not be considered as valid, since 'things'
might have already changed^.
The obvious question to ask is whether one can check the
opponent's allegations and can provide an objective standard for
evaluating alternative interpretations. Indeed one could argue,
probably a Positive economist would so argue, that falsification or
verification do not depend on ad hoc observations or policy outcomes,
but rather require testing with precisely measured empirical facts.
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However, Monetarists for instance, although being representatives of
Positive economics, used this type of ad_ hoc evidence, calling it
'experience', and added it to the 'harder' types. Although they
would be careful in overstressing the validatory power of this type
of evidence they would, nonetheless, contend that, "The most import¬
ant element [of experience] was widespread disillusion with the
predictions derived from Keynesian theory . . . the failure of post-
52
war depression to occur . . . failure of cheap money policy ..."
On the part of Fiscalists Heller also claims that "we have to look at
specific economic experience for cause-and-effect sequences that
demonstrates the potency of fiscal policy" and he goes on to present
53
a list of episodes that, presumably, prove his point . Friedman,
although he is more reluctant about the use of 'episodic' experience
as evidence, still maintains that "1966-67 is a nice episode. It is
54
a nice controlled experiment" , or that "The Great Contraction is
tragic testimony to the power of Monetary policy"^.
Even though this type of "experience" is used as one type
of evidence, albeit an ad hoc one, to be added to the rest of the types
of evidence in use for the process of theory validation, it is rather
an elusive type which cannot claim great objectivity and be called a
'fact'. As was shown, neither Monetarists nor Fiscalists accepted
the conflicting evidence presented by the opposing group as sufficient
to reject their own theory or accept the opponent's. Fiscalists, in
fact, may have accepted the importance of money. But this was far
from what Monetarists tried to prove as their hypothesis. For them
the important thing was non-intervention of any sort. If the money
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supply was allowed to grow at a certain percentage every year, the
price system would work itself out of crises or rigidities. Fine-
tuning, according to Monetarists, was impossible^. On the other
hand, for Fiscalism, the issue was never about whether money mattered
or not; money was considered unimportant only in such cases as the
Radcliffe Report; for Fiscalists of the 1 mixed-economy' type, the
hypothesis was of discretionary policy of both monetary and fiscal
57
actions . What follows from this is, that 'facts', such as the
interpretation of experience from, alternative policy impacts, did not
succeed in persuading either Monetarists of the power of fiscal policy,
or Fiscalists of the importance of monetary policy cast in terms of a
fixed rule.
In consequence economists from both sides had to appeal to
more convincing evidence. More than ad hoc facts were needed and
either group had to resort to more reliable sources to test their
theories. Objectivity had to be determined with exact, measurable,
empirical experience. After all that is what Positive economics is
all about. After a brief consideration of the theoretical arguments
in the controversy, I shall attempt to show that even with this
'harder' type of evidence very little was achieved in coming closer to





1. "Keynesian Monetary Theory and the Cambridge School", in
Johnson and Nobay, Issues in Monetary Economics, op.cit., pp.6-7.
2. They think they stay within Positive economics because the rules
are ambiguous and fluid and, as we shall see, allow a margin of
adjustment.
CHAPTER 3:
3. In addition to the Keynesian failures the monetarist 'counter
revolution' was stimulated by the intensive empirical research
undertaken by the Chicago School led by Friedman and by the St.
Louis Federal Bank led by Andersen, Jordan, Brunner, et_ al.
Johnson in his "Keynesian Revolution and the Monetarist Counter
Revolution", (in his Further Essays in Monetary Economics, 1972,
pp.50-69) argues that the Monetary 'counter revolution" was made
along the Kuhnian path of scientific revolutions, the orthodox
paradigm being Keynesianism established in the thirties. How¬
ever, a Kuhnian paradigm entails a clearly stipulated methodology
which is toppled by an alternative paradigm embracing a new and
incompatible methodology. As we shall see, both Monetarism and
Keynesianism are methodological variations of the same Positive
economic theme, embracing common methodological (i.e. Positivism)
and ontological (i.e. neoclassical theory) assumptions. Two
incompatible paradigms in economics, that can be compared to the
Kuhnian paradigm for example, are Classical Political Economy and
Positive economics.
4. Monetary policy for the Monetarists means the direct control of
the money supply, somehow defined, and not the control of the
interest rate as it is implied by Keynesianism.
5. The term 'Keynesian' needs, I think, some clarification. There
are possibly three factions that can claim the name 'Keynesian'.
One is the English school (Coddington, perhaps more appropriately,
uses the term "program" instead of theory or school to designate
the various schools of economic management, "Rethinking Economic
Policy", Political Quarterly, 1974, pp.430-1), spurred by the
writings of Hicks and to an extent Joan Robinson; the second is
the American school, led by Tobin, Heller, Samuelson, et al.,
and spurred by the writings of Lekachman and Hansen; and the
third is the school that follows Leijonhufvud's interpretation of
Keynes. In view of this, it is necessary to separate the
various 'Keynesian' traditions and give them separate labels
(see A. Coddington, "Keynesian Economics: The Search for First
Principles", Journal of Economic Literature, 1976). As far as
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5. (cont.) adhere to the first and third schools and Fiscalists
those who adhere to the second one (what Coddington has labelled
the "hydraulic" school, ibid., pp.1263-7). It is quite import¬
ant to distinguish between Keynesians and Fiscalists because two
different theoretical and policy perceptions are involved. As
far as Keynes himself is concerned it seems that his original
theory is closer to Monetarism than later Keynesianism or
Fiscalism. As Johnson confirms, "The neo-quantity theorists
can dispute the credentials of the contemporary Keynesians
[meaning Fiscalists], and claim the master's blessing for their
own endeavours", ("Keynes and the Keynesians" in his "Further
Essays . . .", op.cit., p.72). It seems that concepts used by
Keynes, such as expectations and wealth effects, are closer to
monetarist concepts. According to Johnson, "Keynes was wrest¬
ling with basic theoretical problems of a kind which have
attracted in recent times, the attention of the neo-quantity
theorists father than the Keynesian model builders", (ibid.,
p.72). As far as the Monetary controversy is concerned, the
battle is fought between Monetarists and Fiscalists. Strictly
speaking the controversy is not over Keynes' theory against some
version of the Quantity Theory of money but rather over the
simplifications and interpretations of Keynes' theory and policy.
In this sense, therefore, whenever a fiscalist hypothesis is
rejected by Monetarists this does not imply the refutation of
Keynesian theory. It rather refers to the body of theories and
policies formulated by (hydraulic) Fiscalists over the post-war
years.
6. H.G. Johnson, "Recent Developments in Monetary Theory - A
Commentary", in D.R. Croome and H.G. Johnson, Money in Britain
1959-1969, 1970, p.83. "
7. I say apparent because Friedman has allegedly established that
the interpretation of the facts of the 1929 crisis was wrong.
The Economic Depression was not due to the inability of monetary
policy to act, as Keynesians in general claim, but because of
the inertia of the monetary authorities and the ensuing panic.
(See M. Friedman, "The Role of Monetary Policy", in W.L. Johnson
and D.R. Kamerschen, Macroeconomics, 1970, p.372, see also
H.G. Johnson, ibid., p.88.)
8. H.G. Johnson, Essays in Monetary Economics, Second Edition, 1969,
p.245.
9. Yet even in this Friedman sees a failure of the Keynesian theory.
He claims that Keynesians after the last war predicted a sharp
economic depression which, in the end, never appeared (see his
Money and Economic Development, 1972, p.5). Nonetheless, people
like Walter Heller heralded this period of economic expansions as
due, primarily, to fiscal policy (see Heller-Friedman, Monetary
Versus Fiscal Policy, 1969, p.30).
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THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE
CONTROVERSY
A. INTRODUCTION
Policy actions and their success or failure form part of
the 'experience' package used by Monetarists and Fiscalists for theory
validation. For instance, Brunner comments:
What evidence may be cited on behalf of the . . .
Monetarist thesis? Every major inflation provides
support for the thesis, particularly in cases of sub¬
stantial variations in monetary growth . . . The
association between monetary and economic acceler¬
ations or decelerations has also been observed . . .
Observations from periods with divergent movements
of monetary and fiscal forces provide further evidence.*
Regarding"inflation, however, we have seen in the previous chapter
that it is a phenomenon subject to wide interpretations when presented
as evidence for the support of either Fiscalism or Monetarism. Neither
faction accepted the rival interpretations made of these periods. For
example, Modigliani exclaims that, "Indeed, when I look at the recent
inflationary experience going back to 1966, I find it hard to decide
whether the prize for misbehaviour should go to our fiscal or to our
2
monetary policy makers" . Regarding the causal link in the association
between money variations and income it is also an issue disputed quite
strongly by Fiscalists, the strongest position possibly taken by Kaldor
3
in his controversial article, "The New Monetarism" . Finally as far
as the last point in the quotation is concerned, Brunner mentions
"divergent periods" implying the 1964 and 1968 periods in American
economic policy. However, we have seen that although it is true that
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the two policy trends moved in opposite directions, one could not
deduce from this that they were also objective experiments or con¬
clusive tests of the truth of either theory, since neither Fiscalists
nor Monetarists were convinced of the rival interpretations. These
periods constituted only the basis for qualitative judgements mostly
substantiated by casual observations, such as the fact that the tax
cut did not succeed in stimulating the economy, and therefore the
4
Keynesian predictions had failed .
Scientifically and formally, however, these types of
observations constitute a minor - although admittedly a major
emotional - factor and are complemented, and most of the time dis¬
placed, by empirical evidence which is assessed 'precisely' and in a
'dispassionate' way. "Intuition, experience and judgement have now
been subjected to ten years' statistical and econometric analysis"*'.
Positive economic methodology comes to rescue the economist from the
passionate and subjective ad hoc judgements and replaces them with
'hard' econometric facts. It is supposedly the accumulation of such
'facts' that provides the economist with a scientific basis against
which a hypothesis should stand or fall.
But in order to be able to extract such evidence from the
chaos of reality even the utmost empiricist must use some type of an
ordering principle or theory in order to make meaningful classifica¬
tions. As Friedman says, "Every empirical study rests on a theoretical
framework, on a set of tentative hypotheses that the evidence-is
designed to test or adumbrate"^. The purpose of this chapter then is
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to review this theoretical framework within which the controversy
takes place. In doing this I shall try to clarify the two opposing
positions. From this one will be able to see that the controversants
partake in the same theoretical framework, and their differences are
not of kind but of degree. In other words Monetarists and Fiscalists
share the same theoretical perspective, i.e. modified neoclassical
theory and the general IS-LM framework, varying their positions mainly
on time horizons, and where to put the emphasis within this framework.
These differences, as we shall see, stem from different assumptions
about the stability and rigidity of the system. In turn these
assumptions are corroborated by, and interrelated to, the different
methodological assumptions mentioned in the previous chapter. That
is, a predictionist position, implying a simple correlational method,
simultaneously justifies, and is corroborated by, the monetarist
position, which implies flexibility and stability of the free market.
Gn the other hand, an assumptionist position, implying a complex,
structural approach, justifies, and is corroborated by, the fiscalist
position, which implies rigidities and the instability of the economy.
In short the flexibility and stability assumptions correlate with the
'unrealist' assumption, whereas the rigidity and instability with the
7
'realist' .
In what follows I shall review this common theoretical
framework and examine the different positions taken within it.
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B. THEORETICAL DIFFERENCES
a. THE PRICE LEVEL
In 1956 Milton Friedman, the chief proponent of Monetarism,
revived the old quantity theory of money - made redundant by the
Keynesian 'revolution' - as part of what Johnson calls the "counter¬
revolution", and cast it into different terms. Instead of the old
identity the relationship of money took the form of a behavioural
function relating the demand for real balances with a few, and deter¬
minate, independent variables. One of the purposes of this re¬
definition was to give the quantity theory an empirical content made
to fit the empirical testability requirement. In addition it enabled
Monetarists to collect statistical evidence in favour of the Quantity
Theory and against the income-expenditure model. In fact the debate
took the empirical form of testing the stability of the Keynesian
multiplier against the stability of the velocity of money, as these
hypotheses were considered the empirical implications of 'alternative'
theoretical frameworks.
Friedman claimed that this was a major breakthrough achieved
through the continuation of an "oral tradition" kept alive in the
University of Chicago while Keynesianism was in power. However, this
was proved not to be true. As Patinkin has shown there never did
8
exist such a tradition . In fact he says that,
what Friedman has actually presented is an elegant
exposition of the modern portfolio approach to the
demand for money which, though it has some well known
. . . antecedent in the traditional theory, can only
be seen as a continuation of the Keynesian theory of
liquidity preference.^
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This much was also admitted by Friedman who acknowledged the fact
that the reformulation of the quantity theory was "much influenced
by the Keynesian liquidity analysis"^.
However, Friedman in a subsequent article suggested that
although it is granted that the theoretical framework is similar to
the Keynesian there is one important difference and this concerns the
11 12
"missing equation" . Friedman sets out the familiar IS-LM model :
(equilibrium in the market for
goods and services)
(equilibrium between the demand
for real balances and the real
value of the nominal stock of
money)
(definition relating money to
income)
P = general price level,
r = rate of interest,
Mo = the nominal exogenously set stock of money, and
y = real income.
In it he shows that there are three equations to determine four unknowns,
namely: Y , P , r and y . The additional market or equation to
be included constitutes, according to Friedman, the fundamental
characteristic and important difference distinguishing the monetarist
13
from the fiscalist theory
This difference in assumption, according to Monetarists, is
that on the one hand Fiscalists following Keynes' model discuss
(1) C(X , r) + I(r)
(2) Mo = P. L(£ , r)
(3) Y = Py
where: Y = nominal income,
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everything in terms of wage units and they assume a stable
14
price level , whereas they, on the other hand, assume Walrasian types
of markets which are flexible and in which series of demand and supply
equations determine the level of real output, allowing therefore for
price expectations to be determined endogenously by the system^.
It has been counter-argued, however, that the above
difference concerning the 'missing equation' relies heavily on a
naive conception of the Keynesian model- According to this argument,
Monetarists use as a model exposition of Keynesianism the one version
of Keynesian theory relating money, interest rate, output and the
labour market, as it is simplified in the Hicksian cross and which
at a certain level assumes a stable price level^. Or Tobin would
argue that, "Milton Friedman's contention that the crucial difference
between Keynesians and the Monetarists is that Keynesians assume rigid
prices is shown to be factually and logically wrong"^. And yet
Friedman goes on to insist that, "Whatever the [Keynesian] group may
say in their asides and in their qualifications, they treat the price
18
level as an institutional datum in their formal theoretical analysis"
But what are these qualifications and how important are they? Some
Fiscalists would argue that they are not qualifications at all but
they are different assumptions indeed, however not about the price
level but about the complete determination of the system. They insist
that what they assume as rigid is not every price but only the price
19
of labour, i.e. wages . This assumption comes into contrast with
Monetarism because the latter assumes a process of tatonnement in
Walrasian flexible markets. Therefore the difference in reality lies
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in the assumption about rigidity in the labour market and not in the
20
difference about price expectations as most Monetarists have it
In particular the Keynesian interest lies in the institutionally
caused disequilibrium in the labour market in which "there is no
equilibrium . . . but rather a dynamic wage-adjustment equation
determining the rate of change of the nominal wage rate in response
21
to the state of excess supply in the market"
So, apparently, there is a difference between Fiscalists
and Monetarists, namely that of Walrasian flexibility and full employ¬
ment on the one hand, and institutional disequilibrium in the labour
market on the other. Yet how important this difference is is shown
by the fact that a Walrasian system may change into a Keynesian one
as soon as one takes into account information costs explicitly.
"To make the transition from Walras' world to Keynes' world,"
Leijonhufvud maintains, "it is thus sufficient to dispense with the
assumed tatonnement mechanism [and assume information costs] . . .
22
No other 'classical' assumption need be relinquished"
Moreover, Fiscalists have included in their analysis and in
their construction of large econometric models price expectations
explicitly (in the form of a Phillips curve) proving that changes in
the price level may be included and be compatible with Keynesian
23
theory . The difference thus seems to stem from a difference at
the methodological level, at which Assumptionists-Fiscalists assume
a 'realistic' position incorporating some aspects of the 'real:' world,
like rigidities in the labour market, or other markets, whereas
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Predictionists-Monetarists assume an 'unrealistic' (in the sense of
chapter 1) position whereby complete abstraction is preferred, and
absolute market flexibility is assumed. These beliefs are supported,
on the fiscalist side, by the proposition that the economy is basic¬
ally unstable and, on the monetarist side, by the proposition that the
economy is inherently stable. As Andersen and Carlson contend, "The
private economy is inherently stable . . . [and] that monetary and
24
fiscal actions are a source of instability" , and as Ando replies,
"We believe, on the other hand, that the economy is sufficiently
unstable ... so that it requires active fiscal and monetary
25
policies ..." . Thus, flexibility, i.e. individual freedom of
the economic agents and institutions to act in a rational (maximizing)
sense, is facilitated by stability in the economy, i.e. fairly consist¬
ent information about economic indicators. Whereas, inflexibility,
i.e. hampered action of the agents, is corroborated by the belief that
the economy is unstable and requires an authority to alleviate the
rigidity and instability.
However, although differences between Monetarists and
Fiscalists can be mostly reduced to the methodological level (i.e.
Assumptionism versus Predictionism), and the consequent difference in
the assumption about the structure of the economy (i.e. flexible versus
inflexible markets, stable versus unstable economy), it seems that
Monetarists conceive or interpret Fiscalism as representing a price-
rigidity position. Despite Fiscalists' qualifications and protests
about this assumption, Monetarists form their criticism according to
this interpretation. For example, a consequence of the 'price
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rigidity' assumption made by Fiscalists, according to Monetarists,
is that fiscalist monetary policy, conducted through interest rate
indications, is considered improper and biased. The reason behind
this criticism is that built-up price expectations in the interest
rate are unaccounted for due to the 'fixed price' assumption render¬
ing movements of the interest rate ineffective for correct indications
2 6
of monetary policy . Consequently if interest rates are not re¬
liable indicators then one has to turn to the money supply, or some
other kind of monetary aggregate, e.g. the monetary base, in order
27
to take appropriate steps for monetary policy . In effect their
argument runs in the following way: at the beginning changes in the
money supply might induce opposite changes in the interest rate, as
is expected by fiscalist theory. However, if one assumes fast
economic growth then spending and incomes will rise, raising also
the liquidity preference function and thus lowering the real money
supply and therefore increasing prices and interest rates. The
process will reverse the initial relation bringing about a positive
relation between money stock and interest rate changes.
Insofar as the above refers to naive fiscalist policy it
is true. However, according to Fiscalists, it is false insofar as
it refers to large and sophisticated models. The latter explicitly
include price expectations and therefore take into account price-
induced changes in interest rates. Furthermore the above 'money
growth' effects, summarized by Friedman in "The Role of Monetary
28
Policy" are shown by Fiscalists to be either included in, or be
consistent with, Keynesian theory. Teigen, for instance, feels that
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this is not an accurate description of fiscalist policy and stresses
that often,
Keynesians are supposed to recognize only ... an
inverse relationship between monetary impulses and
interest rate changes. This is certainly not the
case. When the entire structure is taken into
account, rather than only the liquidity preference
function, the level of interest rates ... is
determined by a number of elasticities . . .29
In effect, according to this argument, it depends upon the magnitude
of the systemic elasticities whether the relationship is inverse or
not. If for certain categories of expenditures and periods the
elasticities happen to be such that the relationship is direct, then
there is nothing imperative in the complete Keynesian system that
prohibits or excludes it.
i
A further consequence of the 'price rigidity' assumption
attributed to Fiscalism, relates to the so-called stability of the
demand for money function and of velocity. For Monetarism, by
virtue of its assumption about flexibility in the labour market, full
employment will produce the stable velocity needed by Monetarism.
On the other hand Fiscalists due to price fixity will hold for un¬
stable velocity and therefore will consider money supply changes as
not having a direct effect on income. According to Fiscalists,
however, as soon as the price rigidity assumption is removed and the
theoretical differences between the two groups are narrowed down to
differences about condition in the labour market, then the solution
159
of the complete Keynesian system will contain both cases, i.e.
depending on the numerical value of the relevant elasticities velocity
is either stable or unstable. So, in some sense, the monetarist
case, according to Fiscalists, is subsumed under the general and
30
'sophisticated' Keynesian model
Furthermore, concerning the monetarist allegation that
Fiscalists "frequently substitute nominal variables in lieu of real
variables", whereas Monetarists, "distinguish between monetary and
31
real variables" , it can also be maintained that it is inapplicable
as soon as the price rigidity assumption is relaxed.
To recapitulate the various points made so far in this
section: the theoretical difference relating to the assumption
about the 'missing equation', or the exogeneity of the price level,
was found not to be accepted by the fiscalist account of the
32
'sophisticated' Keynesian model . The usual theoretical differ¬
ences discussed in the debate literature, e.g. interest rate
expectations, stability of velocity, real and nominal variables,
were also shown not to be accepted by Fiscalism, on the grounds that
they are variants of the price rigidity assumption. Since Fiscal¬
ists contend that the price level is determined endogenously in
their system, then these criticisms or differences cannot hold true.
Then what is the controversy all about? In my opinion differences
between the two factions concern methodological and ontological
issues taken from within the same theroretical framework. By_
methodological issues I mean the 'unrealistic' (i.e. simple-correlational)
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versus the 'realistic' (i.e. complex-structural) approaches, and by
ontological issues I mean the different assumptions the two factions
entertain about the world (market), i.e. the assumptions about
flexibility-stability and inflexibility-instability. In fact the
methodological and ontological issues are related, in that the
'unrealistic' approach favours a flexible-stable world, whereas a
realistic one favours an inflexible-unstable one. A flexible-stable
world, in turn, favours the assumption of unimpeded maximization that
helps run things smoothly, whereas an inflexible-unstable one favours
the 'realistic' assumption of rigidities that impede maximization.
For example Mundell in making a generalized exposition of Keynesian
theory talks of four cases,
in which (a) prices and wages are both flexible,
(b) prices are flexible and wages rigid, (c)
wages are flexible and prices are rigid, and (d)
prices and wages are both rigid,
and concludes that "The distinction between the four cases hinges on
whether or not firms are prevented from maximizing profits and whether
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or not workers are impeded in their pursuit of maximum utility"
The assumption about price flexibility therefore relates to more
fundamental assumptions belonging to the same neoclassical, positivist,
framework.
b. THE TRANSMISSION MECHANISM
Another allegedly important difference that separates the
Fiscalists from the Monetarists relates to the way monetary impulses
transmit their effects throughout the economy. In fact it is argued
that it is more important than the 'missing equation' difference since
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it involves the definition of the concept of money. It is essential
for the success of a monetary policy to delineate what is the true
empirical content of money so as to determine its close substitutes
in order to see whether the effects of the policy are offset or not.
If for example alternative financial assets are close substitutes
for money balances then monetary policy may be ineffective. "The
crucial distinction between the Monetarists and the Keynesians" it is
argued "resides in their widely differing view of the degree to which
certain alternative financial assets may be close substitutes for
3.4
money balances" . However, as we shall see this "widely differing
view" is also a variation on the price rigidity theme.
To determine first the definition of money and second the
channels through which it transmits its effects, there is a need for
a theory of the transmission mechanism. For years the usual Keynesian
criticism against Monetarism has been the one related to the "black-
box" theory of the transmission mechanism. For instance Samuelson
has claimed that the monetarist position "is a 'black-box' model in
which money enters at the one end as an input and, for reasons un¬
explained and not necessary to explain, invariably induces at the
35
other end of the box an output response in G.N.P." . By a 'black-
box" it was meant that Monetarists accept a link which does not have
to be explained between money supply variations and changes in money
income, whereas for their part Fiscalists claim a portfolio adjustment
process through which monetary impulses transmit their effects.
However, to this accusation Monetarists answer with surprise that,
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It is a minor mystery in the recent history of
economic thought as to where so many economists have
got the impression that Friedman's view of the mone¬
tary mechanism is crucially dependent upon some
mysterious 'direct' effect of money on expenditure
. . . The transmission mechanism is spelled out
clearly enough in more than one place, contrary to
what is all too frequently alleged ... it is an
interest rate mechanism . . . and as Kaldor notes
apparently with surprise is not significantly
different from that described by Keynes56. (my
emphasis.)
Moreover, not only did the Monetarists try to convince the
Fiscalists that their propositions reflected a distinct theory of the
37
transmission mechanism , but also they contended that their theory
was a far more general and superior theory than the Fiscalists'.
Essentially they maintained that for the fiscalist theory "all inform¬
ation bearing on the transmission of monetary impulses is contained
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in the slope properties of the IS-LM diagram" , and thus it is a
restricted theory. In a certain sense therefore the process has
been reversed and now the Fiscalists are accused of an oversimplified
account of the transmission mechanism. According to Monetarists,
Fiscalists look at a process of adjustment that includes a narrow set
of financial assets with a narrowly defined spectrum of interest rates
reflecting only the 'cost of borrowing'. The monetarist position is
best represented by Friedman who claims that,
The Keynesians regard a change in the quantity of money
as affecting in the first instance 'the' interest rate,
interpreted as a market rate on a fairly narrow class
of financial liabilities . . . We, on the other hand,
stress a much broader and more 'direct' impact on
spending. ^9
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But how do Fiscalists respond to this criticism? Hicks
for instance argues that,
the balance sheet must be considered much more generally
... We have a well established theory of the distri¬
bution of assets in a portfolio in which the speculation
considered by Keynes appears as a special case.40
Or Teigen maintains that,
there is nothing inherent in the Keynesian system which
is inconsistent with the introduction of a general
portfolio adjustment transmission mechanism.41
But how is it then explained that Monetarists still believe
in such an allegedly important difference and carry on their tests as
if to prove the truth of the different positions? The anwer lies,
as we shall see, in the monetarist conception of the fiscalist view
as one that contains a fixed-price assumption. "This difference in
the assumed transmission mechanism" says Friedman, "is largely a by-
42
product of the different assumptions about price" . Thus differences
on the transmission mechanism are transformed into differences about
the 'missing equation'. And these latter differences are in turn
transformed into the fundamental differences between the two method¬
ologies (simplicity-complexity) and the two ontologies (flexibility-
inflexibility) . Any kind of rigidity in the mind of the Monetarist
represents more 'realistic' analysis and the impediment of the free
43
market, two ideas that do not match with the whole monetarist outlook
As we shall see in the transmission mechanism expounded by Monetarists
money plays a more important role than interest rates because it is
the instrument that allows flexibility in the market, whereas interest
rates imply direct intervention.
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In analysing the way in which Monetarists view the
transmission mechanism we see that the dominant factor for changes
in income and prices is the adjustment process, stimulated by a dis¬
crepancy between the demand and the supply of money, affecting
spending and thus prices, and consequently income. In other words
the amount of money in excess in the hands of the public will be
spent on both financial and physical assets thus changing the general
price level and output. This latter change will ultimately bring
the state back into equilibrium. The emphasis of the analysis being
on both types of assets constitutes, according to Monetarists, the
major difference between Monetarism and Fiscalism, as far as the
transmission mechanism is concerned. In addition, the interest
rate is interpreted more generally and the monetary changes affect
the items of the portfolio by altering the yields both physical and
financial - and therefore affect income. Furthermore, resulting
changes in the price level adjust the real value of the money supply.
It is this mechanism then that Monetarists propound when they talk
of a more general portfolio theory of the transmission of monetary
impulses, in contrast to the fiscalist 'narrow' one. In effect,
according to the above, Monetarists assign a causal role to the excess
quantity of money in the hands of the public, i.e. to part of the
money supply.
However, against this contention Fiscalists bring forward
the criticism that one cannot know a priori which is the dominant
factor vested with the causal power to determine the whole process
of the portfolio adjustment. Fiscalists, in contrast to what
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Monetarists believe, claim that they accept a general portfolio, in
which no singular factor bears a causal value. In fact they ask,
[is] it the initial increase in the money stock, the
full increase, . . the increase in bank reserves,
the reduction in private bill holdings, the fall in
yields, the increase in the central bank's portfolio,
or some other factor which is responsible for the
income change[?].^4
It is important to stress the point that Fiscalists do not
use only one type of asset in their portolio theory but, as we have
seen (see p.163, footnote 41), a whole array of them, including
financial and real assets. The difference between them and the
Monetarists is in the choice of where to put the emphasis. For the
Monetarists the emphasis is put on changes in the money supply, and
while for the monetarist conception of Fiscalism it is the interest
rate on certain assets, for the more sophisticate version of Fiscalism
45
it is "the disturbance of a portfolio equilibrium" . Effectively
the last position is similar to the first one, since the latter con¬
siders as well a general portfolio theory. However, although for
the former money is important for the latter so are other factors as
46
well . This difference in emphasis reflects the methodological
difference of simplicity versus complex structuralism. A simple
causation between money and economic activity seems sufficient for the
Monetarist whereas a multidimensional analysis seems more adequate for
the Fiscalist.
An important corollary of all this is the distinction between
the short and the long-run. For both sides - and assuming the naive
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Keynesian model for the moment - the effects of changes in the money
stock are separated into a liquidity and an income effect. The
first one is associated with the fiscalist and the second with the
monetarist position. As a consequence the former restricts itself
to the short-run Keynesian world and the latter to the long-run secu¬
lar analysis. In fact this short and long-run distinction relies,
on the one hand, on the fiscalist assumption of wage rigidity in
conditions of under full employment equilibrium and, on the other
hand, on the monetarist assumption of full employment resulting from
changes in the price level in the long run. This distinction is
accepted by Friedman who admits that,
changes in the quantity of money as such in the long run
have a negligible effect on real income, so that non¬
monetary forces 'are all that matter' for changes in real
income over the decades and money 'does not matter'",
but as far as nominal magnitudes are concerned
\
we have regarded the quantity of money ... as
essentially 'all that matters'47
So essentially the distinction is between a Keynesian short-run effect
on real output and a Monetary long-run effect on nominal magnitudes.
Although most Monetarists would accept this distinction that
48
"money-matters-most" in the long-run , they would nevertheless allege
that changes in the short-run, though not the only and major factor,
is a factor that accounts "for short-run changes in both nominal and
49
the real level of activity" . Thus, according to Monetarists, money
is more important for the long-run, but it is also relatively important
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for the short-run. According to Friedman,
The central notion of monetarism is that money matters
for both short-term economic fluctuations of the economy
and for inflation, the trend of prices. Part of the
central notion - the feature that distinguishes it
most from the Keynesian approach - is that what matters
is the quantity of money . . . and not interest rates.50
However, these conclusions are presumably based upon the assumption
of a separate and alternative framework the distinguishing character¬
istic of which is the endogenous determination of the price level and
the emphasis on both real and financial assets in the transmission
mechanism. Yet these conclusions do not seem to be supported by
Monetarists themselves when they claim a different, in terms of gener¬
ality, transmission mechanism but which also includes interest rates.
It has been already shown that both schools believe in an interest
rate mechanism. The difference, claimed by Monetarists, is that the
process needs a wider range of interest rates to include both financial
and real assets; and also, they claim, for interest rates to work
effectively as indicators of monetary policy, price expectations must
be included. However, as far as the sophisticated version of Fiscal-
ism is concerned, it was also shown that both qualifications are
included as characteristics of the transmission mechanism. As Patinkin
claims,
to accept the Keynesian conceptual framework for the
analysis of the demand for money does not imply that one
must reject the quantity-theory conclusions about the
long-run impact of monetary changes on the economy [and
vice versa].51
To a large extent both systems accept an IS-LM general framework for
the transmission mechanism, modified by the emphases either school
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puts on the short-run or long-run, the financial or the real
magnitudes.
Thus even though the general theoretical framework is the
same, the differences stem from different methodological and onto-
52
logical emphases . Whereas the Monetarists tend to prefer a
transmission mechanism that designates the most important role to
money supply disturbances, Fiscalists tend to construct the trans¬
mission mechanism in terms of general disequilibria in various sectors
53-
and parameters . These views are consistent with the pairs of
assumptions of simplicity-flexibility and complexity-inflexibility.
C. CONCLUSION
The Monetary controversy at the theoretical level has been
54
characteristic of a confusion between the two factions . The
alleged differences in the flexibility or inflexibility of prices,
and thus differences about the transmission mechanism, are found not
to be real differences. In so far as we are considering the debate
between (the 'weak' part of) Monetarism and the sophisticated version
of Fiscalism, both factions seem to belong to the generalized neo¬
classical framework, shifting positions only in respect (a) to
methodology, i.e. to differences between unidimensional and multi¬
dimensional causation - simple and complex analysis - and (b) to
ontology, i.e. to differences about more realistic assumptions about
the overall inflexibility and stability of the system. Both Monetar¬
ists and Fiscalists therefore seem to be associated with the same
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neoclassical framework, modified in different directions . As we
shall see, the opposite directions can be taken due to the fluidity
of the Fundamental Postulates of Neoclassical Economics.
Differences, therefore, exist. And these differences
pertain to different assumptions as to how to go about studying the
economy and as to what is the economy itself. In order to see
whether these fundamental differences - and also whether the
theoretical disagreement between Monetarists and the naive conception
of Fiscalism - can be resolved, I now turn to examine the empirical
evidence brought in favour of, or against, either faction. Perhaps,
as Sprinkel says, "A careful, dispassionate study of positive
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"Every man, who has ever reasoned in this subject,
has always proved his theory, whatever it was, by
facts and calculations."
D. Hume, "Of the Balance of Trade"
"[Djifferent economists are going to look at the same
body of data with equal confidence that it supports
their very different theoretical schemes. No matter
what the economic facts are ... W. Heller and
M. Friedman are both going to tell . . . that they




EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE AND THE
RESOLUTION OF THE MONETARY
CONTROVERSY
A. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this chapter is to review the major pieces
of empirical evidence that have been brought forth in order to resolve
the controversy. If the hypothesis, according to Positive economics,
that empirical evidence represents reality is valid, then the reso¬
lution of the conflict should be an easy task. The choice between
rival hypotheses should be dictated by an appeal to empirical reality.
However, as we shall see, although empirical tests of the alternative
hypotheses have been carried out, neither group has been ready to
accept the results. There has always been some kind of qualification
or criticism, either methodological or theoretical, that rendered the
2
empirical results, according to each faction, inapplicable .
The scope of this review will be restricted to empirical
evidence that has stemmed mainly from major monetarist and fiscalist
tests. Firstly, I shall review the monetarist tests, i.e. the money-
income relation evidence, the Friedman-Meiselman tests, the Andersen-
Jordan tests, and the counter-offensives by Fiscalists, comprising the
so-called single-equation tests; and secondly, the fiscalist tests,
i.e. structural models and the counter-offensives by Monetarists,
comprising the large-scale tests.
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B. FORMS OF THE CONTROVERSY
Since the appearance of the first empirical attacks that
the Monetarists levelled against the Fiscalists, the criticism and
counter-attacks that have emerged shaped the debate in numerous forms
that reflected the improvements in techniques and availability of
data. In fact the old issues in the debate have remained the same
and the only thing that did change was the determination of empirical
economic reality. The ad hoc evidence presented before the emergence
of the Friedman-Schwartz and Friedman-Meiselman attack was seen as
inadequate and inconclusive. The methods used by the Radcliffe
Report to support, say, the interest inelasticity of business expend¬
itures was to listen "to opinion rather than analyse . . . data . . .
No tests were conducted and no data were surveyed to examine the
3
validity of this contention" . Despite this 'unpositivism' however
there emerged a tremendous reaction that spurred the expansion, improve¬
ment and widespread use of empirical testing and investigation. In
consequence the controversy took a turn away from the mere verbal or
purely theoretical conjecturing - the Radcliffe Report, for instance,
rejected the quantity theory of money on the "tacit knowledge" that
first, monetary policy was "incidental to interest rate policy" and
4
second, that "there is [no] limit to the velocity of circulation" - to
the 'firm' and 'conclusive' grounds of empirical testing.
Before examining each set of empirical results that were
brought forth it is appropriate to list the issues and empirical
hypotheses that were put to test. The first one, associated with
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Friedman and Schwartz, was concerned with the question whether money
does or does not matter in the determination of aggregate economic
activity. The second issue, associated with Friedman and Meiselman,
was concerned with the comparison of the monetary and fiscal multi¬
pliers in an attempt to establish whether the money supply or
autonomous expenditure mattered more. The third issue, associated
mainly with Andersen and Jordan, was partly an elaboration and per¬
haps an improvement of the previous issue, and related to the relative
efficacy of fiscal and monetary policy. These issues were also
tested within the large-scale model framework. There were also other
issues related to the transmission mechanism, or the demand for money
function, its stability and the role of the interest rate in it"'
(these latter issues are, however, outside the scope of this chapter).
The way and the method with which the above issues were
studied depended on which side of the 'ring' one happened to be. In
the one corner there were the Monetarists propounding the simple
reduced-form, single-equation tests and in the other there were the
Fiscalists supporting the use of large-scale structural econometric
models as a means to extract evidence^. However, although both
factions are characterized by different methods, both of them under¬
took to carry out tests that were based on the method used by the
opposite group. For instance De Leuwe and Kalchbrenner tested
Andersen and Jordan's model with a different specification, and
Andersen tested the merits of Fiscalism and Monetarism by constructing
a model along the lines of the large-scale models, albeit in a
reduced form.
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In respect to the initial distinction between the tests,
however, the choice of method made by the Monetarists was justified
by the fact that for them there were two separate empirical hypotheses
to be tested: whether money matters or it does not matter - hence
the estimation of the correlation between changes in the money stock
and the level of money income - and whether fiscal or monetary
policy was more important in stabilizing the economy. Single-equation
tests were simple and if the exogeneity of the independent variables
was statistically determined then a strict comparison of the magni¬
tudes of the coefficients would presumably decide the truth or falsity
of the hypothesis in question. One vague point in this procedure was
that it was never made clear whether the testing of the equations was
also a testing of the implications of each theory. For instance in
the Andersen-Jordan tests, although the equations were sometimes
called 'reduced forms' the structural model was not, allegedly, made
explicit. The term 'reduced form' was perhaps meant to imply a
relationship between exogenous and endogenous variables, that is to
say between autonomous and induced-by-the-system variables. However,
although the proper econometric procedure implies a relation similar
to the latter, it differs in the respect that the reduced forms may be
7
expanded to the full structural specifications and vice versa . If
this is true then, according to Fiscalists, the Andersen-Jordan test
are not implications of any particular theory, but only independent
empirical hypotheses. Nonetheless the results of these tests were
8
used by Monetarists as evidence for their support of their theory , and
this generated a great deal of criticism not only from Fiscalists but
9
also from supporters of the 'stronger' version of Monetarism .
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On the other side of the debate the Fiscalists justified
their method by pointing out the multidimensionality of the macro-
economic system and the need for allocative detail. At least as far
as the sophisticated version of Fiscalism is concerned, there is not
any one particular factor that should be assigned the causal role.
Fiscalists maintain that since one has to take account for all the
channels through which the effects are transmitted then one needs a
multisectoral, large-scale econometric model. This should encompass
the most important and relevant features of the economic mechanism,
from which the estimation of the parameters, having taken into account
the totality of the system, will serve as evidence for the discrimina¬
tion of the two different theories. According to Fiscalists, then,
it is within this methodological framework that a Keynesian hypothesis
may be appropriately tested. However, as we shall see, in addition
to this type of evidence most Fiscalists tried to fight the Monetarists
on the same battleground, using single-equation tests.
Having seen the forms around which the testing of the
alternative hypotheses revolved, I now turn to examine the resulting
empirical evidence and see whether it was decisive in resolving the
debate.
C. SINGLE-EQUATION TESTS
a. THE MONEY-INCOME RELATION
In a book called "A Monetary History of the U.S. 1867-1960"'''^
Friedman and Schwartz presented evidence that was meant to support the
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hypothesis that money does matter. They compared income changes to
the rate of change of the money stock per unit of time, and found
that practically in all periods examined, the money supply changes
preceded changes in income. According to this investigation empirical
evidence seemed to have changed prior perceptions of experience. Even
for the period of the late '20s and early '30s it was revealed that
money, in opposition to what was generally believed, did matter. All
this implied, for the Monetarists, that money had a controlling influ¬
ence on changes in income. In fact, according to this evidence, it
was not true any more what Keynesians had believed up to then, namely
that low interest rates, liquidity traps, or the instability of velo¬
city could have a pronounced effect in deterring money from having
a systematic relation with income''''''.
However, due to the variability of the time lag from cycle
to cycle it was admitted that money could not be used as a 'fine-
tuning' instrument, but rather that it should be allowed to grow at
a constant rate of, say, three to five per cent per year in order to
correspond to the needs of the growing economy and yet not cause any
inflation. In essence, this finding justified the monetarist onto-
logical assumption of the flexibility of the market and the consequent
non-interventionist stance. In other words, given the 'freedom' and
flexibility of the market any 'fine-tuning' would upset the balance.
However, since any machine needs some oiling, so the economy needs a
'constant rate' of money supply growth in order to operate smoothly.
Effectively then, this evidence was directly and indirectly used,
first to assert the significance and influence of money in the economy,
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and the 'laissez-faire' stance, and second to discredit the fiscalist
propositions, stressing the importance of interest rates as instruments
of monetary policy, and the consequent interventionist stance.
The criticisms and reactions that this evidence generated
were strong and numerous. Kaldor, for instance, emphasized the fact
that there was nothing inherent in the money-income statistical cor¬
relation that could show the direction of - if any - causation.
Was money influencing income or the other way around? The fact that
money supply changes come chronologically first does not mean that
they also determine changes in the level of income causally. In
fact, Kaldor argues, "There is every reason for supposing . . .
that the rise in the 'money supply' should precede the rise in
income - irrespective of whether the money-increase was a cause or
12
effect" . Moreover, the preceding in time of money does not entail
that there is any exogeneity in its variations; on the contrary it
"may merely be a reflection of the operation of the built-in fiscal
13
stabilizer" (although the application of lag structures could allev¬
iate the problem of the statistical endogeneity of money, it could
not, however, alleviate the problem of causation).
Other critics also responded in a similar fashion. One of
them, Samuelson, not only dismissed this evidence as one that rejects
Keynesian theory, but also maintained that "the evidence of timing
and turning-points ... is consistent with many different theories,
14
and also is not a powerful test ..." . Also Davis criticized the
Friedman-Schwartz findings by saying that,
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The Friedman-type cyclical analysis has never seemed
to me to grapple adequately with the implications of
the existence of a strong reverse effect running from
business to money. The existence of such a reverse
effect undercuts seriously the evidential value of the
historical timing pattern of business and monetary
cycles in establishing the causative role of money.15
Finally, Tobin and Swan after having re-estimated the Friedman-Schwartz
model give the final blow by saying that, "Contrary, perhaps, to much
popular belief, the evidence does not support that there is a simple
direct relationship of income to money"^. In addition Tobin and
Swan estimated the predictive capacity of the model and found that the
17
predictions generated diverged significantly from the actual path
Moreover, the conclusion, implied by the Friedman-Schwartz findings,
to the effect that interest rates are insignificant as policy instru¬
ments, has also been contested by Tobin and Swan's findings, who add
that, "While Friedman has doubted the empirical significance of inter¬
est rates, other than expected changes in the value of money, on the
demand for money, other researchers have found evidence of such
18
influence" . The consequence of the evidence that interest
rates are significant is that the money-income relation is weakened.
Once the significance is asserted other influences, besides money,
play an important role in the determination of economic activity.
As Tobin and Swan confirm, "Given such sensitivity, (of money demand
to interest rates) short-run fluctuations in income can have non-monetary
19
as well as monetary causes"
However, despite this fiscalist torrent of criticism and
counter-attacks, Monetarists still hang on the money-income correlation




important facts we have obtained from recent experiences" , and
that it is "the most firmly established empirical association in all
21economics"^" . And yet Fiscalists would respond that this "fact"
22
was a mere "gross association" or that "timing evidence - leads, lags
23
and so on - is no evidence about causation whatsoever"
But where do Monetarists base their belief in this
correlation? Firstly, they claim that there is, over a long period,
quite a close association between money and income, and secondly, in
almost all phases of the cycle money precedes income, though admittedly
with a variable lag. These two evidential points then, imply,
according to the Monetarists, controlling influence. Controlling
influence, however, implies exogeneity and, according to Fiscalists,
this is not true as far as money is concerned. The problem then
centers around the exogeneity of money. While Monetarists claim
that, "no spurious statistical element whatsoever is present . . .
The income series in each country is statistically independent of the
24
money series" , Fiscalists, on the other hand, base their claim that
money is an endogenous variable on the following reasons: (a) they
claim that one cannot argue that money is independent of other factors
not included in the system, and (b) they claim that one cannot know
that the association runs from money to income and not vice versa.
Thus, according to Fiscalists, although money is an important element
within the total picture of economic policy, which is what, according
to them, was shown by the correlation, nonetheless it cannot be
assigned an exclusive causal role. Moreover, Fiscalists argue that
the recognition that money is important does not mean that fiscal policy
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is unimportant. As Samuelson emphasizes,
Most of the evidence is conclusive with respect to a
. . . view that money doesn't matter, but as to the
view that money matters and that fiscal policy . . .
does not have a systematic influence, there is very
little of the . . . evidence that is germane to that.25
In addition there is the argument of the factors outside the relation,
which nonetheless influence it. For example, built-in stabilizers,
movements in interest rates, counter-cyclical government policy, are
some of the factors liable to produce evidence showing money system¬
atically to precede income without this implying or indicating any
26
causal relation . "The substantive issue therefore", as Davis
says, "remains whether or not money is the dominating exogenous
27
influence on the cyclical course of business"
Thus, on the one side Monetarists believe in the exogeneity
of money on statistical grounds, i.e. the money series being signific¬
antly independent of the income series, while on the other side
Fiscalists believe in the endogeneity of money on economic grounds.
Besides some assurance that the correlation is not spurious, Monetar¬
ists have not offered a satisfactory answer to the fiscalist accusation
of economic endogeneity. They have rather insisted on the importance
of this evidence as proving that money matters more than budget manipu¬
lation, and referring to the fiscalist criticisms of the necessity of
determining explicitly the causation of the relation as mere
2 8
"qualifications"
Despite, therefore the 'hardness' of the evidence brought
forth to support the monetarist thesis, it was not accepted by the
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Fiscalists. Inconclusiveness was as much true of the Friedman-Schwartz
evidence as of qualitative judgements of the Radcliffe Report type.
In order to counter-attack the above criticism and bring 'harder' evi¬
dence that would prove the relative merit of Monetarism, the Monetarists
turned to a different type of evidence produced from tests that
compared the relative empirical strength of each hypothesis.
b. THE FRIEDMAN-MEISELMAN TESTS
After the Monetarists had established a correlation between
money and income, they went a step further to compare and test the
relative performance of the quantity theory against the fiscalist auto-
29
nomous expenditure model . It was believed that if the two theories
could be separated into two distinct models then the estimation of
30
these models would provide results capable of resolving the controversy
The rationale behind this test was to determine which variable,
representing each theory, had the most systematic, quick and predictable
effect on the level of consumption. Consumption was chosen instead of
income because given that nominal investment is a part of income then
the use of nominal income would produce spurious results in favour of
the fiscalist position. The variables to represent each theory were:
autonomous expenditure, including investment, exports-imports, government
expenditure and tax collections for the fiscalist side, and some
definition of the money supply for the monetarist side. The models were
presented as two single regression equations, the estimated coefficients
of which represented the multipliers of each theory. The two" regressions
were run over a period of sixty years, finding that the performance of the
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money supply was superior to that of autonomous expenditure,
performance being defined as consistency of the parameter estimates
and in terms of the magnitudes of the correlation coefficients. In
other words results from this test were interpreted as indicating the
relative strength of money over autonomous expenditure in explaining
consumption, and by implication income. For all periods, besides
the Depression years, Friedman and Meiselman (hereafter called F-M)
found that "the stock of money is unquestionably far more critical in
31
interpreting movements in income than is autonomous expenditures"
The criticisms that were stimulated by this test came
32
mainly from Ando and Modigliani, De Prano and Moyer and Hester
The three independent critiques agreed on one fundamental point:
that F-M's empirical results were very much determined by the partic¬
ular conception and definition used to represent the fiscalist
position. Hester argued, for instance, that "Their statistical
comparisons are extremely sensitive to how the autonomous expenditure
33
theory is represented" . Or Ando and Modigliani claimed,
that the relatively low correlation coefficients
between C [consumption] and A [autonomous
expenditures] obtained by FM are due to several
very serious misrepresentations of the Keynesian
theory and its observable implications.34
Finally, De Prano and Mayer contended that,
FM's finding that predictions based on the
autonomous-expenditure equation were inferior to
those based on the money equation was due to a
particular definition of autonomous expenditures.^
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Apart from the definitional problems, the critics contested
the reliability of the F-M's tests and pointed out their various
other shortcomings. For example, misspecification of the consumption
function, inclusion of war years in the period examined, the economic
as distinct from the statistical exogeneity of the independent vari-
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ables , or the use of levels instead of first differences , were
some of the defects on the basis of which Fiscalists did not accept
the F-M results. Moreover, the often repeated fiscalist criticism
to the effect that the discrimination of the competing hypotheses can¬
not be achieved on the basis of simple-equation tests, was brought
forth. This argument is based on the belief that due to the complex¬
ity of macroeconomic phenomena and the manifold interrelations that
need to be represented with a structural and complex model, single-
equation tests cannot distinguish between the effects of money and
autonomous expenditures. For instance, Ando and Modigliani argued
that,
the results reported by FM contain very little, if any,
information about the empirical usefulness of that
model. No really adequate test of this model appears
feasible within the constraint of a single equation.38
Unless a more realistic overview of the economy is undertaken, the
single-equation tests put a severe constraint, "an artificial straight-
39
jacket" , on the tested models. As Poole and Kornblith reported,
neither the simple Keynesian nor the simple quantity
. theory models provide an adequate understanding of
business cycle fluctuations . . . There simply is
not much empirical content in the single-equation
approach as employed in the studies examined here.41
The results, therefore, were not accepted on the basis of their
•
i • •«. 41simplicity
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In addition to these criticisms Fiscalists provided
empirical evidence produced from tests that were equivalent to the
F-M ones. By using modified definitions, especially of the auto¬
nomous expenditures model, excluding war-time periods and removing
42
"some of the oversimplifications andmisspecifications" used in the
F-M tests, Fiscalists tested the models and found that the impact of
autonomous expenditures on consumption was greatly understated in
the F-M tests. They claimed to have found that although money was
important in explaining consumption nevertheless autonomous expend¬
itures, contrary to what F-M found, was on the average, or perhaps
more, important. This result, however, was constrained by the assump¬
tion that the tests could discriminate between the two models inasmuch
as the simple-equation, "straight-jacket", procedure was accepted.
More generally, they claimed that one should not rely on this procedure
43
as it would produce artifical results . Hester, for example, "'using'
a more conventional representation of the autonomous expenditures
theory . . . and some of their data" found that "little empirical
44
evidence . . . favors the quantity theory" . Also by using alternat¬
ive definitions of autonomous expenditures he found that "correlations
45
. . . exceed .90 in non-World War II years" . In essence, according
to the empirical evidence that he adduced, "Friedman and Meiselman's
conclusion that a simple quantity theory performs better than a popular
46
autonomous expenditure theory in correlation tests is false" . In
addition Hester computed first differences instead of levels and found
that irrespective of the measure to represent autonomous expenditures
the fiscalist model "outperforms the monetary model ... in nonwar
47
years" . Also De Prano and Mayer by respecifying slightly the models
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tested found that,
although money is not completely exogenous, we are
in general agreement with FM's positive conclusion
that money is important. We reject, however, their
negative conclusion that autonomous expenditures are
not important.48
Finally, Ando and Modigliani after having redefined the fiscalist
position concluded that their, "tests are fully consistent with the
Keynesian view that both mechanisms play a role" and that, "the
impact effect of autonomous expenditures on current expenditure is
49
shown to remain quite substantially" . Also concerning the impact
effect of money on expenditure, it was found that after modifying
certain assumptions of exogeneity in relation to money, it was much
smaller than was found in the F-M tests^. In short, all critics
of the F-M paper found empirical results significantly contradicting
the results produced by F-M.
This counter-evidence, however, did not seem to convince
F-M who reacted by replying that,
None of the calculations made by our critics ... is
correct because they omit components of income for the
income-expenditure calculations, set the two theories
different tasks, or use lengthy periods combining two
different subperiods.81
Concerning definitions, F-M claimed that their criteria for choosing
the particular ones used in their test were strictly empirical, whereas
52
the Fiscalists' were largely intuitive and a priori . "[I]n our
opinion" F-M argued, "our critics have neither established that, our
measure [of autonomous expenditures] biased the results nor demonstrated
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that their alternative measures are more defensible in terms of
53
relevant criteria" . Concerning the exclusion of wartime periods
they responded that it "is a debating point pure and simple . . .
54
It has no relevance to our papers" . However, F-M did not confine
their response to theoretical counter-critiques, but they also provided
more empirical evidence using some of the alternative definitions
offered by the Fiscalists. F-M conclude,
We have made some of the correct calculations for one of
the alternative concepts of autonomous expenditures . . .
Though less clear-cut, the results are in the same direction
as those from our original calculations.55 (my emphasis)
Even with these new calculations F-M did not succeed in
persuading the Fiscalists of the superiority of the monetarist position.
Fiscalists stayed incontravertibly in their initial position. For
instance, Hester exclaimed that,
someone might have construed the Friedman-Meiselman paper
as saying something about the relative usefulness of the
autonomous expenditure and quantity theories. I have
shown that their results are inconclusive.56
Or Ando and Modigliani replied that they,
cannot . . . accept what seems to be FM's main criticism of
our procedure for testing the income-expenditure model . . .
The specification of our model was chosen to fit, as closely
as possible, the standard Keynesian formulation . . . their
procedure using simple correlations ... is no less heuristic
than our appeal to common sense and informal observation,
although it appears so much more formidable and objective.57
Finally, additional evidence against the monetarist "position
came from applications of the F-M test to British data by Barret and
58
Walters . Regarding the monetarist position their results differed
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quite substantially from the F-M ones, and regarding the fiscalist
position, with a slight change of specification, the autonomous-
59
expenditures model seemed to perform better . Although the obvious
criticism against these results was that the different character¬
istics of the British economy accounted for the divergence of the
results, a study made by Argy showed that the difference in the two
economies were minimal relative to the application of the test and
that therefore the results were comparable^.
In effect, then, one can safely conclude that the F-M
empirical evidence failed to convince the Fiscalists of the relative
prominence of the monetarist position. It would appear, from the
above account, the definitional problem loomed quite large. Evidence
and counter-evidence was produced with different specifications or
modifications of the models tested. Even though the Monetarists
argue that, "important substantive conclusions seldom hinge on which
definition is used" ^, and, "that the definitional problem is not an
obstacle . . . [and] it has been shown that different definitions of
6 2
money give consistent results ..." , and therefore brush away the
problem, it is nevertheless true that different definitions have been
applied and different results have been found. Pierce and Shaw, for
instance, found that, "successive narrowing of the definition of
A [autonomous expenditure] tends to raise the explanatory power
of A from 38% to 80%" . In fact Fiscalists insisted that
the, "definition of autonomous-expenditure is open to a wide variety
of interpretations and the results of tests using different definitions
64
will lead, in general, to large variations" , or that, "the use of
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slightly different definitions will lead in general to different
results"^. Thus the problem seems to revolve around the question
of whether there could be one set of definitions acceptable to both
sides of the debate unconditionally. However, if the problem is
cast in these terms, then the definitional investigation requires
theoretical insight that will determine the empirical scope. This,
however, leaves the Positive economist with empirical facts that are
theory laden and therefore, according to him/her, subjective and
unacceptable. If on the other hand the definitions are determined
strictly empirically, the question arises as to what validates the
criteria with which the empirical truth and content of the definition
of the variables is determined? Surely not theory, and surely not
empirical evidence. In narrowing the problem to one of definition
and conceptual determination of the variables, the task of the
Positive economist, namely to empirically objectify theories, is
undermined.
It is interesting to note in this context that the
definitional problems facing the F-M empirical results is a manifest¬
ation of the methodological problems discussed in part I. The
ambiguities in the definition of 'theoretical' or 'empirical' mentioned
there allow sufficient leeway for alternative interpretations of what
theory or fact should mean. Both Monetarists and Fiscalists in being
inconsistent in this definition stumble on the obstacle of the imposs¬
ibility of drawing a demarcation line between theory and fact. Thus,
the methodological difficulties facing Predictionists and Assumptionists
rear their ugly heads among Monetarists and Fiscalists. It seems that
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perpetual modifications and respecifications produce contradicting
empirical evidence perpetually.
In concluding, we see that although the F-M tests were
perhaps significant in establishing the importance of money, a pro¬
position not rejected by Fiscalists, it was, nevertheless, neither
conclusive nor sufficient in being able to discriminate between the
two theories. In short the objectivity, so much sought after,
could not be found among either sides' empirical evidence. It seems
that for various reasons neither did the Fiscalists ever accept the
objectivity of the F-M results, nor did the Monetarists accept the
counter-criticism. As Brainard and Cooper report 10 years after the
F-M tests, "In retrospect, it appears clear that it is not possible
to discriminate between competing macromodels simply on the basis of
in-sample fits"^. Despite the inconclusiveness of this empirical
evidence Friedman did rely on the F-M tests as evidence for the
67
monetarist position . Thus the stalemate between Monetarists and
Fiscalists grew.
c. THE ANDERSEN-JORDAN TESTS
In view of the controversial nature of the F-M evidence
there arose some dissatisfaction among Monetarists as to the way the
test was conducted. As a result new tests were devised and the
specification was improved. The results elicited by the new tests
were still in favour of the new quantity theory and against the
fiscalist position. The credibility and forcefulness of Monetarism
was enhanced by virtue of the refinement and sophistication of the
single-equation tests.
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Essentially, this sophistication was the result of discontent
towards the testing of multipliers derived from models always assumed
6 8
to be true and good approximations of reality . The Andersen-Jordan
69
tests were considered improvements insofar as they offered direct
tests of alternative economic hypotheses, in a 'purely' empirical
manner, and not tests of the implications of any theory. Although
they were sometimes called reduced-form tests there was nothing in the
model to indicate the structure from which the reduced forms were
, . ,70derived
The tests were designed so as to determine directly the
relative effectiveness of monetary versus fiscal policy. The multiple
regressions calculated had as the independent variable measures of
fiscal and monetary policy. The regressions were run over a period
from 1/1952 to 11/1968. The refinements and improvements over the
F-M tests, consisted mainly in the way in which each variable was meas¬
ured. The variable chosen to represent fiscal policy consisted of
changes in the full employment budget surplus and in the full
employment federal expenditures and revenues. On the other side,
monetary policy was represented by changes in the money supply and in
the monetary base.
In measuring fiscal policy with the full employment budget,
Andersen and Jordan managed to purge the relations of any income induced
changes in the components of the budget, such as, for example, tax
receipts. In addition the use of two measures of monetary policy, and
especially the use of the monetary base, rendered the tests more immune
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to the endogeneity-of-money criticism. The second type of improvement
was in the use of distributed lags in which the shape of the lag was
determined in the regression allowing only for the a_ priori imposition
71
of the length of the lag
All in all the Andersen-Jordan tests were considered by both
sides as a major step towards discriminating between the two theories.
However, it must be emphasized that although Andersen and Jordan (A-J
hereafter) claimed that, strictly speaking, the test was about two
alternative empirical hypotheses, the results nevertheless were taken
as a support of one theoretical position and the rejection of the
other72.
The overall results of the tests were that fiscal policy was
ineffective and that monetary policy was more potent. In fact the
tax coefficients were presented as having perverse signs, i.e. an
increase of taxes will increase G.N.P. In addition it was found that
monetary policy acts more quickly than fiscal policy. According to
A-J, "The response of economic activity to monetary actions compared
with that of fiscal actions is (I) larger, (II) more predictable,
73
and (III) faster" . The results therefore seemed to support the
monetarist position and for some Monetarists conclusively so. For
Friedman in fact the success of the tests-along with the rest of the
evidence proved beyond any doubt the supremacy of the "monetary theory
74
of nominal income"
However, despite the improvements in measurement and the
assurance of the Monetarists, the Fiscalists did not accept the validity
198
of the results partly on some old familiar grounds and partly on the
results of alternative tests. The old familiar arguments were those,
first, of simplicity and, second, of endogeneity. Regarding the
first criticism, the methodological question of single-equation tests
was brought up again and the necessity of taking into account the
interdependence of the whole system was emphasized. It was argued
that if expenditure did not have any effect on income then this did
not mean that fiscal policy was impotent, but rather that one of the
other components of aggregate demand, unspecified behaviourally in
75
the A-J test, must have changed perversely so as to offset the impact
A greater knowledge of the complete structure of the system was there¬
fore needed before anything could be said about the relative effective¬
ness of each policy. Regarding the second criticism, Fiscalists
argued in terms of income induced money changes and of the definition
of money. It was alleged that both definitions of money used in the
tests were not exogenous and that adjustments were needed for the
76
results of the tests to be valid . It was also contended that the
lags in the tests were unrealistic and did not conform to the common
77
experience evidenced up to then . It was also argued that the re¬
sults depended upon the period chosen. Artis and Nobay applied
similar tests to British data from a different period, 1958-1967, and
78
found quite dissimilar results . Also Walters applied the tests to
1955-1956 period data and found quite dissimilar results, at least as
79
far as the money supply is concerned . In addition Davis by splitting
the period into two parts found that, for the earlier part at least,
monetary policy performed quite poorly*^.
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However, the major criticism came from De Leeuw and
Kalchbrenner (D-K hereafter) who ran the same regression on the same
data only with a somewhat different specification of the policy
81
variables . As far as the specification of fiscal policy was con¬
cerned D-K argued that the exogeneity claimed by Andersen and Jordan
for the fiscal variable was interpeted as an exogeneity in terms of
82
the independence from the influence of policy makers . However,
they argued, a different interpretation of exogeneity, namely that
of the independence of the variable from current endogenous variables,
was not taken into account, with the result of bias in the findings.
As one example of this misspecification, they claimed that although
the full employment budget is independent of actual oscillations,
nevertheless it does not take inflation into account. An adjustment
83
to allow for price expectations was therefore considered necessary
In addition D-K felt that the definition of monetary policy did not
conform fully to the economic exogeneity condition. Component parts
84
of the monetary base , such as currency held by the public, were not
independent of movements in endogenous variables representing economic
activity. So they adjusted the monetary base to exclude currency.
The results found after testing the respecified equations were quite
dissimilar to the ones reported by A-J. As D-K report,
(i) although the monetary policy variable remains the
predominant influence in terms of t-ratios, the monetary
multiplier decreases in size, and (ii) although the two
fiscal variables remain insignificant statistically, the
coefficients of the expenditures and receipts variables
have the expected sign.85
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Furthermore the quick action of monetary policy, shown in the A-J
86
tests, also was proved to be much slower . Thus D-K's results
seemed to contradict A-J's. As D-K conclude,
We feel these results cast serious doubt on the Andersen-
Jordan conclusions about fiscal policy. With alternative
and highly plausible measures of Federal receipts and the
monetary base, fiscal policy appears to exert a significant
influence on GNP in the expected direction. Monetary
policy also appears to exert a powerful influence.^7
In reply A-J argued, however, that the alternative
specifications were not economically plausible. They also main¬
tained that D-K confused the issue of the definition of the monetary
88
base . They also claimed that "this process (of peeling the
monetary base) has no economic relevance within the context of the
89
customary body of economic theory ..." . Despite criticisms and
counter-evidence A-J rejected the fiscalist modifications and held
90
on their initial results
In conclusion, we see that the A-J tests though they
constituted improvements of the F-M tests, did not produce empirical
evidence sufficiently conclusive so as to decide between the fiscalist
and monetarist positions. Indeed Fiscalists were persuaded that
money mattered, an issue undisputed by them, but they were far from
being convinced that measures representing fiscal policy were less
strong in determining GNP than measures representing Monetarism. We
have seen that empirical evidence presented by either side was not
accepted and was interpreted according to different perspectives.
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Again here as in the F-M tests, definitions, measurement difficulties
and theoretical problems prevented empirical testing from fulfilling
the positivist criterion of empirical validation. Thus theory was
an inseparable element of empirical observations. In effect differ-
91
ent specifications, or definitions, gave different results . As
Brainard and Cooper say,
Given the fact that economic data do not distinguish
between economic views, the plausibility of theoretical
explanation will continue to bear heavy weight in
distinguishing among alternative hypotheses as well as
in guiding our exploration of the data.92
Not a very happy prospective for the Positive economist who needs
theory-free empirical facts in order to choose between alternative
theoretical schemata.
We have thus seen that the empirical evidence produced by
single-equation tests, and brought forth by Monetarists, have not
proved decisive in resolving the Monetary controversy. Perhaps
empirical evidence produced by large-scale complex models, brought
forth by Fiscalists, might do better. The following section will
briefly review the evidence and examine this possibility.
D. EVIDENCE FROM LARGE-SCALE ECONOMETRIC MODELS
Up to now I have presented evidence relating to the
controversy from tests that are by and large monetarist. The assump¬
tion behind these tests was that single-equation models provide a simple
and rigorous way for solving controversial issues. We have also seen
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that the results based on these tests were not accepted by Fiscalists.
This was due, firstly, to methodological and theoretical reasons and,
secondly, to alternative evidence produced by similar tests conducted
by Fiscalists and containing different specifications. It was
claimed that findings derived from single-equation tests were not
valid because they were either based on misspecifications of the
equations, or they were models that did not explicitly specify the
complete structure from which the behavioural relations were supposed
93
to be derived . From the point of view of the Fiscalists the contro¬
versial issues were far from being resolved with the evidence produced
by single-equation tests.
In their stead Fiscalists offered results and empirical
findings that were based on large-scale econometric models that speci¬
fied the full structure of the economy. It was believed that only
within this complex context could alternative policy formulations be
appropriately tested. It is the purpose of this section to account
for this type of evidence and see the extent to which it has succeeded
in resolving the conflict and achieving convergence of the opposing
views in the Monetary debate.
a. METHOD AND SCOPE OF LARGE-SCALE MODELS
The major objective of large-scale econometric models is to
'mirror' complex reality in a systematic, quantitative, fashion. For
the model builder there is no doubt that the economy is a set of
interdependent and complex processes that need to be classified and
determined quantitatively. A greater knowledge of the complexity of
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the world implies a greater refinement and increase of the scale of
the model, and therefore a greater predictive capacity. This is an
attitude shared by most model builders. According to Frcmm and
Taubman,
F or a system as complex as the modern economy, there
are very few issues that can be examined in the simple,
single-relationship ceteris paribus framework . . .
What is needed is a quantitative simplification of the
relations among economic variables which models the
economy as system rather than as a set of unrelated
random processes.94
To a certain extent this assumption of complex reality is
also shared by the Monetarists. Friedman, for example, claims in
his methodological writings that the world is indeed complex. But
the way to look at it is not through a fully descriptive theory, but
95
rather through simple, analytic, abstractions . In fact, this rule
constitutes an important tenet of Positivism in general, which sees
phenomena in terms of observable, complex, processes the systematiza-
96
tion of which defines the task of the scientist . In this respect,
i.e. in having a complex, unordered, world-view, both schools share
the same positivist criterion. To a certain extent also they carry
out this common perception of the world in a similar fashion, in that
they both attempt to quantify observable phenomena. However, they
differ in the following respect: for the Monetarists the world is
far too complex to be modelled accurately. The way for them to study
it is through simple conjectural hypotheses the tested predictions of
which will generate knowledge about the world; hence the use of
single-equation tests. "With regard to evidence", says Andersen,
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"the testing of simple hypotheses is deemed to be more useful than
97
the building of elaborate structural models"
For the Fiscalists, on the other hand, the more accurate
and detailed a description of reality becomes the easier it is to
capture the totality of the relations and to systematize one's under¬
standing of unordered events and interdependencies. Although a
cumbersome task for estimation, the continuous study of subsectors
and the further disaggregation of the model provides the economist
with greater insights as to the workings of the economy. It follows
that to be able to make predictions, one needs to identify, as much
as possible, all factors involved. According to Fiscalists a
structural model that tends to approximate reality is more apt to
make correct predictions than a less detailed one. For the Fiscal-
ist model builder, all economic factors are relevant and should be
included in a model. This is shown by the Fiscalists' insistence
to disaggregate and try to make as many variables as possible endogen-
ously determined. For Fiscalists causality lies nowhere and everywhere.
For them the monetary sector is as important as the government in
shaping economic policy^.
Another objective of the model builder is to use large-scale
models to test alternative theories or policy proposals. The evidence
99
produced from such tests are considered "systemic" . That is, the
tested coefficients are derived from a complete structure and their
values are supposed to account for the workings of the entire_system.
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Fiscalists emphasize this in order to draw a contrast with
single-equation tests, the coefficients of which are not considered
reduced forms proper. For them the correct way is to attempt to
reconstruct the full structure of the economy and specify a detailed
financial subsector (the MPS model has 30 equations to account for
financial events). The government and monetary multipliers, as
representations of either theory, are thus seen in this context.
In considering some of the issues the above point can be
clarified. Concerning the impact of alternative policies, the
values of the fiscal and monetary multipliers in single-equation
tests, on the one hand, are the result of the impact of a change in
an independent variable (meaning a variable that is unrelated to
other subsectors) on an endogenous variable. For the structural
model, on the other hand, the variables in question are defined within
a broader context and their linkages are traceable to a wider struct¬
ure. In this sense simulation results of alternative policies
reflect all these linkages and account for the totality of the system.
Another example is the appropriate policy indicator issue. This
issue is about the most correct indicator for the effects of monetary
policy. For Fiscalists the effects of monetary policy are gauged in
terms of interest rates, whereas for Monetarists the effects are
calibrated in terms of the quantity of money"^*. A straightforward
problem it seems, which could, presumably, be solved by an appeal to
evidence constructed from tests of the effects of monetary policy (as
measured either by money or interest rate) on economic activity.
Both types of tests do this but the interpretion differs. In
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addition, the results found in either test conflict, with each
102
other . For the single-equation tests the variables are chosen
irrespective of the specification of the complete structure, whereas
large-scale models "concentrate on the specified causal links embodied
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in their structures" . In essence, the two opposing factions
espouse their own method of testing their theories with reality, and
consider their own evidence as the most appropriate.
Notwithstanding all these methodological differences between
the two tests, comparisons can be made between the two sets of evid¬
ence relating to the controversy, mainly for two reasons: (a) there
are monetarist models, like the FRB-St.Louis model, the structure of
which, although small in scale resembles the structure of economy-
wide models, (b) despite fiscalist assertions A-J claim that tests
can be considered reduced forms and that attempts have been made to
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specify the structure behind the tests . In comparing the two
tests we shall see however, that the empirical evidence is contradict¬
ory, the monetarist version of large-scale testing supports
Monetarism, while the fiscalist complex testing supports Fiscalism.
b. FEATURES AND STRUCTURE OF THE FINANCIAL SECTOR
I shall briefly outline the structure of the financial
sector of six econometric models as this will, firstly, provide a
context within which to look at the empirical results and, secondly,
enable the reader to contrast the two different approaches discussed
in the previous section.
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With the exception of the FRB-St.Louis model, all the
models listed in Table I follow the fiscalist tradition and rely
heavily on interest rates for the transmission of monetary impulses.
Most of them use unborrowed reserves, the discount rate and open
market operations as exogenous monetary policy instruments. In
addition the MPS model uses the monetary base and the FRB-St.Louis
model uses one definition of money. Although the latter uses a
measure of fiscal policy (high-employment budget) it does not use a
measure for tax changes. In Table I I have put in a summary form
the most important characteristics of six econometric models.
The main objectives of these models are to make forecasts
and to evaluate alternative policy actions. These objectives are
shared among models in varying proportions. For example the
Condensed Brookings model was considered an advance over the older
Brookings models because it put the emphasis on policy simulations
rather than forecasting. In reaction to monetarist criticisms relat¬
ing to the 'cost of borrowing' limited channel of monetary influence,
the FRB-MIT model expanded the financial sector and had as a specific
objective to fully specify the transmission mechanism of monetary
policy and provide a link with the real sector^"*. The major chan¬
nels specified were the cost of capital, the rates of return on bonds,
and credit rationing''^. The Wharton Mark III model shares similar
objectives, i.e. to expand the financial sector and to include a
107
detailed treatment of prices . The Liu-Hwa model offers an
interesting feature that departs from the rest of the models. In
this model they use a real rather than a nominal rate of interest.
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TABLE I: SUMMARY OF SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS OF MODELS
ENDOGENOUS NO. OF
MODEL
TIME SCALEa DISAGGREGATION FINANCIAL - ENDOGENOUS





BROOKINGS QUARTERLY LARGE MEDIUM MEDIUM 7
FRB-MIT:
D-8 QUARTERLY MEDIUM 19
WHARTON
MK III QUARTERLY VERY LARGE MEDIUM MEDIUM 11
LIU-HWA-
71
MONTHLY MEDIUM LIMITED MEDIUM 6
MPS
(FED-MIT) QUARTERLY
LARGE LIMITED STRONG 30
FRB-ST.LOUIS QUARTERLY VERY SMALL NONE STRONG 2
NOTES: a. Based on number of equations: very small = 9 or less
small =10-49
medium = 50 - 119
large = 120 - 199
very large = 200 or more.
b. Based on sector detail: limited =2-5 sectors
medium =6-20 "
high = 21 or more "
c. Based on qualitative judgements on pervasiveness of
financial variables in real sector equations and rear
variables in financial sector equations (see Fromm and
Klein, below).
SOURCES: G. Fromm and L.R. Klein, "The NBER/NSF Model Comparison Seminar:
An Analysis of Results", Annals of Economic and Social
Measurement, 1976, p.2, Fromm, "Survey of US Models . . .",
op.cit., pp.388-391, Fisher and Sheppard, "Interrelationships
. . .", op.cit., pp.211-5, and L.G. Andersen and L.C.A. Carlson,
"A Monetarist Model of Economic Stabilization", FRB of St. Louis
Review, Nov. 1970, pp.7-21.
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This is in answer to the monetarist criticism concerning the
Fiscalists' use of nominal interest rates which, assuming dis¬
equilibrium between real and nominal magnitudes, biases the results
of econometric models"*^.
This point is important as it implies the need for a sound
price-wage specification. The price-wage equation is, in fact, a
weak point in model building. As Fromm and Taubman confirm,
An examination of the complete model solutions for
1961-62 [of the Brookings model] reveals that the wages
and prices sector is one of the largest contributors of
errors in the aggregate results.109
If a price-wage equation is properly specified then it is possible to
incorporate price expectations. This in turn allows for the examina¬
tion of situations whereby nominal interest rates diverge from real
ones. The calibration of monetary policy with nominal interest rates
is, therefore, biased when an inflationary period is studied. How¬
ever, apart from the Liu-Hwa and the MPS models, the price-wage
equation has been poorly specified by the rest of the models. For
this reason the MPS model is important for the controversy, and also
because it has as a specific objective the examination of the influence
of monetary policy actions on the economy, within a complex model
context. According to Ando the MPS model is sufficiently comprehensive
to account for most questions of stabilization policies. Moreover
it provides a theoretical framework that accommodates most of the
Monetarists' contentions^^. In addition it offers a highly dis-
aggregated monetary sector with the greatest number of financial
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exogenous variables. Finally the St. Louis model was built with the
sole purpose to estimate the impact of alternative policies within a
monetarist context.
I
In judging evidence from large-scale models, Monetarists
offered a series of criticisms. One of these was the alleged confus¬
ion between nominal and real magnitudes. Another criticism related
to the interaction between financial and real sectors. Implicit in
this criticism was the assumption that Fiscalists' models lack a
'wealth effect', i.e. the impact of a change in prices on the relative
yields of assets in private portfolios. The change in the yields
induces a reshuffle of the assets with the consequence of changes in
the pattern of private expenditures. For older models this was
certainly true. However, for the new ones, like the MPS model
"Consumption expenditures are dependent on stock market prices
(through a wealth effect) and outlays for durables are tied to corpor¬
ate bond rates"''''''''". In addition housing starts equations and interest
rates on fixed-plant and equipment are incorporated. Finally, there
is the criticism of the 'budget-restraint'. It is claimed that models
do not account for the effect of changes in the government debt pay¬
ments for maturing securities. However, the Brookings and the
FRB-MIT:D-8 models have partly accounted for this effect by introducing
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some of the relevant variables
Having roughly outlined the structure of the financial sector
in a small sample of large-scale econometric models, the scene has been
set wherein it is possible to examine the empirical evidence intended
to resolve the Monetary controversy.
211
c. THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
Although the debate is not confined to a single issue but
rather it consists of a range of controversial points (such as monetary
versus fiscal policy, crowding-out effect, role of interest rate,
stability of velocity, time-lag in effect of policy actions, exogeneity
of money, indicators issue, etc.), it seems more relevant to concentrate
on one issue, namely the effects of monetary and fiscal policy on macro-
aggregates. This is due to two reasons: firstly, because this issue
features as the most prominent one in the debate, generating much
heated discussion, and secondly, because most of the empirical testing
concentrates around this issue. The monetarist position is that money
plays a more important role than government expenditures, while the
fiscalist position is that both monetary and fiscal policies are import¬
ant. However, the hypothesis to be tested is not about the absolute
superiority of either fiscal or monetary policy, but rather about the
speed of response and the dynamic implications of each policy. Monetar¬
ists claim that changes in the money stock affect real output in the
short-run and nominal magnitudes in the long-run. Real output in the
long run is affected by real forces, such as productivity trends. On
the other hand, Fiscalists claim that changes in government expenditures
and taxes have an important influence - along with accommodating
monetary policy - on both real and nominal magnitudes in the short and
long run.
In Tables II, III, V, VI, VII, VIII, and IX I have set out the
results from empirical testing of a sample of models, of the power of
fiscal and monetary policy in influencing economic activity. Although,
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strictly and technically speaking, it is illegitimate to make
comparisons of results, due to different initial conditions (most of
the models are non-linear) and somewhat different specifications, yet
it is still legitimate to make the comparisons on the assumption that
differences in initial conditions and specifications have a small
effect on the direction and magnitude of the multipliers, and they
are not so great as to make comparisons impossible. In his survey
of large-scale models, Fromm reports that, "some of the disparities
are great. Yet interchanges between model builders have resulted in
113
strikingly similar treatment in a number of areas"
Most of the large-scale models are in agreement about the
effects of fiscal policy (see Table II). The values of the fiscal
multipliers range from 2 to 3 in the first four quarters and increase
thereafter. In the tenth year the multipliers range from 3.3 to
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almost 4.0 . However, when the increase in the price level is
taken into account the results somewhat differ. In the beginning the
differences are not so great, values range from 2 to 2.7, however,
afterwards they start to decrease reaching in the tenth year, for the
Brookings model 0.9 and for the Wharton -3.0. For the FRB-St.Louis,
however, the value of -0.2 had been reached from the eighth quarter
and remained so*^. The values of the personal tax multipliers are
somewhat lower than the expenditure ones. This, however, according
to Fiscalists, is not unexpected.
The difference between expenditure and tax multipliers need
not necessarily equal unity. They do so only in simplistic
balanced-budget models that exclude a multiplicity of leakages
and income-expenditure feedbacks. H6
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TABLE II: FISCAL POLICY DYNAMIC MULTIPLIERS
GOVERNMENT NONDEFENSE EXPENDITURES ON GNP (current dollars)
QUARTER
Condensed Wharton MPS FRB-St. Liu-Hwa
Brookings Mk III (Fed-MIT) Louis monthly
CURa C0Nb CUR CON CUR CON CUR CON CUR
1 1.8 1.8 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.2 0.6 0.5 1.1
2 2.3 2.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.5 1.1 1.0 1.5
3 2.7 2.7 1.7 1.8 2.1 1.9 1.2 1.0 1.8
4 2.8 2.8 1.8 2.0 2.5 2.2 0.7 0.5 2.1
8 2.9 2.7 2.22.4 3.0 2.2 0.1 -0.2 -
.
PERSONA], TAX ON GNP
1 1.0 1.0 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.1
2 1.4 1.3 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.4
3 1.6 1.5 0.9 1.0 1.2 1.1 0.9
4 1.8 1.6 " 1.0 1.2 1.5 1.3 1.2
8 2.3 1.6 1.5 1.7 2.7 2.1 -
NOTES:
a. CUR = current dollars
b. CON = constant dollars (1958)
Brookings:
Period 1956:1 - 1965:4.
Wharton Mk III:







Increase of $5 billion (1958) dollars) in
government expenditure; decrease of
$5 billion in personal taxes.
Increase of $1 billion in nondefense
expenditures with average associated change
in government wage bill and employment;
decrease of $1 billion in personal taxes.
$1 billion increase in exports without
accommodating monetary policy and $1 billion
decrease in personal taxes.
$5 billion increase in nondefense
expenditures.
Increase of $5 billion in nondefense
1964:06. spending.
Fromm, "Survey of United States Models", op.cit., p.408, and
G. Fromm and L.R. Klein, "A Comparison of Eleven Econometric




In general most of the models agree that fiscal policy is
quite powerful and economic aggregates respond quite sensitively
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to its changes . This can be clearly seen in Table III whereby
comparisons are made of results concerning the effects of fiscal
actions between a large-scale model and a small-scale model.
TABLE III: THE EFFECTS ON GNP OF FISCAL POLICY IN




MODEL ST. LOUIS MODEL
AFTER
SPENDING TAXING SPENDING TAXING
Quarter
1 2.0 1.1 0.36 -0.16
2 2.5 2.2 0.89 -0.15
3 3.4 3.2 0.06 -0.23
4 3.2 4.7 0.06 -0.23
NOTES:
SOURCE:
Based on $1 billion spending increase or
tax decrease, or equivalent. Initial
conditions of 1963:1 are used in the FRB-
MIT model. The FRB-MIT results are con¬
verted into comparable dimensions with those
of the St. Louis model.
Full model effects.
Teigen, "The Keynesian-Monetarist Debate
in the U.S. . . op.cit., p.24.
Whereas in the fiscalist model empirical evidence shows an appreciable
effect of expansionary fiscal policy on GNP, in the monetarist model
fiscal policy is shown to be impotent. Within the St. Louis model
fiscal policy has almost adverse impacts on economic activity. More
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recent simulations with the MPS model, however, corroborate the
fiscalist results and oppose the monetarist evidence. Having des¬
cribed evidence of a demand shock in the model Modigliani concludes
that,
These results, which are broadly confirmed by other
econometric models . . . [do not] support the monetarist
view of a highly stable economy in which shocks hardly
make a ripple and the effects of fiscal policy are puny
and fast vanishing.
On the other hand, as can be seen from Table III, the
St. Louis model shows different evidence. It shows that fiscal
actions have a lesser impact, and from the fourth quarter their influ¬
ence starts to diminish. Andersen and Carlson report that,
According to the model fiscal actions have short-run
effects, but for period of a year or more . . . the
net effect is much smaller . . . monetary actions
are the major factor contributing to economic
fluctuations.
It should be noted that the FRB-St,Louis model was extensively tested
and it was found that its performance, as measured by its forecasting
record was, at the least, comparable to the performance of large-
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scale models . In Table IV we can compare the predictive perform¬
ance of the St. Louis model with the Wharton and see that the former
does as well as the latter.
Regarding the effects of an expansionary monetary policy on
the economy, on the one hand results from large-scale models conform
to Fiscalists' expectations that both monetary and fiscal policies are
important, whereas results from small-scale models conform to
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TABLE IV: FORECASTING PERFORMANCE OF TWO MODELS
NAME OF MODEL
ROOT MEAN SQUARE ERRORS











Sample periods: Wharton: 1948 - 1964
St. Louis: 1956 - 1969
Exogenous variables:. Wharton: 43
St. Louis: 3
SOURCE: Andersen and Carlson, "A Monetarist Model for Economic
Stabilization, op.cit., p.16.
Monetarists' expectations that monetary policy - i.e. a fixed change
in money and not fine-tuning - has a relatively stronger effect on
the economy than fiscal measures. In Table V we can see the effect
of a $1 billion increase of unborrowed reserves on the levels of GNP,
121
prices, and on the short- and long-term interest rates
For the CB model an increase of money has an adverse effect
on GNP for the first quarter, while it increases slowly (and perhaps
erratically) thereafter. For the FRB-MIT model, however, GNP
increases steadily from the first quarter. An expansion of the
money supply has the expected (for Fiscalists) sign for both short-
and long-term interest rates in the CB model. These results.suggest
that for the CB model, and to a certain extent for the FRB-MIT model,
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TABLE V: MONETARY POLICY SIMULATIONS WITH TWO LARGE-SCALE MODELS:
INCREASE OF $1 BILLION IN UNBORROWED RESERVES
















































NOTE: a. 1954 $bn for the CB model and 1958 $bn for the
FRB-MIT model.
SOURCE: Fisher and Sheppard, "Interrelationships . .
op.cit., p.226.
an increase in the money supply, although important, does not have as
strong an effect on the economy as the one suggested by Monetarists.
However, results from monetarist models show that an increase
in the growth rate of the money supply has the expected effect hypo-
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thesized by Monetarists . Table VI shows results from a projection
of a 6 per cent growth in the money stock on target variables.
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TABLE VI: SIMULATIONS OF A PROJECTED 6 PER CENT INCREASE IN THE MONEY
STOCK WITH THE FRB-ST.LOUIS MODEL
QUARTER IV/1969 1/1970 11/1970 II1/1970 IV/1970 1/1971 11/1971 II1/1971
REAL GNP -0.1 -1.3 -0.1 0.2 1.6 3.3 3.7 4.8
NOMINAL
GNP
5.1 3.5 4.6 4.8 6.0 7.6 7.8 8.9
GNP PRICE
DEFLATOR
5.0 4.9 4.7 4.5 4.3 4.2 4.0 3.9
COMMERCIAL
PAPER RATE
8.0 7.6 6.7 6.5 6.3 6.1 5.9 5.7
CORPORATE
RATE
7.4 7.4 7.2 7.2 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.2
SOURCE: Andersen and Carlson, "A Monetarist Model for Economic
Stabilization", op.cit., p.19.
The projected simulations show that total spending would be
increasing at almost 9 per cent in the eighth quarter. Although out¬
put will decline very slowly at the beginning, reflecting the
123
effects of past restrictive monetary and fiscal actions , it will start
increasing from the second quarter to reach an almost 5 per cent growth
rate by the end of the second year. Past restrictive monetary actions
will also retard the increase of the price level. However, even with
124
this, the inflation rate will be almost 4 per cent by the end of 1971
Finally, although both short- and long-term interest rates will start
falling this would be in response to the temporary reduction i-n output,
125
and it would not correspond to the rapid growth of money . However,
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the fall of the interest rates will be slow compared to that
indicated in large-scale models. From what it seems then from
these results, despite restrictive past economic policies and in¬
flation, the model seems to corroborate the monetarist hypothesis
that an increase in the money stock will have a pronouned effect on
the economy. This can also be seen in Table VII where comparisons
are made between results from three fiscalist and one monetarist
model.
TABLE VII: DYNAMIC MULTIPLIERS: GROSS NATIONAL
PRODUCT/UNBORROWED RESERVES OR






1 1.2 0.4 1.9 0.0
2 2.9 1.1 2.4 0.1
3 4.5 2.2 3.4 0.6
4 5.3 3.6 4.1 1.5
FRB-ST.LOUIS:
Period 1962:1 - 1964:4
MPS:
WHARTON MK III:
Period 1965:1 - 1974:4
LIU-HWA:
Period 1961:01 - 1964:06
SOURCE: Fromm and Klein,
Seminar", op.cit.,
Increase of 0.5 billion
in MI
Increase of 0.5 billion
in unborrowed reserves
Increase of 0.5 billion
in unborrowed reserves
Increase of 1 billion
in unborrowed reserves
'he NBER/NSF Model Comparison
pp.25-26.
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Thus empirical evidence as determined by the two alternative
approaches seems to favour both sides. This, however, cannot be seen
straightforwardly when comparing the two tables, since different
experiments are involved. Nonetheless adjustments have been made and
results have been converted from the FRB-MIT model in order to compare
with the St. Louis model.
TABLE VIII: CHANGES IN NOMINAL GNP GENERATED
BY A $1 BILLION INCREASE IN
THE MONEY ST0CKa
EFFECT AFTER FRB-MIT M0DELb ST. LOUIS MODEL
1 quarter $ 0.2 $ 1.5
2 quarters 0.4 3.1
4 quarters 0.4 5.8
12 quarters 2.2 5.8
NOTES: a. In billions of current dollars:
initial conditions of 1963:1 for
the FRB-MIT model
b. Based on operations of the full
model.
SOURCE: Teigen, "The Keynesian-Monetarist Debate . . .",
op.cit., p.19.
Table VII compares the effects of an increase in $1 billion
on total spending within the two models. Clearly, from what can be
seen from the table total spending in the St. Louis models responds
much more strongly and quickly than the FRB-MIT model.
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Further comparisons between monetarist and fiscalist models
have been made and they have shown the monetarist side to be much more
sensitive to changes in money than the fiscalist side. Table IX
compares two fiscalist models with the FRS-Chicago model which, though
larger than the FRB-St.Louis model, is still within the monetarist
framework. Whereas for the fiscalist models total spending increases
slowly, for the FRS-Chicago it increases quickly reaching the value of
almost 11 by the end of the year.
TABLE IX: CHANGE IN NOMINAL INCOME DUE TO $1
BILLION INCREASE IN MONETARY
POLICY INSTRUMENT3
QUARTER FRS-MIT FRS-CHICAGO-MIT BROOKINGS
1 0.7 1.2 -0.8
2 2.1 3.7 1.3
3 4.3 . 7.2 1.6
4 6.7 10.8 2.9
NOTE: a. The policy instrument is unborrowed
reserves (Brookings and FRS-MIT)
total reserves (FRS-Chicago-MIT)
SOURCE: R. Zecher, "Implications of Four Econometric
Models for the Indicators Issue", American
Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 1970,
p.48.
In conclusion, one could say that for complex fiscalist
models, although the results are more disparate than for fiscal policy,
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monetary policy seems to be an important instrument, although not as
important as fiscal policy (this in fact corresponds to the 'eclectic'
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position) . While both policies are important, fiscal policy feat¬
ures more prominently within large-scale models. In contrast,
results on the speed of response and the time paths of the alternative
policies from monetarist models seem to support the opposite conclus¬
ion, namely that Monetary policy acts faster and more effectively than
fiscal policy. Thus, as with single-equation tests, evidence from
large-scale models is again inconclusive.
Econometric models have been criticized by many people on
many grounds. They were criticized for leaning heavily towards
127
Keynesian theory , or for including a weak monetary sector and not
separating nominal from real magnitudes while relying solely on the
cost of borrowing channel of influence and not using appropriate mone-
128
tary measures or, finally, of large errors due to high dis-
129
aggregation . In fact nobody, not even the Fiscalists, accepted
evidence from large-scale models as absolutely objective. "It
would be ironic", says Samuelson, "if, inside the Wharton model, we
130
found in the end, Lawrence Klein" . Fiscalists themselves admit¬
ted to the fact that theoretical preconceptions enter into the
131
specification of the equations , and that in many circumstances
forecasting with these models is not very different, although more
132
reliable and indispensable, from ad hoc judgements
Notwithstanding inside and outside criticisms, the performance
of the models was considered quite satisfactory and the results were
133
accepted as reliable " . Although there were many reservations as to
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the accuracy of the results, Fiscalists still believed in the results
from large-scale models as providing objective evidence:
there is a[n] . . . advantage to a formalized model,
i.e. the protection of objectivity and a safeguard
against self-deception . . . Econometric models
have unblemished records for being dispassionate.134
Despite the various defects in large-scale models, Fiscalists still
believe in their ability to evaluate and test economic hypotheses and
policies.
Thus, as far as Fiscalists are concerned, fiscalist theory
and policy, according to the evidence, is shown to be correct. How¬
ever, Monetarists on their part also have shown their theory and
policy to be correct. Fiscalists have referred to empirical evidence
from large-scale models confirming the validity of their thesis.
Monetarists, on the other hand, appealed to empirical evidence that
proved their thesis and conflicted with the Fiscalists' results.
They used small-scale models with specifications that were geared to¬
wards Monetarism. The findings supported their hypotheses. Perhaps
some convergence of views has been achieved regarding the "rediscovery"
135
of money . However, as has been noted, this was not the issue as
far as Fiscalists are concerned. Early Keynesians might have releg¬
ated money to a minor position as a policy variable. But the
'sophisticated' Fiscalists accept the importance of both fiscal and
monetary policy as instruments of macroeconomic management. As
Modigliani says, "the reevaluation of the role of money reflects not
rediscovery, but rather the notable strides we have made in peering
136
into the monetarists' 'black box'" . The bone of contention thus
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seems to be not whether money is important or not but whether one
137
should apply "a fixed . . . rule of monetary policy" or a co¬
ordination of policies for 'fine-tuning' the economy. And regarding
138
this issue both sides have found favour in empirical facts . Both
groups, in fact, appealed to empirical evidence, and both attempted
to show the world 'as it is' without value judgements or preconceptions.
Both, however, found 'hard facts' to support their theory and reject
the other's. According to Ando, "the MPS Model . . , indicates that
it will take roughly 30 to 40 quarters . . . before complete 'crowding-
out' effects take place . . . Therefore the monetarist contention . .
139
. has no foundation" , And according to Andersen, "Fiscal actions
. . . have only a transitory impact on economic activity . . . [whereas
the St. Louis Model] [d]emonstrate[s] the importance of monetary
actions in determination of movements in economic activity"*^. The
claims of both groups were scientifically, in the positivist sense,
justified. Indeed, in a case like this, as Klein says, "what are we
to believe?".
E. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The purpose of this part of the thesis was to see whether,
in a given case such as the Monetary controversy, empirical evidence
can act as an arbiter between conflicting views. In order to do
this I first examined the development of the controversy and the quali¬
tative judgements bearing on the two alternative policy recommendations.
Further, I briefly reviewed the theoretical framework of the contro¬
versy and indicated that Fiscalists and Monetarists do not differ in
respect to the theoretical framework essentially but in respect to
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different emphases and interpretations of the same framework.
Finally, having set the scene, I surveyed the empirical evidence
that was meant to resolve the controversy. Firstly, I examined
the monetarist empirical results stemming from single-equation tests
and the fiscalist counter-evidence, and found that the controversy
still remained unresolved. Secondly, I examined the fiscalist
empirical results stemming from large-scale tests and the monetarist
counter-evidence and found that not even here could the controversy
find resolution. Thus, despite the production of empirical evidence
from fiscalist and monetarist tests, the debate persists"^*.
It may be true, however, that the debate does not have the
same form as before. Now Fiscalists are more reluctant to subscribe
to a Radcliffe Committee view. Perhaps one might see this as a part¬
ial success of the power of empirical testing. But it is also true
that Fiscalists never took the extreme position of the Radcliffe
Report quite seriously. For instance, Samuelson claims that,
Most of the evidence is conclusive with respect to a
Radcliffe Committee stupid view that money doesn't
matter, but as to the view that money matters and that
fiscal policy . . , does not . . . there is very little
. . . evidence that is germane to that."142
As a matter of fact Fiscalists never doubted the importance of money
as such. What they doubted was the absolute causality ascribed to
money and the implied impotence of fiscal policy. "The issue", says
Heller, "is not whether money matters - we all grant that - but
143
whether only money matters, as some Friedmanites . . , would put it"
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In this respect, therefore, Fiscalists remained firm in their view
that both monetary and fiscal policy are important, while Monetarists
rested confident on their view of the appropriate role of money.
So what has been the 'dispassionate' verdict of empirical
evidence with respect to these two alternative views? Brainard and
Cooper, for instance, say that,
D e s p i t e the emergence ... of wide agreement about
the importance of monetary policy, the empirical basis
for many of our beliefs, and a fortiori for distinguish¬
ing among our differences, has remained weak.144
Also both Monetarists and Fiscalists feel quite disappointed about
the reconciliatory power of empirical testing. For example Andersen
admits that,
the debate is far from being resolved . . . Empirical
evidence presented to date has proven to be inconclusive
there is support for both sides of the debate.145
And Modigliani adds that,
despite broad agreement of principle [differences]
would still lead, say Friedman and myself to advocate
much of the time, including right now, very different
monetary and fiscal policies.146
Thus the controversy still persists among Positive economists
147
presently . Empirical testing, despite its 'positive', 'dispassion¬
ate' status, has done very little to lift the burden of the conflict
from the shoulders of orthodox economics*"^. ' This irresolution is
manifested in the extent to which economists deal with the issues
persistently. For instance, in 1970 there was a conference on the
226a
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indicators issue published in the American Economic Review . Also
in 1971 Fiscalists expressed their views on 'eclecticism' in a collect¬
ion of lectures presented at De Paul University^1"1. In 1975 there
was an open debate between Friedman and several British economists on
policy issues shown on television. Even after Friedman's Nobel prize
presentation there followed a debate again shown on television.
Concerning the economic prospects for 1977 in the United States,
economists are still divided between a fiscalist and a monetarist
view^*^. Also in relation to the causes of inflation the gap is
152
even more widened . Finally in journals such as the Federal Bank
of St. Louis Review, the Lloyd's Bank Review, the International
Economic Review and the American Economic Review the debate is going
153
on, perhaps not as strongly as before, but at a firm pace
However, how does this inability of empirical testing to
resolve the controversy and convince the opposing factions reconcile
with the Positive economic methodological dictum that empirical evid¬
ence should choose between competing theories? How can Positive
economists be faced with the fact that the dictum does not work, at
least as far as the Monetary controversy is concerned, and still
believe in Positive economics? Obviously, Monetarists cannot argue
that Fiscalists do not accept the empirical facts because of blind
Keynesian ideology, because Fiscalists have produced their own empir¬
ical facts, which of course are not accepted by Monetarists. Why
then empirical results cannot convince the opposing sides when both,
in fact, accept the rule of empirical testing as the only criterion of
truth? As Foley says, "The ineffectiveness of policy economics is a
154
symptom of a deeper bind that economists are in"
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AN EXPLANATION OF CONFLICT
IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS
OUTLINE
The purpose of this part of the thesis is to explain the
continuing persistence of the Monetary controversy. It is an attempt
to understand the logic of the methodological impasse hindering the
resolution of the conflict. This impasse concerns the failure of
empirical testing to enable Positive economists to choose decisively
between two rival theories.
The basis of the methodology of Positive economics is to
continuously test theories with empirical facts. Whenever there are
two conflicting theoretical schemata, the one that survives best the
tide of experience is the one that should be preferred. Although
there are methodological conflicts within Positive economics, there
is nevertheless agreement as to what will be the tester. It is
agreed that empirical, quantitative, facts will pronounce the last
judgement on which is going to be the true theory. If continuous
empirical assessment fails to falsify a theory - through either its
predictions or its assumptions - then a Positive economist can feel
confident that this theory should be the chosen one"''.
Irrespective of whether one belongs to a monetarist or a
fiscalist stand one always respects the validatory power of empirical
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testing . If a theory is systematically confronted with conflicting
evidence one abandons the theory and looks for a better one. One is
tempted to say, however, that the Monetary controversy has not been
the case to prove this point. Empirical evidence has been accummulated
on either side of the debate. On the one hand, Monetarists presented
their findings from either single-equation tests or small-scale models,
and on the other, Fiscalists rested confident on their pile of empirical
facts produced from structural models. Neither, however, succeeded in
persuading their opponent of either the truth of their theory or the
falsity of the other's; "where Monetarism diverges from the main stream
of economics, it cannot, in my opinion, stand up to the test of plaus¬
ible economic analysis and the full range of empirical experience" says
3
Samuelson , Friedman, however, replies that, "those people who speak
most loudly about the potency of fiscal policy have produced no . . .
evidence. But there is a great deal of evidence which has been produced
primarily by those of us who have argued for the potency of monetary
4
policy" One could probably go on to cite further examples of econo¬
mists in the controversy claiming that empirical evidence has favoured
their own version of the truth"'. However, I hope that the preceding
chapters have succeeded in showing the failure of quantitative data to
solve the debate.
If, therefore, empirical evidence does not prove to be a
sufficient criterion for discriminating between two alternative theories,
and if the controversy persists up to date without being resolved, then
one should attempt to explain why Positive economics fails to "fulfill
its role as a valid scientific methodology able to solve a major conflict,
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and still persists as the dominant methodology. How is it that such
a conflict can persist within the economic orthodoxy without produc¬
ing a crisis? Why do Positive economists remain convinced of the
potency of Positive economics, when it is obvious that it has failed?
In essence, I feel that one should answer these questions by seeking
the logic behind the Monetary conflict and its persistence within
the structure of Positive economics itself.
In Part I some of the ideals of Positive economics have
been examined and juxtaposed to the reality of their practice. The
purity of the distinctions have been shown to contradict to the vague¬
ness and ambiguity of their definition, as well as to the reality of
keeping them pure in practice. It has been further hypothesized that
some of these ambiguities and contradictions arise from fundamental
and unresolved problems in the theory of knowledge. In Part II the
ideal of Positive economics to the effect that empirical testing
should discriminate between competing theories has been examined, as
it were, in action. As far as the Monetary controversy is concerned,
it has been shown that its persistence proves that empirical testing
does not work. It fails in its function as a criterion for the choice
between conflicting theories.
In Part III I intend to analyse the structure of Positive
economics and expose the deeper logic that goes on behind the persist¬
ence of the Monetary and F-Twist controversies. In doing this my
purpose is to understand how two major economic conflicts are -structured,
and how this structure prevents their resolution.
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Before doing this however, I shall review some of the
methodological criticisms levelled against Positive economics. In
my view the methodology literature of economics is saturated with two
related criticisms: that Positive economics is (a) ideologically
biased and infiltrated with value-judgements, and (b) that its
scientist ideals do not correspond to the harsh reality of human
society, its unpredictability and the difficulty of its quantification.
By implication these criticisms are also used as arguments to explain
conflict in economics.
There is no doubt that most of this criticism goes some way
in understanding the methodological problems facing Positive economics.
Yet methodological discussion would benefit if an understanding of the
structural relations behind conflict in Positive economics was made,
instead of arguing from an external point of view. Perhaps the
explanation of conflict that I will attempt in this part may be con¬
sidered as complementary to the above criticisms. It will mainly
differ from the above approaches in that it will fuse in a structural
manner the logical tensions in both the methodology and ontology of
Positive economics. In doing this the necessary relations that bind
the distinctions of Positive economics will be shown, and how they
form the basis for the persistence of the Monetary and F-Twist
controversies.
CHAPTER 6





CLAIMS TOWARDS A CRITIQUE OF
POSITIVE ECONOMICS: A REVIEW
A. THE THEORY OF VALUE AND VALUES IN THE THEORY
One of the most important assumptions, necessary for the
viability of empirical testing in Positive economics, is the distinction
between positive and normative propositions. This assumption is a pre¬
requisite for the separation of what can and what can not be empiric¬
ally testable'''. Positive judgements, since they refer to what actually
is, can be empirically tested because empirical facts represent 'what
is', whereas value judgements, since they refer to what ought to be,
can not be tested because 'what ought to be' is not part of the domain
of empirical facts. So theories, or their predictions, are testable
only if their propositions are positive judgements about empirical
reality.
Neoclassical economics, according to most Positive economists
from J.N. Keynes, Senior, Sidgwick to Friedman, Koopmans and Samuelson,
although general and abstract, refers to actual-representative-
situations and its conclusions delineate what is possible if certain
conditions are fulfilled. Thus, conclusions drawn from neoclassical
economic theory are assumed to satisfy the testability requirement.
Although to most Positive economists this distinction between
positive and normative propositions seems to be almost a self-evident
truth they, nevertheless, take great pains in their methodological
obiter dicta to justify the positive character of Neoclassical economics.
.245
This can only be explained as a reaction against the immense flow of
criticisms that have tried to show the metaphysical nature of the
neoclassical theory of value. In what follows I will review what I
think are the representative proponents of this criticism (see also
the discussion in Part I).
To begin with, one of the most important critics is perhaps
Gunnar Myrdal who attempts to expose this positivist illusion of a
'wertfrei' economics by pointing out the implicit ethical assumptions
of Neoclassical economics inherited by the 'natural order' and
2
Utilitarian philosophies . Myrdal's purpose throughout his methodo¬
logical writings is to investigate the possibility of scientific
economics. That is, he tries to bring into awareness the question
of valuations in social theory. If economics is more prone to meta-
3
physics than the natural sciences , then prima facie, there is a
problem as to the possibility of selecting objectively between alter¬
native theories. Value judgements produce a "conspicuous lack of
agreement among the various writers on the economic aspects of practical
and political problems. . . This inability of economics to agree has
4
almost become proverbial" .
For the Positive economist the solution to this problem is
very simple: draw your boundary line between what is to be positive
and what normative and everything will fall into place; there is no
reason why a Positive economist should not be 'disinterested'^:
"Positive economics is in principle independent of any particular
ethical position or normative judgements"^. Furthermore, disagreements
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in economics are potentially resolvable, since "the difference
(between policy controversies) is not a moral one but a scientific
7
one, m principle capable of being resolved by empirical evidence" .
Myrdal, however, refers to the persistence of controversies in eco¬
nomics and explains it in terms of the impossibility of economics to
g
be divested of normative implications .
This obvious conflict of opinions between Friedman and
Myrdal can be explained in terms of the different meanings attached
to value judgements in each case. For the ordinary Positive econo-
9
mist value judgements refer to different political ideals, systems
or cultural norms, tastes, which constitute "differences about which
men can ultimately only fight"^. One can always choose, in a con¬
scious way, to formulate one's scientific hypotheses by remaining
through the means of empirical testing - detached of any political
valuation. Positive economists refer to what is or could be and not
to what ought to be. In contrast, for Myrdal, valuations refer to
largely unconscious processes, which infiltrate the structure of Neo¬
classical economics. For him value judgements are not external to
economics but form part of it. Economic concepts and terminology
are impregnated with valuations''' . The development of economics
from 'natural law' doctrines and Utilitarianism and the increasingly
growing empirical scope of economics, according to Myrdal, have shaped
modern economic theory into a quasi metaphysical and quasi scientific
12
construction . The subjective and the objective are interdependent,
and if the former remains latent, as in the case of Neoclassical
economics, this creates contradictions leading to the generation of
13
opposing schools of thought and consequently disagreement
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According to Myrdal, the definition of economics in terms of ends
and means will not do either, since there is no clear-cut demarcation
between the two. Even more, the selection itself of a set of means
14
constitutes a value judgement and is, therefore biased . In fact,
not only do value judgements constitute an integral part of theory
but they also enter into every phase of Positive economics. The way
economists have learned to look at the world, or the use of value-
laden concepts induces observation and selection of facts to be
conducted according to some 'principle' or 'valuation' which, if left
implicit, will lead to biased inferences"^. According to Streeten,
"the values enter . . . the structure of theoretical thought . . .
[and] are ever-present and permeate empirical analysis through and
through""^.
So it seems that there is no way out for the Positive
economist since, firstly, according to Myrdal, he cannot separate
values from facts or ends from means, because this would be a value
in itself"^; amd, secondly, since the selection of empirical evidence
is itself value-laden. Therefore, according to this criticism, the
Positive economist cannot use empirical testing as an objective criter¬
ion for discriminating between positive and normative propositions or
choosing between competing theories. Consequently, the Positive
economist is at an impasse, unless he accepts the metaphysical nature
of his theories. But that would ask too much of him since Positive
economics is, in fact, based upon the possibility of distinguishing
between what is and what ought to be.
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In quite a similar vein other economists, like Joan Robinson,
Kenneth Boulding, Ronald Meek, Murray Rothbard, et_ al_. , have attempted
to unravel the fundamentally metaphysical nature of neoclassical
18
assumptions . For instance Joan Robinson reaches similar conclus¬
ions when she says that "economics itself . . . has always been partly
a vehicle for the ruling ideology of each period as well as partly a
19
method of scientific investigation" . As a "method of scientific
investigation" economics should contain propositions that satisfy
20
Popper's criterion of falsification . As a set of ideological
propositions it is, on the one hand, influenced by older schools
where ideologies were more explicit, e.g. mercantilism, laissez-faire,
21
etc. , by the nature of the subject whereby a description of economic
22
phenomena will involve value judgements , and by personal valuations
23
that enter everywhere in the economist's method , in addition to the
value-laden concepts which he has to use, e.g. equilibrium, good, wel-
24
fare, etc. . On the other hand, it is a reflection of the status
25
quo, mirroring and justifying the structure of capitalism
However, if such a distinction, i.e. ideology-science, is
maintained, at least as far as the "Economic Philosophy" is concerned,
Joan Robinson does not deviate from standard positivist practice when
2 6
she talks of ideology as "meaningless noise or . . . circular argument"
or when she says that, "The hallmark of a metaphysical proposition is
27
that it is not capable of being tested" . In some sense the positive
and normative distinction is still maintained. Nonetheless, she does
differ from the Positive economist when she accepts ideologies- as
structural and useful components of economic theory and does not discard
them as unnecessary; in fact she says that "metaphysical statements are
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not without content" and, like Myrdal, she considers ideologies
as initial visions that "provide a quarry from which hypotheses can
be drawn. They do not belong to the realm of science and yet they
are necessary to it. Without them we would not know what it is that
29
we want to know"
Thus, the positivist clear-cut distinction is replaced by
the ambivalence that ideologies "do not belong to the realm of science
30
and yet they are necessary to it" . Since metaphysical propositions
cannot be tested, and since they constitute the 'world-view' of the
social scientist, the Positive economist is unable to apply his cri¬
terion of empirical testing to justify his assumptions or resolve
controversies about two different 'world-views'. In fact, Joan
Robinson would also be at an impasse had she not provided, as she did,
a way out. The way out is to make assumptions explicit, "to reveal
31
[the] contradictions" and since "We cannot escape from our own
habits of thought ... we go round about. We can see what we value,
32
and try to see why"
This alternative is very similar to Myrdal's who says that,
"We must try to lay bare the specific logical errors resulting from
33
the insertion of valuations" . In his early works Myrdal argued for
an eradication of "all the valuations tacitly implied by the basic
34
concepts with the help of logical analysis" . However, in his later
works he accepts the structural role of value judgements and argues
that in addition to the fact that "Explicit value premises are". . .
35
logically required"' , "There is no way of studying social reality
36
other than from the viewpoint of human ideals" , that they help to
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create "a vision of what the essential facts and the causal relations
37
between them are"
Thus, like Joan Robinson, Myrdal shows that, since valuations
are present everywhere in economic theory and methodology and since
social phenomena are by themselves conducive to ideology formation,
there is no way out but to try to make the latent valuations explicit
and accept them as an integral part of theory which gives it meaning
and content. "The only way of defending 'objectivity' in research
38
is to work with explicit, often alternative, specific value premises"
In reviewing several other critics of Positive economics,
who follow similar lines as Myrdal's and Robinson's, one observes the
recurrence of the same argument, when discussion is turned towards
finding a remedy for the problem of the indispensability of value
judgements. For example Macfie says that, "all personal views have
individual bases, and so are prejudiced. The only way then to reach
39
towards truth ... is to understand all relevant prejudices"
Also Rothbard claims that it is "incumbent upon economists to present
a coherent and supported ethical system or forever hold their valuations
40
and political peace" . Meek also declares that'"ideology' will
always be with us . . . Surely, to a limited but significant extent,
reason can help - and not least in making us conscious ... of our
41
own ideologies" . Finally, Little maintains that,
Welfare economics and ethics cannot, then, be separated.
They are inseparable because the welfare terminology is
a value terminology ... If the value premises are
made explicit, and are not hidden, the result will be
informative and interesting - and cannot be misleading.42
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The regularity of such a solution to the problem of value
judgements in economics I think, needs some explanation. As soon
as the economist accepts the necessarily ideological character of
value theory he is left with the task of justifying his/her own
assumptions about the nature of economics. If, on the one hand,
he/she accepts that what he/she says is objective then he/she falls
against his/her own criticism to the effect that valuations enter
everywhere in every theory and methodology. If, on the other hand,
he/she acknowledges the possibility of his/her critique of ideology
in economics being itself ideological, then he/she must try to justify
his/her choice of the particular ideology used. However, since there
are no criteria left for him/her since value judgements enter everywhere,
he/she has to find the way out of the vicious circle by stating that if
valuations are made explicit and act as a source of theory, then every¬
thing would be less contradictory and certainly more relevant. None¬
theless, the economist is still left with the perennial quest of having
to find objective, detached, criteria for selecting between alternative
explicit and relevant ideologies.
Both Robinson and Myrdal, in fact, are aware of this problem.
Both, however, do very little to find a satisfactory solution. For
instance Robinson says that, "The objectivity of science arises, not be¬
cause the individual is impartial, but because many individuals are
43
continually testing each other's theories" , or that, "logic will
dissolve . . . [an] ideological proposition into a completely meaningless
44
noise" , or, "Adopting Professor Popper's criterion for propositions
that belong to the empirical sciences, that they are capable of being
45
falsified by evidence" . Thus, the impression that one gets in
252
reading Joan Robinson's remarks regarding criteria for the possibility
46
of sorting out "this mixture of ideology and science" is an accept¬
ance of metaphysics, along with an effort for community testing, logic
and falsifiability. However, it seems that Joan Robinson is asking
too much from the novice economist when she tells him/her that, on the
one hand, everything is metaphysical and yet, on the other, something
ought not to be metaphysical. Firstly, if each individual is biased
by ideology, either implicitly or explicitly, then there will be a
tendency for fruitless conflict rather than for constructive testing
of each other's ideologies. To test a theory constructively one has
to be detached from one's ideological position, a task which, accord¬
ing to Robinson's idea of interdependence between theory and ideology,
cannot be fulfilled. Secondly, logic cannot be used as a tool for
dissolving metaphysical propositions since, on the one hand, we would
fall in the same position as that of the Positive economist, who by
the application of logic, distinguishes between positive and normative
and between synthetic and analytic statements, and since, on the other
hand, if each individual is permanently tainted with ideology he will
always tend, openly or tacitly, to logically rationalise and justify
his position. Thirdly, the falsifiability criterion (at least as
used by Popper) clearly cannot function, since it implies that there
is an objective tester, i.e. empirical facts. However, for Joan
Robinson empirical facts cannot be objective, since she has argued
that empirical facts can be chosen so as to justify any ideology. In
fact the selection of one set of evidence over another is itself a
value judgement^.
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Similarly Myrdal, after having pleaded for the unravelling
of hidden valuations and for the full acceptance of them, formulates
his criteria of objectivity by saying that, "Logically, the only
distinction that is scientifically valid is the one between more
48
relevant factors and less relevant ones" . In addition, according
to Streeten's report of Myrdal's methodological position, "The logical
crux of science (is) the continual encounter - sometimes constructive,
sometimes destructive - between the a_ priori and the a_ posteriori,
49
between vision and experience" . Thus, Myrdal's criteria for choos¬
ing between explicit, alternative value premises are: (1) relevance
and usefulness^, and (2) dialectical testing between theory and
fact. As far as the first criterion is concerned, one is in difficulty
in trying to define relevance or usefulness. Since value premises are
part of the structure of economic theory, relevance will be defined
according to each different and alternative value premise. For example,
the priority of studying the pattern of income distribution may be
relevant to Myrdal who believes that a particular pattern of income
distribution affects economic variables such as capital and labour
shares, prices, savings, etc., whereas to people like Friedman and
Samuelsor., for instance, in compliance with traditional neoclassical
theory, income distribution is determined by the formation of prices
according to the decision taking of producers and consumers, and there¬
fore its study is secondary to that of price formation and consumption.
Another example can be taken from the Monetary controversy, where one
sees that, for the Fiscalists, the belief for a detailed and structural
analysis of the economic processes will render relevant the analytical
study of individual, disaggregated sectors, whereas, for the Monetarists,
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a belief in simple hypothesis testing will render relevant the study
of aggregated variables*^. It appears, therefore, from the above
examples that relevance and usefulness are very much a function of
52
the type of questions'one asks and ultimately of ideologies . And
even if the latter were made explicit we could not discriminate be¬
tween alternative sets of ideologies according to the criterion of
relevance, because it is assumed that ideologies and relevance are
interdependent. In effect, there must be a third criterion which
will enable us to choose between alternative value-laden theories.
If we accept Myrdal's second criterion of "continuous testing" between
theory and fact, we must assume that, as in the case of Robinson, at
least, at a point of time in this dialectical process, there must be
a moment of independence between "vision" and "experience". In other
words, irrespective of whether it is the theory that tests the facts
or the facts that test the theory, there must be either a set of
theories or a set of facts that can be, firstly, independent of each
other and, secondly, objective. In this sense, therefore, Myrdal's
criteria are nothing more than a desperate cry or an act of faith,
when he has already said that facts and theories are, in fact, inter¬
dependent and that there is no way of separating between the two
unlike the Positive economist who, epistemologically, accepts such
53
separation . For example, Myrdal says that, "Facts come to mean
something only as ascertained and organized in the frame of a theory
. . . [and] the truth about society is therefore always a theory: a
vision of what the essential facts and the causal relations between
54
them are" , or in a different context, the "structural inter--
dependence of valuations and facts is presented as a necessary
condition of all . . . theory and research"^. Like Robinson, Myrdal
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accepts the implicit proposition that theories and facts are
interdependent and yet sometimes they are not. Clearly, one has
to provide 'objective' criteria to show how one knows when a theory is
independent of fact and vice versa. However, this is a position
which is denied to Myrdal, because according to his methodology
criteria will always imply value judgements. In fact, the position
that is implicit in both Robinson's and Myrdal's epistemological
claims, leads necessarily to relativism^.
Myrdal does recognize this 'danger', perhaps more than
Robinson, when he says,
But is not the proposition that politics ought to be
rational . . . and that economists ought to support
this endeavour itself a normative principle? And is
it not arbitrary at that? . . . The answer to this
question is that the possibility of scientific endeavour
depends upon the tacit assumption that rational is
desirable.57
However, it seems that the desirability of rational, or objective,
argumentation or the "possibility" of science are beliefs and values
well entrenched in our system of thought and, therefore, as such do
not constitute 'objective', 'rational' or 'experimental' processes,
but they are rather acts of faith. After all, as Myrdal says, the
"tacit assumption must be made explicit and then if it is why not
58
sacrifice 'truth' to higher-values"
By critically reviewing some of the criticisms levelled
against Positive economics, I do not purport to either justify- Positive
economics or to show that the criticisms in themselves are wrong.
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What I do want to show, however, is that, while most of the criticisms
referring to the role of ideology in economics are in themselves
correct, nevertheless in the alternative offered they create an inherent
contradiction, i.e. they accept the simultaneous existence of ideology
and science. However, to say that there is a logical contradiction
does not mean that the alternatives are irrational or fruitless.
They themselves may serve, according to Robinson and Myrdal, as struct¬
ural components of economic theory, with a meaningful role. As
Streeten puts it, "The attempt to save the theory from self-contradiction
59
succeeds only through an arbitrary step into metaphysics"
Finally, in this section, I will make two additional
observations in reference to this category of criticism. The one
pertains to the comparison between the critics' alternative and
Positive economics, and the other to the adequacy of a 'value-laden
economics' criticism as an explanation of the persistence of economic
controversies.
As far as the first observation is concerned Myrdal claims
that in Neoclassical economics valuations are latent and permeate the
concepts and terminology everywhere, whereas his alternative is to be
self-critical and bring out in the open all the metaphysical implica¬
tions found in a theory; "we must try to lay bare the specific
logical errors resulting from . . . valuations"^.
However, it seems somehow puzzling, and somewhat presumptuous,
to say that one is self-critical and makes one's ideology explicit while
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the others are not - moreover to claim self-criticism for oneself
is quite uncritical of the claim of self-criticism. True enough
Positive economists usually do not tend to recognize the existence
of value judgements in neoclassical theory. Nonetheless, this is
not evidence enough for claiming that valuations are left implicit
by Positive economists. When Myrdal or Robinson claim for making
ideologies explicit, in fact they assume that there are ideologies,
whereas for the Positive economist it is not at all obvious that there
exists unconscious ideological bias that cannot be purged by empirical
testing. Moreover, Positive economists from J.N. Keynes to Robbins
and Friedman have made their assumptions (not as ideologies) explicit
and tried to defend them rationally. For instance, Friedman says,
"In seeking to make a science as "objective" as possible, our aim
should be to formulate the rules explicitly in so far as possible"^*.
I do not think that it is the case that Positive economists are
'naive' or are not 'self-critical' necessarily, but it seems to me
that they take an epistemological stand which offers the possibility
of separating between positive and value judgements. After all,
Myrdal's and Robinson's position of accepting the interdependence of
positive and value judgements is itself an epistemological datum; as
Myrdal admits: "The actual choice of viewpoint and categories will,
of course, depend, in the last resort, on the underlying epistemological
approach"*^.
Thus, it is not necessary, i.e. stemming necessarily from
their epistemology, that Positive economists cannot question their
assumptions. Although it may be true that most of the time
• 258
self-criticism is not a virtue characteristic of Positive economists,
yet it cannot be claimed that Positive economists are necessarily not
self-critical - but rather that they belong to an epistemology that
defines ideology differently. Accordingly, I do not think that it
is fruitful to criticize Positive economists from the point of view
of a different epistemological paradigm as this would not show Posit¬
ive economists their implicit contradictions, but rather convince
them that the critic is speaking from a different and most of the
time 'nonsensical' point of view.
This kind of criticism seeks to find defects in the process
of theory selection in Positive economics, that may be considered as
causes of persistent controversy. However, Positive economics is a
paradigm that contains a self-contained coherent logic. By finding
defects that arise mainly from viewing Positive economics through the
eyes of an alternative paradigm, one does not seek to understand the
logic of Positive economics, but perhaps to demolish it and replace
it. I believe that in offering an explanation of conflict one should
analyse the structure of Positive economics and expose all the logical
connections therein that lead to such conflict.
For example, if we were to apply the 'value-laden economics'
criticism to explain the persistence of the Monetary controversy, it
would seem that there are two factors missing. Firstly, assuming
that the Monetarists and the Fiscalists have different ideologies and
also assuming that these ideologies are latent, then would there be a
„ resolution of the conflict if the latent ideologies were made explicit?
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If we take Myrdal's early position, i.e. exorcising valuations by making them
explicit, it follows that by making the ideologies overt we are able
to logically analyse them, expose their contradictions and meaning-
lessness and thus discard them. This, consequently, would leave us
with pure logic and fact, in which case the controversy would be
resolved. However, one cannot assume that facts and theories are
interdependent and that values are needed to select facts and yet
also assume that by making values explicit we are divested of them.
It seems that even if ideologies were exposed the controversy would
still persist, since there could never be a complete independence be¬
tween vision and fact. Explicit or implicit values would always
enter in the logical (analytical) concepts and in the selection of
facts and the debate would go on. If, on the other hand, we take
Myrdal's later epistemological position, i.e. accept valuations as
structural components and useful parts of theory, we would still have
two 'ideologies', say Monetarism (laissez-faire) and Fiscalism
(interventionism), completely different, which moreover, if they were
made explicit, would reveal their dissonance even louder and clearer,
thus generating a greater gap between the two opposing factions. If
Samuelson or Friedman, for example, would see that they are ideo¬
logically biased - an unlikely event - they would find it impossible
either to accept this bias as useful, since they are Positive economists
and as such do not have any use for ideologies, or to discard it, since
this would imply discarding their 'identities' as Monetarists and
Fiscalists. Prima facie, if there are two diametrically opposed
ideologies, and they are made explicit, their strength grows rather
than diminishes. Secondly, an intra-paradigmatic conflict, such as
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the Monetary controversy, cannot be explained by only appealing to
the two completely different ideologies as this would imply rather an
inter-paradigmatic conflict, such as for example between Marxism and
Neoclassical economics. To be able to explain a conflict within a
paradigm one would need something more than ideological differences.
One would need to find a contradiction or a conflicting duality embed¬
ded in the structure of the paradigm itself, which would be logical
(structural) rather than only ideological. This logical contradict¬
ion, as we shall see in the following chapter, would be such as to
bind the structure of the paradigm, despite inner conflict, in a
coherent, self-contained form.
If, therefore, a logical contradiction runs through the
construction of Positive economics, and is so situated as to form
complementary (binary) logical opposites, then a tension must exist
which allows and in fact nurtures the development of opposing schools
of thought. This tension must be so structured as to render the
resolution of the conflict impossible, unless a new paradigm with
different epistemological and theoretical conceptions and different
logic is introduced.
To summarize: the greatest part in the effort to criticize
Positive economics focuses on the role of value-judgements and ideo¬
logy in theory formation and validation in economics. As we have
seen this criticism is important because, if correct, it destroys the
whole positivist mechanism of validation. In this sense the -role of
ideology may be construed as important in explaining the persistence
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of the Monetary controversy. If, for example, ideologies are
intricately woven with theories and if, in addition, valuations
form a necessary part of empirical evidence and testing, then the
controversy will persist, since there are no criteria to render any
theory valid. The two opposing factions will stand by their ideo¬
logies and valuations and the controversy will continue and,
ultimately, reach an impasse.
In applying the ideology-explanation to the Monetary
controversy Culbertson, for instance, claims that,
the hidden political content of professional work may lead
theory and research to be cast into a form that does not
lead to resolution of conflicts and cumulative refinement
of knowledge, but rather to continuing conflict between
partisan groups, governed by their political positions or
ideologies,
and concludes that, "the driving force in the whole controversy has
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been ideological" . Consequently, if Positive economics is consist¬
ent with its rules, the Monetary controversy, as it is a major one,
will become the basis for a methodological crisis in Positive economics^
The paradox in the case of the Monetary controversy, however,
is that although there is wide agreement as to the power of empirical
testing to discriminate objectively between competing theories, and that
although empirical testing has been shown inadequate to resolve the con¬
troversy, yet economists from both sides of the debate continue to use
empirical testing as the sole criterion of objectivity persistently.
It seems as if there is a binding force keeping economists tied to the
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positivist obligation to use empirical testing as a valid criterion
and to feel justified in doing this. Consequently, one cannot, at
least sufficiently, argue that the Monetary controversy persists
because the belief in empirical testing constitutes a value judgement
or ideology. Although this forms part of the explanation it cannot
fully account for the continuing insistence of Positive economists to
use empirical testing when it is obvious that it has not fulfilled
its role as a validational criterion, at least as far as the Monetary
controversy is concerned. Obviously, this complex phenomenon of a
controversy persisting through the history of economics calls for a
fuller explanation. One that would delineate the structure within
which ideas about ideology and methodology are intertwined.
Another explanation that can be given for the paradox
(belief-failure-persistence) is in terms of 'paradigms', 'anomalies'
and 'crises' in a Kuhnian, modified by Ward, sense. According to
this explanation, as economists are members of the same paradigm they
use empirical testing as part of their training and their acquired
'Weltanschauung'. The question whether empirical testing has been
shown to be a success or a failure (an anomaly) is irrelevant to the
Positive economist who is attached to the principle on the grounds of
(unconscious) faith to the paradigm rather than pure rationality or
objectivity. In other words, crisis is averted in Positive economics
by sweeping, as it were, the failure of empirical testing under the
carpet of the profession and the paradigm.
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However, for this explanation to apply one must assign to
Positive economics the status of a paradigm. The Kuhnian interpret¬
ation of scientific development in terms of paradigms and anomalies,
though perhaps more appropriate to physics, cannot be straight¬
forwardly applied to economics. This is because of the relationship
between economics and the social structure. A change in the social
structure brings about a change in both economist and economy, where¬
as it brings about a change only in physicist and not in matter.
Thus, for example, class antagonism permits the parallel development
of conflicting economic schools (e.g. Marxism and Marginalism). The
status of a paradigm is assigned to that school favoured by the
dominant class, with no necessary validity accompanying it according
to the mechanism of the Kuhnian theory. The validity it has reflects
the interests of the class (forming part of the social structure) in
power. Despite these difficulties in applying the Khunian interpret¬
ations in a straight forward manner, however, hints and ideas can be
borrowed that can be used to explain crisis, disagreement and
development in economics^.
The two above-mentioned explanations (ideology and paradigm)
are indeed important, and perhaps, complementary interpretations of
conflict in economics. However, what is of interest in this thesis
is the logic that goes behind the aforementioned paradox. One can
hardly expect a Positive economist to accept that he/she acts on
faith or ideology*^. In order to provide an explanation that accounts
for such a logic, the structure of Positive economics has to be logic¬
ally decomposed and reconstituted (always from the point of view of the
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Positive economist). The implicit rationalization made by the
Positive economist to reconcile the failure of empirical testing and
his/her insistence in using it, is to be found here. However, before
proceeding in this examination, another set of criticisms will be
reviewed.
B. THE 'SCIENTISM' OF THE SCIENCE OF ECONOMICS
In addition to the criticisms that economics is ideologically
biased, there have been numerous other criticisms levelled against the
methodology of Positive economics. One can separate these criticisms
into two broad categories. The first one refers to the lack of pre¬
cision and experimentation in the social sciences, the scope of
economics, i.e. the openness of the social system, the need for social
integration and the consequent use of ceteris paribus clauses. The
second category refers to the gap between theory and reality and to
the consequent irrelevance of neoclassical theory. Needless to say
that there have been other types of criticism, but I believe these are
the most crucial ones, and the ones that have taken the greatest part
of the literature. Obviously these two categories are interrelated
for instance lack of experimentation implies an open system which
implies need for integration of social phenomena, which in turn touches
upon the question of theoretical abstraction, delimitation and relevance.
Regarding the second category of criticisms, i.e. the gap
between economic theory and reality, many of the issues involved have
already been discussed in relation to the F-Twist controversy in Part I
of the thesis. The old question of whether the static analysis of
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equilibrium is relevant to the economic problems facing modern
society has been the favourite criticism among historically and
6 7
institutionally oriented economists . However, with the advance
and popularity of empirical investigation, equilibrium analysis has
somewhat lost its empirically true value and has become a framework,
6 8
which has only an "as if" value . Accordingly, the issue of the
relevance of neoclassical theory has stayed within the broader
context of the F-Twist controversy.
Regarding the first category, i.e. experimentation in
economics, Positive economists believe that although there is a differ¬
ence between natural and social phenomena this difference is not of a
kind but only of degree. The acquisition of objectivity for Positive
economists is only a matter of refining techniques to overcome the
obstacles put by social phenomena and measure precisely. In a sense,
it is believed that differences in phenomena are countered by a
methodology, i.e. Positivism, that offers the same criteria of
validation for both physics and economics. ^
Against this there have been criticisms that go as far back
as the rise of English and Austrian Marginalism and its opposition
German Historicism. The criticisms and the consequent debate go on
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even today . A fundamental argument challenging the positivist
contention of the possibility of controlled experimentation in eco¬
nomics refers to the difficulty of differentiating between the observer
and the observed. According to this argument whereas matter"does not
have consciousness and thus can be controlled, man, the subject of
266
economics, does and is, therefore, uncontrollable and unpredictable.
Moreover, not only is the distinction between the observer and the
observed blurred in the case of economics, but in fact the observer
is also the observed. Two representative proponents of this argu¬
ment are Hayek^ and Knight^. Although neither of them belong to
the Historical or Institutionalist school, they nevertheless share a
great deal of the latter's criticism of Positive economics. Both
Hayek and Knight hold that the phenomena of society are not conducive
to experimentation and that, therefore, a different methodology -
72
such as introspection - is needed . However, the Institutional-
ists or Historicists differ from Hayek and Knight in that they accept
a wholistic picture of society whereas Knight and, especially, Hayek
reject the concept of whole and embrace the concept of the individual.
There are two reasons advanced for showing the impossibility
for economics to emulate the methodology of the experimental sciences.
The first one relates to the opennes of the economic system, and the
second one relates to, what can be generally called, the consciousness
of the subject of economics. These two reasons, according to the
critics, constitute an important barrier to the application of experi¬
mental methods that could render feasible the accumulation of objective
and exact empirical evidence.
As far as the first reason is concerned, it is argued that
the neoclassical definition of economic reality in terms of scarce
means and multiple ends, along with the positivist insistence "to focus
only on the quantifiable aspects of society, imposes an artificial limit
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on the scope of the science and offers a distorted view of economic
73
action . In essence it is argued that a theoretical, and therefore
an ad hoc, delimitation of economics, with the help of ceteris paribus
clauses, cannot be expected to be true of actual social reality, where¬
by the interdependency of all human factors prohibits the possibility
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of controlled experimentation . While the natural sciences also
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exhibit similar difficulties , it can still be maintained that the
impact of exogenous influences on the phenomenon under investigation
is, in principle, relatively measurable and thus controlled. A
theoretical ceteris paribus could be true in Neoclassical economics
76
if a conceptual exogeneity of external factors is assumed . However,
for the 'real' world, either the effect of every exogenous factor must
be measured (something which cannot be comfortably claimed for economics),
or the study of society should be conducted on a more integrated and,
77
therefore, more qualitative basis
Thus, it is claimed, because of the nature of economic
phenomena experimentation or quantification can never acquire the
'hardness' of the natural sciences. If the subject of economics is
man then, athough theoretically we could speak of economic man, it is
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virtually impossible to do so in empirical terms . If the openness
of the social system is accepted then economics should go beyond quanti¬
fication and study the total structure of society, in which case it
would mean that objectivity would have to take a different meaning than
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the one implied by experimentation . The problem here, as in the
case of the previous section, is that once quantification, and there¬
fore fixed criteria of objectivity, are rejected, validation becomes
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a shaky construct based upon, for instance, "introspection" ,
81
"interdependency" , or, once again, making valuations explicit and
82
study in a qualitative manner the institutions that induce them
However, before I discuss these alternatives I will consider the
second reason offered against the use of positivist methods in the
social sciences.
The phenomena of physics concern inanimate objects the
behaviour of which can be observed from a 'distance', i.e. in an
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objective manner . In contrast the phenomena of economics (human
behaviour) concern objects that are characterized by consciousness
and purposive action. This feature of economic phenomena raises two
problems: firstly, it is very difficult to control human behaviour
due to the variations in purpose and consciousness - and therefore
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experiment with it , and secondly, the observers themselves are,
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(a) persons with consciousness , and (b) parts of the phenomenon
under observation. According to Knight,
all such knowledge (of social) phenomena] is inseparable
from (a) self-knowledge of the knower and (b) know¬
ledge of other knowers and their knowledge, or of their
'minds', and hence on the nature and conditions of
knowing and thinking as such.86
The criterion of the independence between knower and known
forms the cornerstone of positivist epistemology. If this criterion
is perceived as invalid when applied to the social sciences, the
prospective of a Positive economics is greatly weakened. This criter¬
ion is also rejected by Hayek who claims that the categories and facts
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of economics are part of the way we classify things . There is no
external knowledge of objects and phenomena but only internal know¬
ledge of our own classifications. According to Hayek,
* I
all mental phenomena [including economics], sense
perceptions and images as well as the more abstract
"concepts" and "ideas" must be regarded as acts of
classification performed by the brain . . . the
qualities which we perceive are not properties of
the objects but ways in which . . . [we] have learnt
to group or classify . . .88
Thus, according to the above, there is no objective, i.e. external,
way to resolve, say, the Monetary debate. The accumulation of
empirical evidence does not help because empirical evidence is,
firstly, produced by objects the attitudes of which are perceived by
the observer through his/her a priori classifications, and secondly,
dependent on theory, since its selection is determined by our acquired
preconceptions, parts of which form the theory in question. For
example, according to this argument, the pattern of the money supply
lagging always behind income is a product not of the structure of the
economy, but a product of the structure of our mind. Thus, a differ¬
ent structure of mind would produce a different structure of the
economy and thus a different macroeconomic theory, e.g. income lagging
behind money. Our external observations and experiments are, there¬
fore, subjective and can not be used as a criterion for choosing
between competing theories. In other words, the evidence from
either single-equation tests or large scale models is not independent
of the models themselves and is consequently inappropriate for
appraising the theories behind them.
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The question whether experimentation is possible in economics
has been the focus of many methodological discussions. In my judge¬
ment, the central issue revolves around the definition of 'fact',
89
'evidence' or 'experience' . Once a Positive economist is clear
about the meaning of 'fact', i.e. quantified attributes of observed
behaviour, then it follows that it is legitimate to consider the
methodology of the social sciences equivalent to the methodology of
the physical sciences. Comparison of empirical facts with predict¬
ions is considered sufficient for theory appraisal. Moreover,
although Positive economists would admit the openness of the system,
they would still claim that experimentation in economics does not
90
involve, in principle, more problems than physics . It is believed
that the development of quantification would limit the scope of eco-
91
nomics and provide a definite domain . On the other hand, once it
is accepted that quantification is not possible in economics, due to
the qualitative character of economic experience, then facts become
more fluid and lose their assymetrical power with respect to theory
validation. In effect, experimentation seems impossible because of
the indeterminancy and interdependency of economic experiences, and
92
because facts are considered to be part of theory
In a sense, the problem goes back to the role of value-
judgements and valuations. Since Positive economics does not
recognize this fusion between 'classifications' (valuations) and
experience as valid, it can legitimately claim validity for quantifi¬
cation and experimentation. If, on the other hand, this fusfon is
accepted and empirical facts lose their objectivity, then a different
epistemology is called for. Ultimately, we would have different
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epistemologics basing their claims on different views about the
nature of reality (ontology). For the Positive economist reality is
such that it can be quantified and externalized, whereas for people
like Hayek and Knight economic reality is not external to the observer
but forms part of his/her "classifications", thus losing its objective
externality. It follows that Hayek and Knight would reject experi¬
mentation and call for "introspection". We have therefore two
epistemologies based on two ontologies. If, however, the function
of an epistemology (theory of knowledge) is to support an ontology
93
(theory of reality) and if, on the other hand, the epistemology
itself is based on an ontology, then there is a need for another
epistemology which would support this ontology. The consequence
94
is, as Mollis and Nell observe, an infinite regress . It follows
that the task of choosing between any two alternative epistemologies
is not easy, and unless a justification of the initial epistemology
is given, it may lead to an impasse. In what follows I shall review
Hayek's and Knight's justification of their epistemologies.
Hayek claims that "wholes" cannot be perceived and therefore
95
the individual is the proper object of inquiry . Since the structure
96
of the mind of all individuals is similar , he proposes that economic
97
knowledge becomes possible only through introspection . This posit¬
ion follows from the fact that "Our procedure is based on the
experience that other people as a rule . . . classify their sense
98
impressions as we do" . Accordingly, if there is a common structure
underlying our thought and if the subjective is linked with the
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objective, then inward self-knowledge is the only way to study social
99
phenomena . However, if we think of introspection as a viable
methodology, how can a conflict of ideas, such as in the Monetary
controversy, be resolved? If we introspect the only thing we will
be able to see within us is our own ideas and values which will
always justify our own position. If the other faction does the same
then we will need a third faction which will (introspectively?)
decide for the superiority of one position over the other. Clearly
the acceptance of a third faction acting as an objective (external)
criterion of validation is denied to Hayek who claims that everything
is known through a priori classifications. The fundamental contra¬
diction in Hayek's position is that the idea of introspection in
itself implies previous classifications (known to us through other
introspections?). In other words, if our knowledge is determined
by a. priori classifications of categories, then introspection of our
internal knowledge needs a further introspection to be justified,
since it is a catagory of our a priori classifications. Finally,
Hayek's ontological statement about the existence of a common mind
structure, is itself a statement which either has to be proved empiric¬
ally or introspectively. The first position is rejected by Hayek
himself and the second creates an infinite regress.
Knight also starts with the same assumption about the
priority of the individual over the whole in social investigation^^,
and the interdependency between the knower and the known"^. Although
he also proposes introspection as a suitable method for economics, he
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also adds as a criterion of objectivity the idea of a social critical
consensus. Knight bases his logic of theory validation on a scient¬
ific ethic. Firstly, introspection will reveal to us theories about
102
society , and secondly, these theories will be criticized by
103
"competent observers" . Obviously problems such as the ones dis¬
cussed in the previous section will arise. For instance, what are
the criteria of competence or what are the criteria with which we
will be able to achieve consensus in the first place, and in the
second, why should competent observers be objectively critical? As
Winch argues, making an external check upon one's actions or theories
implies the establishment of a standard. However, standards and
rules have their basis in society, and in society there may be differ-
104
ent ideologies implying different and irreconcilable standards
In fact Knight is aware of these problems when he says that,
a consensus regarding truth is itself by no means a
'mere' (undisputed) fact. It rests upon value judge¬
ments as to both competence and the moral reliability
of observers and reporters.105
Scientific truth then according to Knight, is a value judgement, and
theory appraisal depends upon criticism from competent observers:
"truth is a value, established by criticism""^^. One might argue,
however, that criticism may stem from different ideological perspect¬
ives, to which Knight replies that, "Without a sense of honour (as
well as special competence) among scientists . . . there could be no
107
science" , and that, "objectivity in this field [economics] is
established only by verification by other observers, which depends on
inter-communication and also on the competence and integrity of the
108
observers" . Thus Knight's criteria of theory validation are:
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honesty-integrity, competence and inter-communication. Apart from
the problems of divergence of ideologies, conflict of opinion, sub¬
jective bias, there is also the problem of applying the above criteria
in theory selection, say, in the Monetary controversy. Surely, no
one could argue against the integrity, competence or inter¬
communication of either the Monetarists or the Fiscalists. Although
there is no doubt that members of both schools fulfil all the above
criteria one can see little progress achieved in resolving the con¬
troversy. Moreover, one would need to prove one's honesty and
competence before one could use these qualities to select between
alternative schools. Which means that a set of fixed criteria have
to be established for the determination of honesty and competence.
For instance, as far as Marxism is concerned, the criterion of compet¬
ence would not be fulfilled, when competence is defined according to
the standards of Positive economics, and vice versa. Also it is
hard to see proper scientific inter-communication in the social
sciences - in the sense Knight means it - where fixed ideological
and a_ priori methodological perspectives keep opposing factions in
constant distance.
Knight's and Hayek's observations as to the nature of
economic reality may be correct insofar as they are used as a critique
of Positive economics. But once the critique is turned into assump¬
tions from which a new social ontology and methodology flow, one is
left with alternatives that carry the contradictions found in Positive
economics, only in a reverse manner. In other words, when subjective
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states are recognized as part of scientific procedure and when the
qualitative character of social phenomena is ascertained, then Posit¬
ivism, which emphasizes objectivity and quantification, falls as a
scientific methodology. However, an alternative methodology should
not take subjectivity and qualitativeness - used as a critique of
Positive economics - and turn them into premises from which the
alternatives are formed. This follows from the fact that once
objectivity, i.e. independence of observation and quantification,
and thus fixed criteria of validation, are rejected, then one is at
difficulty in avoiding relativism. In the case of Hayek and Knight,
the premise of subjectivity leads necessarily to introspection, which
as a scientific criterion is hard to justify. Perhaps what is needed
is a theory of social action which is not merely the opposite of
Positive economics, but which is based on a completely different
paradigm incorporating different ontological and epistemological
assumptions.
In this chapter I have discussed critiques of Positive
economics and factors that can be used to explain irresolution of
controversy in economics. These are: value judgements and ideology,
subjectivity in observation and the impossibility of experimentation.
As we have seen these factors may be taken as sufficient but not
necessary explanations. They are not necessary because they largely
refer to the defects and shortcomings of economic theory and method
and not to the inherent logic that propagates the continuation of
conflict in economics. If it is assumed that the potential development
of techniques and methods could overcome defects such as subjectivity,
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values and consciousness in both observer and observed, and render
economics objective, then controversy in economics would be resolv¬
able since the obstacles would have been removed. Following
section C which will deal with a more systematic explanation of
conflict in economics given by Krupp, I shall attempt to put forward
a necessary explanation of the persistence of controversy, and par¬
ticularly of the Monetary controversy. This explanation will
account for the logical impossibility of resolution in economic
disagreements, irrespective of the potential development of techniques
and methods.
C. KRUPP'S EXPLANATION OF CONTROVERSY
Once the validity of empirical facts (as reflecting the
'real' and 'true' structure of experience) is unquestioned, and once
empirical facts, however, have been shown incapable of resolving
theoretical disagreement and unravelling the truth, then an explana¬
tion is needed to account for this inconsistency. Sherman Krupp attempts
to do this by delineating four areas of disagreement and five factors
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that explain it . The possible areas of disagreement are:
(1) assumptions and axioms of a theory, (2) implications,
(3) applicability, and (4) value-judgements^^. These areas may
be easily recognized in the case of the Monetary controversy. Firstly,
there is disagreement concerning the assumptions of price flexibility
and full employment, secondly, although both factions accept the
common IS-LM framework, they deduce different implications about the
transmission mechanism of monetary impulses, i.e. Fiscalists accept
an inverse relationship between the rate of money growth and interest
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rates, whereas Monetarists accept only the long-run direct
relationship, thirdly, there is disagreement concerning the bound¬
aries of the testing scope of the theories, i.e. Fiscalists prefer
disagreggated and descriptive observations, whereas Monetarists
prefer simple and aggregated observations, and fourthly, there is
disagreement as to the desirability of fiscal or monetary policy,
the objectives of price stability or full employment, and the degree
of government intervention.
For the Positive economist, however, these areas of
disagreement are potentially resolvable with empirical evidence.
Yet, as Krupp points out, "Perhaps the most important observations
that can be made about . . . theoretical controversy ... is that
these arguments cannot be resolved on strictly empirical grounds"***.
This fundamental characteristic of controversy is also representative
of the Monetary dispute. Empirical evidence has contributed very
little towards the resolution of the debate. Empirical tests have
not succeeded in persuading either faction.
Why is this happening? Krupp offers an array of factors
that are supposed to explain this phenomenon. The first one relates
to the choice of strategy, i.e. the choice of perspective from which
the economist will look at the world: "the framework chosen focuses
112
the direction of a theory's development" . According to Krupp,
the choice of strategy cannot be justified with empirical facts as
113
its preference is based upon a_ priori preconceptions . The second
factor concerns the connection of theory with observable reality:
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"operational definitions can always be brought into question" and
therefore "theories are resistent to simple disconfirmation by the
114
usual application of testing procedures" . The third factor
refers to the use of ceteris paribus conditionals. If the theory
is elastic, i.e. too broad and general, then it easily survives
empirical testing"^. The fourth factor concerns the presence of
judgements in the selection of evidence''^. And the fifth factor
relates to the existence of values in the formation and choice of
definitions and sets of evidence: "Differences in values affect
117
many questions that seem to be empirically determinable"
The picture that Krupp presents in relation to the
difficulties in resolving controversies in economics is depicted in
the diagram in Figure V. The subject in a controversy is theory
(or two alternative theories) and the objective is testing it. The
steps that are required for theory to reach its objective, i.e.
validation, are operational definitions, ceteris paribus clauses and
the selection of evidence. However, in all these steps there is an
element involved which interferes with the smooth flow of the proced¬
ure. Starting even with the subject, i.e. theory, its shape is
determined by preconceptions; then in connecting the subject with
the real world, values enter in the definition required to do this.
The difficulty of testing the theory increases when conditionals
render the assumptions of the theory too broad, and finally, the
selection of alternative sets of evidence requires "delicate judgement"
which further distracts the procedure.
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Most of these factors can be used to explain the persistence
of the Monetary controversy. For example, the two different strateg¬
ies used, one accepting the smoothness and continuity of the
competitive market, while the other accepting the resistent dis¬
equilibrium states in the system, may account for the divergence of
118
empirical results . Also operational definitions are a source of
disagreement. For instance, the empirical definition of money has
presented problems in connection with the validation of alternative
theories of the transmission mechanism. The complementarity or sub-
stitutability of money - an important factor in delineating the
scope of the test - depends on the definition money is given.
Finally, the selection of evidence is determined by the degree of
simplicity or aggregation of the models used.
In evaluating Krupp's explanation of controversy, there
arise certain questions that somehow weaken the explanatory value of
the factors presented. Contrary to what Krupp claims, for instance,
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i.e. that Samuelson is a Logical Positivist and an ultra-empiricist,
119
whereas Friedman is not (!) , I think that it can be discerned from
the methodological writings of either economist that they both belong
120
to Positive economics . If this is so, then both believe m the
ultimate power of empirical testing. Moreover, although they accept
the existence of value judgements, they cannot accept, since they are
Positive economists, that because of them, controversial issues can¬
not be resolved with empirical facts. They believe that empirical
testing will potentially resolve the controversy. And this is true
despite the fact that the Monetary controversy persists and survives
all the empirical tests used by either faction. The result is that
the validation procedure in the controversy is hampered not only by
the intermediation of values and preconceptions, but also by the
application of an epistemological datum, i.e. empirical testing,
which, in itself, may be methodologically unjustifiable and, even
more, has been shown inadequate as a criterion of theory validation
in the case of the Monetary controversy. While, therefore, Krupp
explains the divergence of opinions in economics and the possibility
of methodological deadlock, in terms of obstacles in scientific pro¬
cedure, he does not explain the stubborn persistence of economists
involved in the controversy in continuing to use the same criterion
of validation and objectivity. Consequently, although Krupp's ex¬
planatory schema may help to account for the difficulty of resolving
the controversy with the existing methodological means, it cannot
fully account for the impossibility of resolving it. Value judgements
may explain differences in opinion but they do not fully explain their
persistence. In this case a different explanation is required, one
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that would account for both the divergence of opinions and also the
mechanisms that perpetuate such divergence.
Another difficulty in understanding Krupp's explanation is
that although in his framework values, preconceptions and judgements
permeate all the stages of the validation process he, nonetheless,
ascribes to controversy the property of being a vehicle for scientific
121
advance and issue clarification . In fact, because of this prop-
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erty, controversies are considered essential for scientific procedure
Krupp justifies this position by evoking the role of controversy as an
123
agent of advance in scientific knowledge . However, the difficulty
is that if, according to Krupp, deductive criteria, i.e. strategy,
operational definitions, conditional statements, are disputed because
they are value-laden, and if inductive criteria, i.e. selection of
empirical evidence, are also disputed because of "delicate judgements",
then one cannot see what criteria are left for determining what is
progress in scientific knowledge and what is not. Moreover, the
hypothesis 'controversy-scientific advance' is not always supported by
the facts. Not all controversies in economics have brought scientific
124
advance. For example the fact that the Marginalists won over the
controversy with the Historicists, and became the established paradigm,
does not mean that issues have been clarified and that economic know¬
ledge approximated truth more scientifically. Indeed, problems and
phenomena are looked at differently but not necessarily in a 'better'
or 'clearer' way. Following Kuhn's analysis, a paradigmatic shift
involves a complex process, in which controversy, as an 'anomaly', plays
a certain role, but also in which a host of other factors play an
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important role . Moreover a paradigmatic shift, according to
Kuhn, does not necessarily imply scientific advance, but only a
126
change in perspectives and world views . Furthermore, socio¬
economic forces, rather than only controversy, can account for the
paradigmatic shift and the development of economics, for instance the
rise of Marginalism reflecting the rise of industrial capitalism.
In the case where Marginalism won over Historicism, there was not
necessarily scientific progress, but perhaps only the suppression of
one opposing school of thought (unfavoured by the dominant class) to
127
the advantage of another (apologetic to the dominant class)
In concluding, I maintain that we cannot distinguish
between scientific progress and scientific regress when criteria are
blurred by ideological struggle. Scientific advance for whom?
128
There is no automatic mechanism, as Krupp implies , that will turn
controversies into scientific progress. Paradoxically, Krupp him¬
self admits that criteria of theory selection are a source of
129
conflict . It is difficult, therefore, to understand what criteria
he uses in order to determine scientific advance. Finally, although
Krupp explains the origin of controversy and identifies the sources
of disagreement in economics, he does not, however, fully explain
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64. Continued from Page 287.
Recognition should also be given to the claim that the controversy
is due to the critical nature of the scientific process. There
is never a decisive test that forms an absolute criterion of
choice between theories. Every test is falsifiable, since it
is empirical, and the critical spirit of the scientist sees to
it. There is no doubt that this factor is important in explaining
the persistence of controversy, since all issues and their tests
are open to continuous falsification. However, in accepting this
explanation - or others similar to it, such as that empirical
techniques are ineffective - as sufficient and adequate, we fail
to recognize all the other elements involved in scientific con¬
troversies. We fail to depict the particular ideas and their
interrelations that form the conceptual 'matrix' of conflict. The
fallibilist nature of science perhaps explains the existence of
controversies, but it does not tell us anything about the ideo¬
logical and methodological elements involved, nor about the
logical ambiguities stemming from them. By delineating the
relations of these ideas the structure and the logic, rather than
only the existence, of the controversy is explained. Such an
explanation may tell us something about the persistent theoretical
and methodological qualifications that are used to interpret
empirical criteria of choice, as well as about the systematic
relations between particular methodologies and ontologies that
back such qualifications.
65. Addition.
For a discussion of the so-called 'Growth of Knowledge' theories
of science, see the introduction of A A Arouh "The logic of con¬
flict in the appraisal of economic theories" forthcoming.
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CHAPTER 7:
THE LOGIC OF CONTROVERSY
IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS
"A contradiction originally latent, gave rise
to opposed schools of thought."!
G. Myrdal
"There is a conflict between contrary tendencies,
each of which is necessary to existence, and
there must be a set of rules to reconcile them."
"The leading characteristic of the ideology that
dominates ... is its extreme confusion. To





THE LOGIC OF CONTROVERSY IN
POSITIVE ECONOMICS
J
A. A CHOICE OF METAPHYSIC
"Car les methodes impliquent des metaphysiques, elles trahissent
a leur insu les conclusions qu'elles pretendent parfois ne pas
encore connaitre ... La methode definie ici confesse le
sentiment que toute vraie connaissance est impossible."^
A. Camus
Like any other myth Positive economics - in both its
epistemological and ontological aspects - expresses a wish. This
wish is to know and control reality. Like all myths however, Positive
economics is ambiguous. The function of this ambiguity is to conceal
the contradiction that arises from the ideals of Positive economics and
its practice. The ideals are that theory and fact, subject and object,
ends and means, are truly independent and, more importantly, that
empirical testing ought to discriminate between competing theories.
The practice is that theory and fact are interrelated in an ambiguous
way, that the subject is simultaneously the object, that ends influence
means and finally, that in actual fact controversies persist in Positive
economics in spite of empirical testing.
The purpose of this chapter is to show the logic that binds
the structure of Positive economics and is behind the ambiguities con¬
cealing this contradiction. In doing this an explanation of perpetual
conflict in economics will emerge as well as of the paradox between the
continuous faith of Positive economists to the positivist ideals and
the reality of persistent theoretical strife.
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This explanation differs from a causal explanation, which
attributes persistent controversy to only ideological factors, or
to socio-historical forces, or to other external causes, in that it
traces out the logical relations that connect the conceptual structure
used by the controversants from an internal point of view. The
conflict will not be attributed to only external causes (although these
may also be important], but it will be reflected in the ambiguous nature
of this conceptual structure, and the logical tension stemming from
it. Accordingly, Positive economics will be taKen as a system of
beliefs, a myth (not in the pejorative sense], the analysis of which
will reveal the logic that nurtures the Monetarist and F-Twist con¬
troversies (for such analyses of myths see E Leach, Genesis as Myth,
1969 and C Levi-Strauss "Mythologiques" in L'Homme Nu, Paris, 1971
and E Leach (ed] The Structural Study of Myth and Totemism, London,
1967]. This analysis has an advantage over uni-dimensional causal
explanations, in that it fits the binary nature of the phenomenon in
question. The methodological and ideological conflict involved will
be analysed in terms of binary oppositions that are already built into
the dichotomies of Positive economics. This will constitute a structural
explanation of conflict in Positive economics, which will delineate,
first, the methodological and ideological reasons that are used to
qualify the conflicting positions in the face of contradicting evidence
and, second, the logical relations that stem from the distinctions of
Positive economics to allow divergent interpretations of the agreed
upon criterion of positivist objectivity, i.e. empirical testing.
The explanation is called structural because it attempts to reveal
the deep structure of controversy in economics, in terms of which
both the conflict and the unity may be understood. This deep structure
takes the form of structural relations. Structural relations in
my use of the expression are binary oppositions, and in the case in
question these binary oppositions are implied in the distinctions of
Positive economics. They are logically related to form a unity
or identity. Thus each distinction contains a structural relation.
The logical tension between conflict and unity implied in these
oppositions is the key to the understanding the conflicting inter¬
pretations of Positive economics.
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One point that must be emphasized from the outset is that
this explanation does not intend to offer an account of the factors
that cause the emergence and persistence of controversies. Instead
it attempts to seek a ubiquitous relation that connects the distinct¬
ions of Positive economics. This relation will be defined according
to each particular distinction as this is stipulated in Positive
economics. No other factor will be added but solely the logic of the
categories of Positive economics will be interpreted. The totality
of these relations in the whole of Positive economics will form a
logical structure that can be viewed as a deep structure lying behind
the categories, distinctions and thought patterns of Positive economics.
It will be hypothesized that conflict in Positive economics is a mani¬
festation of this deep structure. Thus an analysis of the surface
structure of Positive economics will reveal a deeper structure, which
through logical transformations and correlations will be shown to
manifest itself in irreconcilable conflict.
The validity of this method, and thus of this explanation, is
not based upon an external criterion, such as empirical facts or relev¬
ance, but on its esoteric cohesion and plausibility. Plausibility,
however, is only a contingent characteristic of this explanation.
Thus it is not required necessarily to render it valid. The validity
of the explanation depends on its logical coherence in revealing the
deep structure of Positive economics. And even at that it does not
claim to be more real than any other explanation, but only that it can
be used as a structural perspective through which to look at continuous
conflict. Needless to say that as Positive economics cannot justify
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its method of empirical testing, due to the Problem of Induction, so
the method used here cannot justify why one account of the logic of
conflict equally logically coherent is more valid than another, due to
the Problem of Deduction. The only (and perhaps arbitrary) reason for
choosing this particular method is that it offers a viable (a_ priori)
means to structure the pieces of conflict in economics logically.
Thus, the logical justification of any methodology involves
contradictions due to unresolved problems in the theory of knowledge.
Difficulties and ambiguities in the logical structure of methodologies
reflect difficulties and ambiguities in the justification of induction
and deduction. The consequence of these difficulties is to make, as
4
Streeten says, "an arbitrary step into metaphysics" . Perhaps the
only way out of such difficulties is to acknowledge them. My task,
however, is not only to uncover the metaphysic and use it as a 'world-
view', as Robinson and Myrdal maintain, but also to accept the fact
that if^ I want to put forward an explanation of conflict in economics,
I must do so within the logical constraints of my metaphysic. In gen¬
eral my metaphysic is that since there are logically unresolved
ambiguities in the theory of knowledge, no methodology (including mine)
can be logically justified in its claims to knowledge (irrespective of
whether it applies correctly, as in the case of induction which al¬
though in general it has been shown to work well, at least as far as
physics is concerned, it has not been possible to justify logically).
However, since economics (and science in general) has to have claims
to knowledge, it has to act despite epistemological difficulti-es. The
same situation applies to my explanation only with the difference that
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my metaphysic accepts the contradiction between logical impasse and
necessary action as part of its structure.
In what follows I offer an explanatory schema of conflict
in economics that although it is viable cannot offer (in a logical
sense), due to the above-mentioned problems, any validateonal status
other than its explanatory and structural consistency. Furthermore
this viability is enhanced by the fact that there are no alternative
structural explanations of conflict in Positive economics. Most ex¬
planations attribute conflict to historical, sociological or
ideological reasons. - In this sense an external view of Positive
economics is taken. I consider the explanation proposed here as
alternative to these explanations, since it attempts to look at con¬
flict in Positive economics from an internal point of view. Thus,
until a different internal and structural explanation is proposed it
may serve as a provisional one, which however cannot be logically
justified and validated, unless an arbitrary and logically contradict¬
ory step is taken. It follows that I cannot use the arguments that
it explains 'better' or 'more adequately', or that it is 'more relevant',
simply because I cannot have unequivocal criteria of 'betterness',
'adequacy' and 'relevance'. The choice of the particular method used
in this explanation is not therefore dictated by any logically justifi¬
able methodology, but by a metaphysic (itself contradictory) which
stipulates an approach incorporating an emphasis on aesthetic structure
(in the structuralist sense), a symmetric consistency of explanation and
a logical viability. If one argued, however, that the criteria of
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aesthetic, symmetrical and viable are subjective, the answer would
be that they are stipulated within the postulated metaphysic (in an
axiomatic sense), which can be contested only by an appeal to an
alternative, subjective and, given the Problems of Induction and
Deduction, unjustifiable metaphysic. If one argued back saying
that this might lead to relativism, then the answer would be that it
does so out of the logical necessity of having to act (i.e. give an
explanation) and the contradiction that one cannot logically justify
why one acts, and whether the particular action (explanation) is
valid. Perhaps the only validity and justification that can be
claimed for the following explanation is the absence of other similar
explanations and its viability to accommodate persistent theoretical
and empirical conflict.
B. AN ONTO-LOGICAL EXPLANATION OF THE MONETARY AND
F-TWIST CONTROVERSIES5
In what follows I shall attempt to put the distinctions of
Positive economics in relation to one another, according to a unify¬
ing principle. This principle will take the form of a structural
opposition between necessity and contingency that characterizes all
the distinctions. In appearing in various combinations and forms
throughout the structure of Positive economics, it will constitute a
deep structure beneath the distinctions that can be used as a basis
for understanding the logic of conflict in Positive economics.
By being a fusion of positivist philosophy and Neoclassical
economics, Positive economics inherits a fundamental dichotomy, first,
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at the methodological level, and second, at the ontological level.
At the methodological level, like any other philosophical system,
Positivism is confronted with the dilemma between universal and
particular knowledge.' Essentially, it has to find a way out of
the dilemma by choosing between either a totally abstract and
general solution or a totally empirical and specific one, that is
between either an absolutely deductive or an absolutely inductive
perspective.
This problem has confronted most philosophical systems and
up to the 16th and 17th centuries its solution followed, primarily,
the Aristotelian lines of 'essence' and 'appearance'. The solution
to the dilemma, according to the ancient and medieval philosophies,
was to go beyond sense observations (appearances) because they were
temporal and contingent, in order to unravel an omnipresent and ever¬
lasting 'essence' the existence of which was considered necessary.
The proof of the validity of a statement about the existence of
'essence' depended upon logical and deductive arguments^. However,
the infinite regress, created from having to justify the choice of
one particular 'essence' among others, could only be stopped by an
appeal to a (superimposed) metaphysic, or some 'imperative', that
would bring the regress into a 'terminal essence'.
Positivism (in all its forms) emerged as a solution to the
dilemma mainly as a reaction against such a type of metaphysical
7
reasoning . As science developed the need for observation and experi-
8
ment increased . It was believed that theories should not have
metaphysical foundations but that their truth should correspond to
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empirical reality . In a sense, this reaction led Positivists to
the other horn of the dilemma, namely the Problem of Induction. In
other words, how could one know that a set of empirical evidence was
not specific to a particular context and therefore might change from
situation to situation. Or, put differently, one needed to prove
the general validity of empirical evidence by an appeal to another
set of empirical evidence which would prove the general applicability
of the initial set.
However, Positivists confronted these difficulties by
attempting to make a clear distinction between the two extremes of
deductivism and inductivism. They made a breakthrough (or so they
thought) by introducing a fundamental dichotomy that runs through
the structure of positivist epistemology. They postulated a theory
of knowledge that is distinct from a theory of reality. By sharply
distinguishing what is to be reality and what knowledge of it, a
distinction of validatory roles was made possible. The role of
knowledge (theory) is strictly to sort out the complex reality, while
the role of validation is given over to empirical experience derived
from that reality. Thus as only empirical reality retains the role
of validation, experimentation and observation become the indispens¬
able tools of science and 'true' knowledge. There are no mystical
connections between theory and fact. The role of each one is
clearly postulated and distinguished. In doing this Positivism
formed the basis for the erosion of all metaphysical and transcedental
tendencies inherited from older philosophies. There was to be no
fixed idea any more - such as God or 'essence' - that would render
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a theory valid. There was only scientific observation and experiment
that decided any theoretical issue. In the positivist world the
distinction between 'essence' and 'appearance' became obsolete^.
Although Positivists would attempt to impute causation to unobserved
phenomena, they would reject any mystical or occult entities - such
as 'essence' and 'appearance' - that could not be put to any testable
and observable form"'' . In their attempt, therefore, to overcome
epistemological difficulties stemming from the Problem of Deduction
and to divest their assumptions of any metaphysical remnants, Positiv¬
ists constructed a philosophical system that offers a set of
prescriptive rules for the acquisition of scientific knowledge
(empirical testing) and a set of views that define the nature of the
12
world (complex, unmechanistic, reality)
As an outcome of such sharp distinctions between knowledge
and reality, of theory and fact, Positivism inherited an opposition
of tendencies that formed the basis of its epistemological premises.
On the one hand, its claims to scientific knowledge consist of prin¬
ciples the application of which is considered necessary for the
acquisition of 'true' knowledge. On the other hand, reality is seen
as a collection of contingent events the occurrence of which obeys no
necessary and mechanistic rules.
Concerning epistemological principles, Positivists stipulate
a set of rules that are recognized as universal. No matter what the
nature of the phenomena to be studied is, be it human or physical, the
method of studying them is common to all. The application of this
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method does not depend on the historical context or particular
nature of the events under study, but rather on a strict observance
of the prespecified itinerary: observe - make hypotheses - test.
In this sense, therefore, Positivism has as its subject a set of
rules the application of which leads necessarily to the truth or
falsity of a theory (see Figure VI on p.308).
Concerning reality, the object of Positivism, it consists
of unrelated events the nature of which is dependent upon temporal
and provisional contexts. The world is made of a set of contingent
states which are not causally related in any necessary way.
Occurrences in this complex world are not considered to follow
mechanistic rules or to rely on a certain, prespecified structure.
In view of such a chaotic nature of reality, the task of the scient¬
ist becomes to explore systematic patterns and regularities through
observation and experiment. However, one is not supposed (allowed)
to attach mechanistic causality to these patterns as this would go
against the contingency of reality. Patterns could be systematic
and be used as projectors of future events, but they do not reflect
any causal functioning. Causal relations are to be found only in
the hypothetico-deductive nature of theories. Reality is far too
complex and accidental to allow actual inferences of causal relation¬
ships between real events. Causality is reserved for general
theories, and they are mostly heuristic. In short, the central
theme of the positivist theory of reality is that any real event in
13
the world is contingent and could be otherwise than what it is
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From one point of view, in having made a clear distinction
between knowledge and reality or theory and fact, Positivism succeeds
in reconciling the (empirically) untested certainty of absolute
deductiveness and the'specific uncertainty of absolute inductiveness.
By postulating a fixed and independent set of rules as a guide to
know the world it renders the study of a contingent world possible.
For other systems, for example, knowledge and reality, theory and
fact, are intimately interrelated and the first constitutes part of
the latter. Marxism, for instance, explains its epistemological
position, or the position of others, in terms of the historical con¬
text in which both theory and fact are moulded. In other words
each historical period emits, as it were, its own theories and facts.
The subject acts upon these facts in order to understand them as
well as to change them. Knowledge and reality are one in the con¬
cept of 'praxis'. Whereas, in the case of Positivism it becomes
essential for statements about knowledge to be different from state¬
ments about reality. In this sense, the opposition between necessary
knowledge and contingent reality is needed to sustain the viability
of the positivist epistemological position. From another point of
view, Positivism by virtue of this juxtaposition between knowledge
and reality, retains a fundamental tension which is to be found at
all its levels. The recurring theme of necessity and contingency
implied in the knowledge-reality dichotomy is further repeated in
the analytic-synthetic and in the normative-positive distinctions
forming a binding relationship. In what follows I shall describe
how this tension is manifested in the structure of Positivism-and
relates to Neoclassical economics to form Positive economics.
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C. THE STRUCTURAL RELATIONS OF POSITIVE ECONOMICS
To begin with there is the distinction between knowledge
and reality. Reality is there and must be known. However, as we
have seen in chapter 2, the attempt to know reality gives rise to
problems and logical impasses, i.e. the Problems of Induction and
Deduction. To mediate for these impasses Positivism achieves a
split between what is to be knowledge and what is to be reality.
This split is achieved at the cost of an ambiguity in the definitions
of knowledge and reality. In the case of knowledge, theory is
given a definition which is a fusion between the abstract and the
empirical. In the case of reality, facts are given a definition
which is a fusion between the empirical and the abstract. The con¬
sequence of this ambiguity is a tension that needs to be relieved if
the practice of Positive economics is to remain viable. This relief
is realised in the joining of forces between Positivism and Utilitar¬
ianism. The ambiguity, however, is not dissolved entirely, but in
this unification it appears as a structured dichotomy between neces¬
sity and contingency, which is manifested at, and permeates, all the
levels of Positive economics. But let us see first how the
unification between Positivism and Utilitarianism is realised.
In its application to the social sciences, Positivism finds
its counterpart in utilitarian philosophy and Liberalism, of which
14
Neoclassical economics is a byproduct . In Utilitarianism society
is split into atoms or individuals whose goal is the attainment of
the greatest possible state of happiness or pleasure. In striving
to attain this end individuals, free from any socially superimposed
constraint, achieve the maximum of social happiness. The assumption
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behind this belief is that since society is defined as the sum
total of all individuals, the achievement of the greatest pleasure
of each unit will automatically lead to the greatest pleasure of all
units.
The synthesis between Positivism and Utilitarianism becomes
feasible because the latter offers a theory of action (behaviour,
reality) which suits the epistemology of the former^. Since individ¬
uals are considered discrete units and their action is gauged in terms
of their observable behaviour to achieve a state of happiness, the
study of society becomes amenable to scientific observation and experi¬
ment. The definition of society, since it is considered to be the
addition of all individuals, is to be divested of any metaphysical
and untestable notion of a 'whole'. The 'whole' can be translated
into each individual and the action of each individual can be observed
empirically. If, therefore, the behaviour of each individual can be
scientifically assessed, then the behaviour of society, mutatis
mutandis, can also be assessed. There is no qualitative difference
between the totality and its parts^.
The intellectual unification between Positivism and
Utilitarianism is further made possible by the fact that Positivism,
having rejected all previous philosophies as metaphysical, turned to
Utilitarianism to find the earthly rationality necessary for the appli¬
cation of its epistemology. As Hollis and Nell say,
Logical Positivism . . . drew on support outside philosophy,
when it banished organic as well as moral notions from the
moral sciences. Reason was again enthroned in a new return
to timeless calculation and universal experiment.1?
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The relationship between Positivism and Utilitarianism is
further consolidated, with reference to Positive economics, when
neoclassical theory is brought into the picture. In parallel with
Positivism, Neoclassical economics rejects the classical economic
doctrines on the grounds that the latter use metaphysical (and un-
18
measurable) concepts such as value . The major assumption in
Neoclassical economics, in contrast to Classical political economy,
relates to the motives of the economic agents. Their behaviour is
determined by their striving to maximize. Consumers maximize their
(measurable?) utilities and producers their quantifiable profit.
Neoclassical theory, being intimately linked to Utilitarianism,
applies the principles of this system to explain economic behaviour
(reality). The utilitarian assumption of man's pursuit of satis¬
faction as the ultimate goal applies to Neoclassical economics as
the satisfaction of economic wants and objectives. That is, each
good has a definite amount of utility and the economic agent attempts
to achieve such a combination of goods, in accordance with his/her
income, that will maximize his/her total utility. Although the
modern theory of consumption and demand does not deal directly with
utility but with preferences, nonetheless it rests its foundations
on Utilitarianism and Bentham's 'felicific calculus'. Preferences
have replaced utilities because of their properties of measurability
without altering, however, the basic neoclassical framework.
According to Meek, "... the expulsion of utility from value theory
has not meant the expulsion of the presuppositions which were brought
19
in with the utility theory"
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The neoclassical theory of economic behaviour can be
separated into two parts: the one refers to a subjective and the
other to an objective part. The central assumption of Neoclassical
economics is that individuals set their own ends and goals and attempt
to allocate their scarce means in such a way as to fulfil these goals.
The first part of this assumption concerns the setting and perception
of specific goals by the individual and the second part concerns the
application of definite, fixed rules, determined by scarcity, to
accomplish these goals.
I call the first part subjective because in it is assumed
that each individual or group sets a particular set of goals as an
objective which may be different from the rest of the individuals or
groups. For example, a consumer sets as his/her particular goal
the satisfaction of his/her wants, while the producer the pursuit of
profit, or the government attempts to reach full employment and/or
stable growth, etc. Marshall, for instance, says that,
individual judgements as to the desirability of different
social aims, or as to matters of fact which lie beyond
the scope of any individual's special studies, should be
clearly distinguished from those which claim to have been
reached by scientific method.^0
Thus these goals are set subjectively and are to be distinguished
21
from objective (scientific) goals . Also the content of each set
of goals is different from individual to individual, from group to
group, from sector to sector, from social role to social role, and
22
from one historical period to another . In this sense, therefore,
the subjective determination of each set of goals is dependent upon
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contingent factors. That is as periods, roles and sectors change
so also does the content of the goals.
I call the second part objective because it transcends
individual, sectoral, national or historical differences and applies
universally. The second part shows how the social unit will act in
23
a constraint situation . It is a determined situation because of
the assumptions of scarcity and economic rationality. The two
assumptions together form the way the action of the economic agent
will take; that is, he/she will always and everywhere allocate scarce
resources in a rational way so as to achieve the maximum gains with
the minimum of losses. In this sense the rational allocation of
scarce resources to alternative ends constitutes a universal principle
which is to be found outside the subjective scope of the individual.
Its nature does not depend upon historical or contextual (contingent)
factors and is therefore necessary. Constraint optimization is part
of the necessary behaviour of any individual, sector, role and within
24
any particular period and place
The result of the combination between Positivism and
25
Utilitarianism (Neoclassical economics) is Positive economics . In
Positive economics one finds an epistemology based upon Positivism,
and an ontology (a theory of social action) based upon utilitarian
liberalism. The combination is realized at two (interrelated) levels:
one logical and one contextual (historical).
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FIGURE VI: NECESSITY AND CONTINGENCY IN POSITIVISM
AND UTILITARIANISM
NOTES: a. In its manifestation in Neoclassical economics.
At the first level, the logical opposition between necessity
and contingency in the positivist theory of knowledge is juxtaposed to
the logical opposition between contingency and necessity in Utilitarian¬
ism (i.e. Neoclassical economics). The synthesis is feasible-because
of the complementarity between features in the positivist epistemology
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and features in Utilitarianism. In Figure VI we see that the
necessary subject of Positivism relates to the contingent subjectivity
of Utilitarianism and the necessary objectivity of the latter relates
to the contingent object of the former. This interconnection is
realized in the overall context of a synthesis between an epistemology
and an economic philosophy, or more broadly between a philosophy of
scientific knowledge and a philosophy of reality. On the one hand,
the economic philosophy offers the notion of a rational economic man
applying his maximising rules in an objective (outside of him) manner
and ordering the chaotic complexity implicit in the positivist con¬
tingent world. In this sense, the positivist rational scientist
needs the utilitarian rational economic man to sort out his/her messy
world. On the other hand, the positivist epistemology offers a theory
of knowledge consisting of certain and fixed rules which put the con¬
flicting multiplicity of possible alternative ends, forming the
subjective part of rational economic man, into a theoretical perspect-
2 6
ive or a well-ordered framework . Utilitarianism (or Neoclassical
economics) views society in terms of sectors or individuals who share
contingently determined values of varying importance and nature. In
view of this it needs a theory of knowledge that would transcend ideo¬
logical differences between individuals or groups and render the study
of society scientifically viable. In this sense, rational economic
man needs rational scientist man to sort out his 'irrational',
27
subjective, part of the world .
Accordingly, what is lacking from positivist philosophy is
borrowed from economic philosophy and what is lacking from the latter
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is borrowed from the former . Positive economics is not, therefore,
only a theory of knowledge or only an economic philosophy but is the
unison of the two. It is a system embracing a positivist theory of
knowledge and a utilitarian theory of economic reality, inheriting all
the contradictions found therein. Although the tensions, found in
Positivism and Utilitarianism separately, are relieved in the synthesis,
they further reassert themselves in the formation of Positive economics.
The logical opposition between necessity and contingency reappears
and consolidates itself throughout the structure of Positive economics.
Since the synthesis is achieved in terms of the juxtaposition between
necessary objectivity (rules of behaviour, scarcity) and contingent
object (reality) and between necessary subject (rules of science) and
contingent subjectivity (alternative ends), the structured tension is
filtered through and decomposed in the two foundations of Positive
economics: science and behaviour. The viability of the system is
therefore maintained with a renewed structured opposition inherited
t.
by the conjoining of parts of Positivism with parts of Utiliarianism.
The connection of Positivism and Utilitarianism is in their philo¬
sophical alliance to combat the ambiguities inherited from the Problems
of Induction and Deduction. In doing this, however, they do not re¬
solve the riddle but rationalize it and reassert the ambiguities in a
form of a structural relation, i.e. contingency-necessity. The
connection is important because it implies the complementarity of the
two systems. And the complementarity forms the context in which the
structured contradiction or tension inherited reappears.
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At the contextual (historical] level certain develop¬
ments in both Positivism and Neoclassical economics facilitated
the marriage of the two. Firstly, both Positivism and Neoclassical
economics reject anything that has to do with metaphysics29. 'Essences'
or 'wholes' are considered pseudoproblems30, and their study should
be left to art rather than science31. In consequence, Positivism
is led to develop a theory of Knowledge based on methodological
individualism and Neoclassical economics a theory of reality on
economic individualism. The compartmentalization of reality into
discrete units renders scientific observation feasible. The actions
of individuals are cast in terms of rational choices or preferences
the classification of which enables the application of measurement
techniques32. By divesting reality from notions such as 'whole'
or 'essence' Positivism opens the way for experimentation and
science3 3.
Another development that brought the alliance31* closer
together - also related to the 'anti-metaphysics' campaign - is the
distinction between analytic and synthetic, on the one hand, and
means and ends on the other. Although Positivists acknowledge the
existence of metaphysical statements they render them harmless by
ascribing to them a vacuous role. Such statements, it is believed,
are empty because they do not correspond to any part of the factual
domain. Some of them are also tautologies since their meaning depends
on the parts from which they are constructed. (A distinction should
be drawn, however, between metaphysical and analytic statements.
Metaphysical statements of the form 'for every x there is somewhere
a y' can be characterized as vacuous because there is no empirical
statement that can verify or falsify it. In this sense their
vacuity consists in the undecidability of their truth-value. On
the other hand, analytic statements may be called vacuous because
they imply a tautology in the sense that tautologies do not des¬
cribe or say, but only show, and so are true whatever the emp¬
irical facts may be]. The function of these statements should,
therefore, remain heuristic and their analysis should be referred
to the linguist rather than to the scientist. In contrast
synthetic statements are about facts derived from the real
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(empirical) world (we have seen, however, that each part of the
distinction contains an ambiguity: analytic, THEORETICAL-empirical;
synthetic, EMPIRICAL-theoretical).
This fundamental positivist distinction paves the way for
the neoclassical distinction between ends and means. It helps the
economist to distinguish which is to be the subject and scope of
economics. It forms the boundaries within which economics would
feel secure from whatever has to do with art and ideology. Economists
are not to engage in questions concerning the preference of desirable
ends; their job is rather to delineate the method by which to attain
35
these ends . Goals, aspirations or subjective ends are neither here
nor there in terms of science. They belong to the realm of meta¬
physics and they are, therefore, useless to the scientist. Though
they are useless as subjects of science, however, they are useful as
objects of scientific research. A scientist does not use 'what ought'
statements because they cannot help him/her to make predictions concern¬
ing 'what is' statements. Nevertheless, since normative statements
are part of subjective reality they can be studied in a positive fashion
(to the extent they are amenable to scientific observation). On the
other hand, statements relating to the ways the ends should be accomp¬
lished, or to the effects of a change in these ends, are positive and
refer to the way things actually 'are'. The allocation of scarce
resources to alternative ends is a fixed rule applying to all cases
36
and is factually true of any context or situation . The study and
explanation (prediction) of such rules constitutes the subject—matter
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of Neoclassical economics. Predictions based upon such rules are
synthetic statements that can easily be put into empirical test.
A development that grew out of this distinction was
37
Marginalism and the consequent expansion of quantification
Economics by defining its scope in terms of scarcity and the allocat¬
ion of means to alternative ends reversed the old problems of
Classical economics from value being determined by labour and product-
38
ion to value being determined by utilities and exchange . In fact
the term value was discarded and price (the result of exchange) took
its place. Price was determined by the interaction of economic
agents in the market. The old problems of distribution and accumu¬
lation became problems of exchange. Supply and demand became the
cornerstone of economic science. Everything, therefore, was in
accordance with the demands made by Positivism. Firstly, all action
was conducted on the surface (exchange, market) and therefore could
be empirically observed. Secondly, via Marginalism, mathematics
could be applied and the world appeared - as in physics - as a set
of mathematical functions and interrelations. Thirdly, price was a
quantifiable concept and, more importantly, it rendered all other
39
economic concepts quantifiable . Fourthly, by virtue of putting
boundaries on the subject of economics, the delineation of 'pure'
40
relations made quantification and empirical observation easier
And fifthly, the individualization of the subject of economics, along
with the assumption of the selfish pursuit of interest, allowed the
formation of utility or preference functions that could be ordered
and therefore quantified.
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In consequence, economics acquired the status of science
because it separated positive from normative statements, rendered
its theories quantifiable, defined its empirical scope, induced
measurement, and finally, by virtue of all this the fundamental tenet
of Positivism was fulfilled: empirical testing and observation
became possible and hence Political Economy turned into the science
of Economics^"1".
a.
, NECESSITY AND CONTINGENCY
In continuing the logical synthesis between Positivism
and Utilitarianism we see that the tension between knowledge and
reality or between the implied necessity and contingency, forming
the basis of Positivism and Utilitarianism, is repeated in their
synthesis, namely in the structure of Positive economics. Figure VII
picks up where Figure VI has left, and depicts the continuation of the
tension in the structure of Positive economics. The epistemological
part of Positive economics borrows directly from the positivist theory
of knowledge and the behavioural (ontological) part directly from neo¬
classical theory. Each building block in Positivism and Neoclassical
economics contains this tension in a somplete form: necessary objectiv
contingent subjectivity in economics (see Figure VI). As a fusion
between the two, however, Positive economics inherits the tension as a
result of a transaction. From Positivism the necessity-contingency
opposition is decomposed and Positive economics inherits the part relat
ing to the necessary rules of science. The contingent object in
Positivism is incorporated in the contingent part of Positive "economics
From Neoclassical economics the equivalent tension is also decomposed
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and the contingent subjectivity part becomes the world (reality) of
Positive economics. The part relating to the necessary objectivity
of the neoclassical theory of reality is reduced either to an 'as if'
representation of reality or an 'ideal-type'. In essence, therefore,
the neoclassical theory of reality is composed of a part referring to
the actual state of the world (ends) and a part referring to an
assumption about the world (means). In the synthesis of Positive
economics the actual contingent part of neoclassical theory becomes
the Positive economic theory of reality and the necessary (means,
rationality) part is incorporated in the scientific rules taken from
Positivism.
FIGURE VII: THE LOGIC AND STRUCTURE OF POSITIVE ECONOMICS
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The necessary part relates to the scientific method used
in economics. As in Positivism it provides a set of criteria by
which the economist can choose between alternative theories. The
assumptions behind these criteria are universal and fixed because
they apply to any situation irrespective of its content. For example,
the precept that a theory should systematically be put into empirical
test, is a rule valid for any theory anywhere and anytime. The method
by which one is to acquire scientific knowledge is independent of the
phenomena under study or the theories interpreting them. One has to
test theories with facts and facts should be empirically and quanti-
fiably amenable. In this sense, therefore, a set of methodological
rules becomes the necessary component of Positive economics.
In sharp contrast to the fixed criteria for knowledge,
Positive economics believes that the world is too complex and the
events therein occurring not in any prearranged way but unnecessarily.
There is no necessary connection between any two events. There are
only systematic regularities. Following a strongly empiricist tradi¬
tion Positive economics considers the world as one among possible
42
others, one that could be otherwise . The economist cannot know the
world a priori, he/she has to experience it. The theory of reality
espoused in Positive economics is, therefore, a theory of contingent
43
reality
However, in further analysing the methodological (knowledge)
and behavioural (reality) premises of Positive economics, we see that
the necessity-contingency tension reasserts itself in a different form,
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i.e. that of logical necessity versus logical contingency and that
of ontological necessity versus ontological contingency (see
Figure VII).
The first one manifests itself in the distinction between
analytic and synthetic. This distinction is indispensable because
Positive economists acknowledge the existence and need of quasi a
priori statements or theories (as we have seen in chapter 1). These
are used either to set an ordered perspective to the mass of unordered
data and to render complex reality intelligible, or to be used as
'as if' theories. Maximization and perfect competition are two
examples of analytic statements. These statements are normally de¬
fined as a set of tautologies that are empirically meaningless. As
such their inner content is logically necessary. If, for instance,
we define MV=PT to be such so as when we keep velocity and output
constant, then necessarily money will equal the price level. Or if
all the conditions of the perfect competition model hold then
necessarily the producer will produce that output which will maximize
profits. Since the conclusions follow directly from the premises
in fact they are contained in the premises - they are therefore
logically necessary. (It should be noted, however, that although
analytic statements are logically necessary they are nonetheless
epistemologically contingent. That is, all analytic statements are
considered heuristic or ideal-type constructs the choice of which
partly depends on subjective criteria as well as criteria such as
44
simplicity or fruitfulness . Their status is tentative even- if
they are confirmed by experience. Positive economists believe that
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to a single phenomenon there may be an infinite number of
interpretations or theories. A priori choosing between alternative
interpretations has to be based on epistemologically contingent
criteria.) '
The opposite of logical necessity is implied in the
formulation of synthetic statements. By contrast to analytic state¬
ments, the elements comprising synthetic statements are not abstract
or vacuous but represent concrete, empirical reality. For example,
the statement that a change in the money supply will induce an upward
(downward) shift in income is supposed to be a synthetic statement
the validity of which depends on whether a measure of money system¬
atically leads (lags) a measure for the price level, both quantities
measuring empirical variables. Since the nature of synthetic state¬
ments is empirical, inferences cannot be drawn with a logical method,
as in analytic statements. They are not logical constructs the con¬
clusions of which are necessarily implied in the assumptions. From
the point of view of logic they are contingent. They depend upon
empirical reality which is contingent and unnecessary. They are
therefore logically contingent. (From an epistemological point of
view, however, they are necessary. Their choice does not depend
upon the subjective state of the individual scientist, but upon the
necessary requirements and rules of observation and experiment.)
The second tension, i.e. that of ontological necessity
versus ontological contingency, manifests itself in the equall-y
indispensable distinction between possible ends and determined means.
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Ends reflect the subjective part of the world, which should be
accepted as given and unquestionable, while means reflect the
objective part of the world, the domain to which the economist
should be restricted. (See Figure VII.)
On the one hand the nature of ends is not considered fixed.
Ends belong to a subjective realm where everything is possible.
Every end is a possible one and could be otherwise. A consumer
may value the acquisition of luxury cars or the purchasing of stamps.
Each end belongs to one's subjective taste or psychology and is not
supposed to be scientifically questioned. National governments may
attempt to fulfil different ends based upon different priorities or
ideologies. A socialist country, for example, may value more the
expansion of heavy industry or a more equal distribution of income,
whereas a capitalist country may value more the expansion of consumer
goods and service industries and a more efficient (and unequal)
allocation of resources. The possible ends that people or countries
can have are almost infinite and contingent upon a variety of factors.
Since this tenet of Positive economics refers to actual reality its
characteristic is, therefore, that of ontoiogical contingency.
On the other hand, the ways or the means with which
individuals or societies fulfil this variety of ends are determined.
They are determined by virtue of scarcity and the wish to allocate
rationally and optimally. Irrespective of whether a rich man wants
to buy a yacht or a poor man wants to buy a loaf of bread, each one
will attempt to attain these ends according to the same principle,
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i.e. each one will allocate his/her finite income in such a way as
to acquire the maximum utility with the minimum cost. The principle
45
is universal and applies equally to planned and 'free' economies
Although maximization is considered an ideal-type it nevertheless
refers to a representative tendency among social agents which deter¬
mines their actual behaviour. Accordingly, as the nature of means
is assumed necessary, and as they refer to the real world, they
imply ontological necessity.
v
The above distinctions between knowledge and reality,
analytic and synthetic, ends and means, disparate though they seem,
are characterized by a structured correlation which holds together
the totality of the Positive economic system. The binding force
which pieces together the structural components of Positive economics
lies in the ubiquitous wish to limit what is scientifically viable
and what is not. That is, in the wish to resolve the Problems of
Knowledge and act 'scientifically'. The reaction against older
metaphysics and authority led to the opposite, namely a reverence for
what is objective and free. In the case of methodology Positive
economics defines its assumptions for the criteria of choosing between
alternative theories, not according to some metaphysic but according
to empirical facts. Facts, neither man nor God, should decide which
is the true theory. In the case of actual behaviour Positive economics
defines its assumptions for the criteria for choosing between alternat¬
ive ends, not according to the laws of external authority but according
to universal rules that maximize efficiency.
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b. METHODOLOGY AND IDEOLOGY
The cost, however, of establishing such assumptions is the
ever-present tension between necessity and contingency. This is
further repeated at the methodological and ideological levels of
Positive economics (see Figure VII).
At the methodological level it manifests itself in the
formation of conflicting methodological schools. These schools are
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the Structuralists (Assumptionists) and the Correlationists
(Predictionists). The Structuralists correspond to the school that
espouses the assumption of a complex reality but sets as its aim the
attempt to model this reality accurately and descriptively. In
addition Structuralists (as Assumptionists) claim that validation
should be done more at the level of assumptions rather than only at
the level of predictions. Although their method admits only synthetic
statements as the final arbiter of competing theories, it also accepts
analytic statements and the study of factors that faithfully reflect
the economic complexity and which are factually and logically
interrelated.
On the other side the Correlationists start from the same
premise of a complex world and conclude that, since the world is much
too complex its interrelations cannot be adequately traced out.
Therefore, one should abstract from them in order to be able to con¬
struct rigorous theories. The objective of the Correlationists (as
Predictionists) is to formulate simple hypotheses that can generate
empirical predictions and test their validity with synthetic statements.
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Their job, therefore, is to trace regularities, explain them with a
few variables and test their explanatory power with the systematic
47
application of their predictions with experience
I
As noted in previous chapters, however, economists are not
separated as Structuralists or Correlationists in any clear-cut manner.
These labels pertain to opposing tendencies existing simultaneously
within Positive economics. This is mainly shown from the fact that
both schools adhere to the principle of empirical validation and
accept the distinction between positive and normative statements
(see chapter 1). A methodological conflict within Positive economics
is possible because it stems from a tension that is structurally built
in its epistemological premises. This tension, which is caused by
the ambiguities discussed in chapters 1 and 2, reappears in the
distinction between analytic and synthetic statements permitting the
polarization of interpretations as to the appropriate nature of method.
On the one hand, the presence and function of analytic
statements, implying logical necessity, allows the economist to accept
a methodology that tackles complex reality in a comprehensive and
analytic way, portraying all the logical and factual connections.
Structuralists rely on one foot of Positive economics, as it were, and
stress the importance of logically analysing the world. That is,
their methodological premise is the continuous accumulation of analytic
statements, in the form of complex, structural models, that enable them
to come closer to the synthetic truth, i.e. approach empirical.reality
by persistently analysing its structure. Moreover by'doing this they
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do not break any positivist rule since their method can always be
justified by an appeal to the structure of Positive economics itself
and especially to its analytic part.
I
On the other hand, Correlationists base their methodological
claims on the other foot of Positive economics, i.e. synthetic state¬
ments. The logical contingency implied induces economists to decide
that they should rely on simple synthetic hypotheses upon which to
base their knowledge of the world. In fact, it is believed that the
accumulation of such synthetic hypotheses will lead them to the
acquisition of synthetic truth. Moreover they too feel secure that
Positive economics will endorse their claims, since synthetic
statements are part of its structure.
Hence, the methodological dichotomy splitting Positive
economics is stimulated by the way the theory of knowledge in Positive
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economics is structured . This methodological conflict is exempli¬
fied in the Monetary and F-Twist controversies. In the one case, the
fight is between structural models and single-equation tests, and in
the other, between Assumptionists and Predictionists. Both factions
claim to be scientific and both factions justify their methodological
claims by appealing to Positive economics. Having said this, the
question arises, however, as to what it is that makes certain econo¬
mists espouse one interpretation of Positive economics and other
economists the other? The answer, as we shall see, lies in the
interrelation between methodology and ideology.
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At the ideological level the necessity-contingency
opposition, found at the methodological level, appears in a trans¬
posed form. It appears in the distinction between ends and means
and it permits interpretations of reality that are conflicting.
This is manifested in the conflict between economists supporting
49
interventionism and economists supporting laissez-faire , (see Fig.VII).
On the one hand, in the case of Interventionism, the
multiplicity of possible, contingent, ends sets out a perspective
through which the economist views the world as a set of interrelated
sectors the complexity of which is considered enormous. Each of
these sectors contains an almost infinite array of ends that need to
be realised. It is believed that social agents in their attempt to
fulfil their objectives within each sector, are confronted with all
sort of lacks and rigidities, due to the institutional complexity.
This is believed to hinder their actions in applying maximization
rules in order to accomplish their ends optimally. Their action,
although rational, does not lead the economy into general equilibrium.
The Keynesian under full-employment equilibrium is very much a case
in point. Over and above this, it is believed that in modern economies
ends among and within sectors may conflict^. It is thought that
private welfare does not necessarily lead to social welfare.
Pollution, for example, does not - at least in the short-run - impede
the maximization of private returns, whereas it impedes the maximization
of social returns. Education and health are two more instances of a
clash between the public and the private sector. Consequently,
rigidities or conflicts between ends among and within sectors
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necessitate the 'discrete' intervention of an organization that is,
presumably, above all sectors and which is able to coordinate and
integrate the actions of all sectors. Hence the need for a 'mixed
economy' with a central government acting through direct (national¬
ization, planning) or indirect (taxes, transfers) ways to coordinate
the alternative and conflicting goals in a strategy that renders the
function of the economy optimal and leads to equilibrium^"'. The
interventionist ideology is based upon the contingent ends assumption
and forms a modified Neoclassical economics: a Neo-Neoclassical
synthesis.
On the other hand, in the case of laissez-faire, there is
a strongly held belief that the market will automatically adjust
disequilibrium states if left to its own, while the price system,
through competition, will dissolve any rigidities and conflicts by
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allocating scarce resources optimally . This belief is primarily
based upon the 'means' part of Neoclassical economics. The market
mechanism is considered the natural way to apply the necessary allocat-
ory rules to maximize resources efficiently. Any sort of outside
intervention is considered a second best solution leading away from
the Pareto optimal position. Inherent in this belief is the assump¬
tion of rationality. Man is believed to be more or less economically
rational and if left to act freely, i.e. unhampered by any externally
superimposed authority, will always try to optimize his scarce means
to accomplish his private ends. If everyone in the economy acts in
the same manner, the allocation of total resources is also optimized.
For example, if pollution starts to become a cost to society eventually
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the industry creating it will find it necessary, in the long-run, to
internalize the costs of pollution as it gradually becomes an
external diseconomy. Consequently, in its effort to minimize these
costs it also automatically minimizes pollution. It is believed
that for any problem, conflict or rigidity in an economy, the price
mechanism (if well-oiled, i.e. three to four per cent of money growth)
will necessarily lead to the best fulfilment of the desired ends.
Or put differently, once economic agents make their choices rationally
and allocate their resources optimally, then it follows that the sum
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total of the agents, i.e. society, will also be at an optimal point
The ideology of laissez-faire rests its case upon that part of
Positive economics emphasizing the rules that necessarily allocate
resources optimally.
The proponents of either belief, however, will probably
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never admit that their views are ideological . They are Positive
economists and as such their assumptions about the world are so either
because the world is_ so or that it is as if so. Yet it cannot be
argued that these beliefs were found simultaneously with the develop¬
ment of Positive economics, thus creating the impression that they
are part of the reality of the modern world. They existed long before
and independently of modern economics"'*'. Laissez-faire grew with
Mercantilism, long before the 19th century, as an ideology viewing the
role of man as an individual acting rationally in a complex environment.
Interventionism is also an ideology developed by the early socialists
and Utopians who viewed the role of man as too weak in relation to the
complexity of the world needing, therefore, help. The integration
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and refinement (or spurious concealment) of these ideologies within
Positive economics created two poles that manifest themselves in the
distinction between ends and means. The interpretation - or perhaps
exaggeration - of these poles permits a conflict of ideologies that
is concealed under the securing, scientific, blanket of Positive
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economics
Having accounted for the ideological part of Positive
economics we are now in a position to understand why some economists
have chosen one methodology instead of another, why Structuralism
instead of Correlationism or vice versa. The answer again lies in
the necessity-contingency opposition. In the ideological part of
Positive economics, economists are dichotomized between a theory of
a necessary and a theory of a contingent world. The first one re¬
lates to laissez-faire and the second to Interventionism. As it
stands this opposition needs to find its counterpart in a theory of
knowledge in order to justify its claims to knowledge. In other
words, since each ideology cannot find its logical correlate in the
other ideology it looks for it in the methodology part of Positive
economics. The contingent world of Interventionism allies with the
necessary methodology of Structuralism in order to form the structured
opposition between logical necessity and ontological contingency. The
contingent world of Interventionism can be scientifically assessed by
the necessary logic of a structuralist methodology. On the other hand,
the necessary world of laissez-faire finds its natural ally in the
contingent methodology of Correlationism. The juxtaposition between
logical contingency and ontological necessity is formed again as a
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transformation of the opposition between logical necessity and
ontological contingency. This cross-exchange forms a dialectical
process in which the choice of one particular ideology or methodology
determines its counterpart. The nature of ideology is structurally
combined with the opposite nature of methodology and vice versa. An
Interventionist, for example, could not ally with a correlationist
methodology as this would go against his/her fundamental assumption
of the nature of the world being made of an uncoordinated multiplicity
of states. Equally an adamant supporter of the efficacy of the
market system working automatically could not ally with Structuralism
as this would go against his/her assumption of a well structured and
fundamentally simple mechanism operating amidst the complexity of
events. Thus, there is no one-way causal direction from ideology to
methodology or from methodology to ideology. The process is dialect¬
ical rather than causal. Just as the ideology, i.e. the theory about
reality, specifies the way with which to know reality, so also the
methodology, i.e. the theory about the way to know reality, specifies
57
the form that reality takes . What connects the opposing terms is
the specific logic manifested in the structural relation between
necessity and contingency.
The synthesis between Interventionism and Structuralism
constitutes the foundation of Fiscalism and correspondingly the syn¬
thesis between laissez-faire and Correlationism constitutes the
foundation of Monetarism. These syntheses also constitute the found¬
ations of Assumptionists and Predictionists. The opposition "between
Fiscalism and Monetarism forms the Monetary controversy and the
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opposition between Assumptionism and Predictionism forms the F-Twist
controversy. The interrelations that lead to these conflicts are
depicted in Figure VIII (on p.330) whereby the structure of these
conflicts is delineated. Figure VIII puts together all the previous
arguments and, as if in a jigsaw puzzle, fits the logical pieces for
an explanation of conflict in economics. In other words, the distinct¬
ions and categories of Positive economics are put in relation to one
another according to the structural relation of necessity-contingency.
This structural relation appears in various combinations forming a
deeper structure logically binding the distinctions of Positive economics.
This 'complex matrix' of relations also constitutes the basis for
persistent conflict. The diagram in Figure VIII can be read from
either end. If we start from the top end we have the oppositions
within the structure of Positive economics stemming from the synthesis
between Positivism and Utilitarianism, that lead to conflict. If we
start from the bottom end we have two controversies that can be ex¬
plained in terms of the oppositions derived from their inner logic.
On the one hand, Positivism by attempting to discover reality stumbles
upon the Problems of Induction and Deduction and thus, through mediat¬
ions, combinations and distinctions, creates a school of thought,
namely Positive economics, that is riddled with ambiguities and tens¬
ions which lead to permanent conflict. On the other hand, conflict
in economics, or the logic of it, can be decomposed to its constituents
that lead in a structural way to the basic oppositions necessitated by
the fundamental ambiguities in the positivist attempt to know and dis¬
cover reality. In either case the structure and logic of Positive
economics is analysed and an understanding of perpetual conflict in
it becomes possible.
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FIGURE VIII: A RECONSTRUCTION OF THE LOGIC AND STRUCTURE





































Thus, the continuing persistence of the F-Twist and Monetary
conflicts can be explained in terms of more fundamental conflicts in
Positive economics. These conflicts are structural in the sense that
each part of a conflicting relationship cannot stand logically on its
own but needs the other part to form a whole. The tension that is
generated stems from the striving of each part of the conflict to
achieve a logical identity with its complement. The identity of
each part depends on its relation to other parts in the system.
Each part forms a member of a dichotomy or conflict that needs its
opposite to form a logical and coherent unity. As we have seen the
structure of Positive economics consists of such dichotomies and
conflicts that are united by the opposition between necessity and
contingency. In fact controversies in Positive economics are both
a reflection and a manifestation of these conflicts. The logical
oppositions binding the structure of Positive economics form a deeper
structure that is behind the ideals and distinctions of Positive
economics. These logical oppositions through a series of transform¬
ations manifest themselves in the surface structure of Positive
economics in the form of persistent conflicts, such as the Monetary
and F-Twist controversies.
Although Monetarists and Fiscalists think that they are
separated only by theoretical and empirical issues, their divergence
is much wider and deeper, embracing methodological (epistemological)
and ideological (ontological) differences. However, it is accepted
by all sides that the issues can be easily decided with an appeal to
empirical facts. Yet the appeal has been made and the verdict still
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remains ambivalent. Both Fiscalists and Monetarists find their
position justified by the same judge: empirical facts. Both sides
being parts of Positive economics hold as their prime target the
confrontation of theories with empirical experience. Both sides,
however, having found justice in empirical experience, resort to
methodological and theoretical arguments to further justify or qualify
their position. And indeed these arguments and qualifications are
found in the basic dichotomies inherent in the structure of Positive
economics. Each faction emphasizes a particular part of this struct¬
ure and rationalizes its position in relation to it. The structured
dichotomies, because they are the outcome of fundamental ambiguities
and unresolved tensions, nurture the development of conflicting ideas
and methods. The irony is that the same paradigm gives an epistemo-
logical solution that is meant to solve the conflict, namely empirical
testing which is, however, found within the structure itself that has
created the conflict. The conflicts persist because the paradigm
that nurtures them gives them also their justification. In other
words, both sides in the controversies find epistemological and onto-
logical justification in the distinctions of Positive economics, the




The general purpose of this thesis has been to examine the
logic of persistent conflict in economics. Thus no effort was
devoted to a direct critique of the methodology of Positive economics,
but rather to an account of the reasons that make it self-defeating.
The objective was not to take each part of Positive economics and
subject it to a critique of its defects, but present the whole struct¬
ure of Positive economics in a light that exposes the mechanism which
renders it ineffective. The case of the Monetary controversy has
been chosen as a typical example of this ineffectiveness. It should
be noted, however, that the event of empirical testing not working in
the case of the Monetary controversy is by no means conclusive evid¬
ence of empirical testing not working in general. To prove this one
would need a systematic study of many controversies where empirical
testing is involved. Yet, from a logical point of view, Positive
economics is committed to an uncompromising pledge that its method¬
ology* given appropriate methods and data, would discriminate between
all conflicting theories. Had it not been so, Positive economics
would not have been able to apply logical criteria for showing which
set of conflicting theories it can resolve and which it cannot.
Hence, according to this logic, it suffices to find one counter-
instance falsifying the methodological hypothesis of empirical testing
in order to show that it is not a necessary condition for theory
validation.
Thus, the main question put forward in this thesis was:
What is it that makes the methodology of Positive economics persistently
inoperative in a case such as the Monetary controversy?
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During the course of this research it eventually became
clear that in order to answer this question I should not regard it
from an alternative methodology's point of view (viz. Mollis and
Nell) but from within Positive economics. The reasons were that
although a critique of Positive economics from without could provide
a sufficient explanation of the persistence of the Monetary contro¬
versy (such as for example that the theories in question are not
testable, or that ceteris paribus clauses are elastic, or because of
errors in data, definitional problems and ideological bias) a struct¬
ural analysis of the methodology of Positive economics from within
would provide a necessary explanation. The explanation would be
necessary because it would expose the logical mechanism within Posit¬
ive economics which necessitates the recurrence of the bi-polar
situation from which persistent conflicting ideas about theory and
method stem.
The fundamental assumption behind this explanation was that
problems in the theory of knowledge remain largely unresolved and
that therefore no epistemological system is unequivocal. However,
since the decision has been taken to know the world (be it economic
or otherwise), concessions, assumptions, distinctions and mediations
had to be made in order to circumvent the Problems of Knowledge, e.g.
the Problems of Induction and Deduction, the Problem of Demarcation
Criteria, etc. (For instance in Physics the assumption of the uni¬
formity of nature - itself creating a logical regress - mediates
for the irresolution of the Problem of Induction. Even if the
Problem remains unresolved, the assumption, as long as it actually
works in practice, permits the use of inductive inference. However,
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as far as economics is concerned the assumption of the uniformity
5 8
of society would hardly apply .) The contradiction is as follows:
People (scientists and lay-men alike) need to know and therefore act
in a specific manner in order to know. In the past an axiomatic
and necessary authority provided the source of all knowledge. No
logical justification of its origin was asked for. However, as
soon as 'enlightened rationality' took the place of the 'superimposed
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ideology' , people were led to justify the source of their knowledge
in a logical way. But as soon as they were confronted with the un-
solvable problems of knowledge logic (and rationality) deserted them.
Thus, if people claim to be rational and face such a logical impasse,
then they must stop actively seeking knowledge, since they cannot
justify this action. Yet they go on acting thus, despite the logical
contradiction between the rational justification of their action and
their assumption of rationality.
This general contradiction about knowledge and its
justification is transferred to economics and runs through its con¬
stituents. The application of inductive methods to economic
phenomena carries with it the logical paradox of the Problem of
Induction. More than any other epistemological system, Positive
economics professes to be rational (in the sense of Comte and the
Vienna Circle) and yet cannot offer a rational justification of the
ways it extracts economic knowledge. This logical impasse, however,
is mediated (or perhaps repressed) with distinctions and demarcations
that seem to offer a viable methodology. This seeming viability,
nonetheless, is achieved at the cost of a structured ambiguity, which
in the form of a tension runs through the distinctions and the
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demarcations. This latent tension takes the form of a contingency-
necessity structural relation. The permeation of this tension
throughout the structure of Positive economics creates a polarity in
each concept that is the result of the general ambiguity between
economic knowledge and reality. This binary nature of the concepts
of Positive economics is homologous to conflicting ideological views
about the nature of the economy and the way to know it. Hence, for
example, the genesis and continuation of the Monetary and F-Tv/ist
. 60
controversies
Thus, a fundamental ambiguity manifests itself as an antinomy
or tension that polarizes the concepts of Positive economics. This
polarization permits conflicting interpretations of the epistemology
and ontology of Positive economics. These interpretations, in turn,
nurture the development of controversies. These controversies persist
because the methodology that is presumed to resolve them is produced
from the same ambiguous paradigm that creates them.
-*■ <c
It is obvious, however, that an ambiguity runs through the
assumption behind the above explanation, in that although I proclaim
a scepticism that seems to leave no alternative open for any kind of
discussion (scientific or otherwise), implicitly I offer scepticism
as an alternative, which if it would have to be consistent should
also negate itself. I feel that I have set up a trap in which I
have fallen myself. Yet I have fallen in the trap voluntarily when
I decided to offer an explanation of conflict in economics. -The
ambiguity even permeates the idea of writing this thesis itself.
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If, in accordance with my basic assumption, everything is logically
fluid and there are no foundations - epistemological or ideological -
to support any position, then the writing of the thesis itself is
based on fluid foundations which make it a very shaky construct.
But why then do I write a thesis when I know that the idea
is ambiguous? The reason is concessionary. I do it because I want
(need) to explain persistent conflict in economics. The urge to
know is equally strong as the urge to be logically consistent. In
the conflict between knowledge and logical consistency no side ever
takes the upper hand. The crippling effects of the philosophical
regresses are countered by the attempt to know and explain. Although
one knows that one's assumptions would be riddled with ambiguities one
goes on to find ways to bring things into awareness. One of the main
reasons, therefore, for writing this thesis was to bring out on the
surface the tangled threads of the logical structure of Positive
economics in order to show the source of conflict within it. Despite
the logical impasses and ambiguities inherent in the assumptions
behind the writing of this thesis it was felt imperative and worth
while to search for new (but perhaps ambiguous) knowledge.
Thus my justification for writing this thesis contains a
structured ambiguity (fluidity) that is mediated by the need to know
and explain, in order to produce a solution and make the writing of
the thesis viable. As in all cases, so in this, "behind all sense
• .,61 ' .there is a nonsense"
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I have chosen to comment critically on Hollis and Nell's
"Rational Economic Man" mainly for two reasons. Firstly, they offer
a critique of Positive economics that is perhaps the most up to date
and complete analysis of economic orthodoxy. And secondly, they
suggest a strategy for an alternative framework which, according to
them, claims to be free of the contradictions found in Positive
economics.
Their critique is based on the epistemological insufficiencies
of Positive economics and it is, partly, a result of their alternative
framework, namely Rationalism. According to Hollis and Nell their
"critique of Neoclassicism finally rests not on (their) critique of
2
Positivism but on an alternative to it, Rationalism" . In reviewing
Hollis and Nell's critique of Positive economics my purpose is to
juxtapose an alternative viewing of methodological problems in
economic orthodoxy. Whereas my viewing of Positive economics focuses
on the logic and structure of Positive economics as a coherent whole,
Hollis and Nell's viewing focuses on, mainly, the logical defects of
Positive economics per se and on a critique in terms of an alternative
methodology. I consider my viewing if not more advantageous, then
complementary to Hollis and Nell's, because it depicts the logical
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and structural relations of Positive economics from within rather
than from an alternative point of view.
Another reason for commenting on Hollis and Nell's critique
is that the claims to objectivity made by them on behalf of their
alternative are too strong. I shall base my criticism on the
assumption, presented in the introductory note of chapter 7, that
there is no theoretical system, either epistemological or onto-
logical, that is entirely free of contradictions, and which provides
the ultimate solution to the Inductive and Deductive Problems.
Obviously, it is neither intended nor pretended to offer a
complete criticism of "Rational Economic Man" as this would form the
basis for another thesis. What is suggested here are limited
observations on a very small range of issues.
B. SCIENTIFIC MAN VERSUS ECONOMIC MAN
Most critics of Positive economics attack the assumption of
the independence between theory and fact that helps Positive econo¬
mists consolidate their claims to objectivity and reality. "We
believe, in general,", say Hollis and Nell, "that no clear or unique
3
line can be drawn between 'fact' and 'interpretation'" . Thus, most
of the critics who follow this line of criticism turn to another
system - encompassing an epistemological and an ontological theory -
which substitutes for the positivist 'objectivity' another one (see
chapter 6). For example Hollis and Nell claim that their "argument
4
proceeds from the premiss that the world is the way it is" . The
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difference is that the world of Hollis and Nell is an axiomatic one
in contradistinction to the positivist a posteriori one. "[T]he
a priori ramifications of the concept of ability to reproduce",
continue Hollis and Nell, "are, we believe, the root of production
theory and so of any sound general economic theory""'. Once the
independence of theory from facts is denied then necessarily one has
to resort to another criterion of objectivity, if one has to act
scientifically. Since Pragmatism is rejected^, Hollis and Nell
turn to Rationalism. In other words because theories and facts are
inseparable and because one cannot maintain an analytic and synthetic
distinction, one has to use both theory and fact in order to select
between alternative interpretations. Validation, therefore, is
transferred from empirical facts to 'real definitions'.
'Real definitions' are neither empty analytical propositions
nor strictly speaking empirical (measurable) facts. For example the
definition of an economic system as one of a producing and self-
7 8
reproducing unit , is a definition that incorporates the 'essences'
9
of the process in both a factual and a logical way . Factual because
it depends upon self evident, conceptual, perceptions***, and logical
because it draws the logical inter-dependencies and ramifications
from these 'conceptual perceptions* in the style of Euclidean geometry.
Furthermore, these 'real definitions' are 'necessarily true'.
By a conceptually necessary truth we mean a necessary
truth in which some constants which do not belong to
formal logic occur essentially ... we shall call
them conceptual, in that they rely on basic concepts
under which an activity must fall, if it is to be
correctly identified as theoretically significant
activity . . . explanation takes place when a
conclusion is deduced from a sound and independent
theory.H
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These truths, therefore, are not empty, in the positivist sense of
analytic truths, but they say something about the real world. They
12
claim that the world must be as it is . In contrast to Positivism which
c 1 aim s that the world could be otherwise, Rationalism claims that
13
the world is as it is and could not be otherwise
As far as epistemology is concerned, Hollis and Nell
reverse the positivist position from empirical facts validating
theories to a priori conceptual truths validating empirical facts.
As far as ontology is concerned they stipulate an economic world
defined by production and reproduction (in their 'essential' and
'conceptual' sense). Here too they reverse the positivist position
14
from subjective value theory to 'objective' production relations
However, in the fundamental structure of 'Rationalistic'
economics an assumption is held which is also vital to Positive
economics. Even though Hollis and Nell try to "entwine the Inductive
and Deductive Problems"^ in a synthesis which will produce a solution
to the Problems of Knowledge, they do this at the cost of creating two
'realities': one which belongs to the scientist and one to the
'bearer' of economic variables.
The first assumption that Hollis and Nell make is to base
their theory of economic reality on their theory of scientific
knowledge. Rationalism, it is argued, offers a criterion, i.e. real
definitions, upon which to construct complex theoretical systems.
It helps them to capture the 'essences' of all historical periods,
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i.e. production and reproduction, and apply them to each contingent
period which may vary from one historical stage to the other.
Slavery, feudalism and capitalism, for instance, are three particular
manifestations of these ubiquitous 'essences'. "We submit then",
say Hoilis and Nell, "that, the real definition or basic concept
upon which economics must rest is that of a system's ability to re¬
produce itself . . . The actual details of different social structure
are facts independent of economic theory"
However, the "actual details", i.e. the mode of exchange,
the particular economic behaviour, ideology, etc., in short the
Marxian superstructure, are determined by the particular mode of
production in a given historical period. If one analyses the cont¬
ents of 'super-structure' one will find that science, or any theory
of knowledge for that matter, is part of this surface structure which
changes and is shaped accordingly as the mode of production changes.
If, therefore, Hollis and Nell wished to remain consistently Marxists
they would have to submit that the scientific man does not possess
properties different from the lay economic man (at least as far as
ideology is concerned) but belongs to the same sphere of influence:
the prevailing mode of production. In fact it is doubtful whether
they have a choice to do otherwise. If for their economics they
borrow a Classical-Marxian schema, however modified by Neo-Ricardianism,
they also have to stick to a Marxian theory of knowledge which is in¬
separable from a theory of economic reality. The historical-
materialist dimension given in the concept of 'praxis' allows-only
the idea of science reflecting and being shaped by the mode of
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production . If, on the other hand, they inject Marxism with a
bit of Leibnizian or Spinozian Rationalism, then they have to resort
to an idealist theory of knowledge which would, prima facie, contra¬
dict their Marxist theory of reality. If they stand by the first
choice, i.e. 'pure' Marxism, then their theory of knowledge must
change from 'real definitions' and 'axiomatic necessary truths' con¬
taining omnipresent 'essences' to contingent theories of science
that reflect and are determined by the particular historical period.
If, however, they retain the rationalist position, then they must
resort to some kind of mechanistic, harmonious universe, God (in a
18
figurative sense ) and a solution to the theory of knowledge which
contains and presupposes the Deductive Problem.
To recapitulate the argument so far: it is maintained that
the contradiction in Hollis and Nell's claims is that the general
action of economic agents is determined by the production and self-
19
reproduction of the economic process , which is universal, necessary
and true of any historical period, while the specific action is deter¬
mined by the specific mode of production prevailing at a point in
time. However, the action of the scientific agent, general or
specific, is not determined by any historical and contingent factor
and is free of any ideologies reflecting the modes of production.
The rational scientific man is always there observing the world as
it changes from feudalism to capitalism to socialism, while being
free and unhampered to define the 'essences'. Thus, while Rational
Economic man changes from period to period, Rational Scientific man
remains unchanged.
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C. THE DEDUCTIVE PROBLEM
Connected with the above contradiction is the question
whether in fact Hollis and Nell have solved the Deductive Problem.
Their claim is that they have solved the Inductive Problem with the
help of deduction:
Our solution to the Inductive Problem will be, in
general, that without assumptions about continuity
in the world scientific knowledge is impossible, and,
in particular, that a correlation is an instance of
a law if there is a theoretical explanation of its
significance.^0
Since one cannot know whether empirical correlations will remain so
in the future, one has to revert to an axiomatic and necessary truth
which will necessitate the repeated occurrence of the events.
Following this, Hollis and Nell, however, acknowledge the
existence of the Deductive Problem; namely they ask, "how necessary
21
truths are to be distinguished from others" ? Their solution is
that,
economic theories are to be judged partly by whether
they are backed by a suitable scientific method which
is itself backed by a sound theory of knowledge, which
has an answer to the Inductive and Deductive Problems.22
Since the Inductive Problem is solved, once deduction is brought into
the picture, and since the Deductive Problem is supposed to be solved
by an appeal to a "sound theory of knowledge", i.e. Rationalism, it
appears that the system is complete and the infinite regresses plaguing
the assumptions of Positive economics, Empiricism, and Pragmatism
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finally find an end. However, the only question that remains to
be answered is: how sound is the epistemology of Rationalism?
As has already been mentioned Rationalism propounds the
23
need for true axioms , and more particularly the need for real
definitions. These are "necessary truth(s) in which non-logical
24
[i.e. factually significant] constants occur . . . essentially"
Immediately, however, Hollis and Nell feel inclined to qualify their
claims by saying that,
We see a need to be able to justify assumptions . . .
Ex hypothesei this cannot be done by proof or
evidence. So we are at an impasse, unless we take
a theory of knowledge which admits the existence of
self-evident necessary truths.^5 (my emphasis)
Obviously one is still left with the need to justify, firstly, the
theory of knowledge and, secondly, the "self-evident necessary truths".
Having said that neoclassical assumptions are disputable, and there¬
fore not self-evident and that, "'real definitions' make a better
26
basis than introspected postulates" , Hollis and Nell argue that,
"if economic theory can be axiomatized, then its axioms have to be
27
self-evidently true" . These self-evident truths are £ priori
28
necessities that are logically and not psychologically self-evident
Furthermore they contain real definitions. So, it is maintained
that necessary truths are logically and factually compelling.
However, I think that the above presents two problems: in the one
case it is about the justification of the theory of reality, and in
the other of the theory of knowledge. The 'ugly' head of the
Deductive Problems arises in both cases.
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In the first case, although Mollis and Nell in their
theory of reality admit that axioms can be disputable - they claim
that this "does not cancel the search for those axioms which state
29
the real definitions of the basic concept of economics" - they
nevertheless revert to concepts in their real definitions, such as
'essences', which define all economic systems. The question,
however, is: what makes it 'compelling' to assign the status of
'essential' to one set of concepts rather than another? It may be
self-evident that man has to feed himself or that every system is a
production and a reproduction unit, but it is by no means self-
evident that this set of essential concepts should be the one and
only one upon which economics must rest. Other truths may also be
logically self-evident. Rationality and scarcity, for instance,
may very well be two alternative self-evident truths.
In fact, Hollis and Nell, here and as everywhere else,
anticipated this objection and in pages 242-245 they try to justify
their choice of production and reproduction as the primary premises
for economics, by invoking the conceptual necessity of this assumption.
This point is important and needs to be discussed because, as they
themselves admit, the question,
Why should we claim a necessarily privileged status for
'production' or, more exactly, the 'reproduction' of
the economic system? ... is dangerous as it is
apparently difficult. For if we cannot provide a
satisfactory answer, our whole argument is in jeopardy.^0
Thus, they must provide arguments that prove the necessity of.
'reproduction' as a basic premise against other contentions such as
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choice and exchange. (As a matter of fact they consider other
candidates as well, e.g. money, market, labour and capital. However,
I believe that for the purposes of the argument most of these candid¬
ates may be subsumed under the generic terms of scarcity-rationality
and the implied exchange and choice.)
Thus, "The reproduction of the system ... is primary",
because other assumptions such as, "Choice depends upon choosers,
exchange upon traders, labour upon workers, and so on. Choosers
31
need reasons and abilities, traders must have goods and skills"
Firstly, they dispense with 'choice' by placing it within a specific
(contingent) social context. Once this is admitted 'choice' loses
its abstract, general and essential form, attributed by the Neo¬
classical economists, and acquires a significance that is limited
by the existence and perpetuation of the social context, i.e. product-
32
ion and reproduction . They further dispense with the idea of
choice of production methods by saying that production methods are
not chosen but "that society as a whole is responsible for what
33
exists in it" , i.e. that controlled preference of production methods,
at least for the present, does not exist. The point about Hollis and
Nell's argument dispensing with 'choice' is that, as they themselves
34
admit , although reproduction involves both a conceptual and phys-
35
ical necessity, because "outputs require inputs" , nevertheless
one cannot exclude the logical possibility in the future of a concept¬
ual necessity for 'choice' when, as they point out, "we may be able to
control and determine the shape and form of what exists in society""^.
In other words the chronological dimension of 'future' is important
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as far as a descriptive (as opposed to a logical) proposition is
concerned, i.e. a proposition containing empirical and not conceptual
terms. However, it is unimportant as far as conceptual necessity
(i.e. not involving time) is assumed for 'choice'. If this is so
then one cannot claim conceptual priority for reproduction simply
because it precedes 'choice' in time, i.e. reproduction is not
rendered necessary because it comes before choice. After all it is
difficult to discover the historical origin of things, and even more
difficult to claim that the chronological origin of things define
conceptual first principles. Therefore, once these arguments are
taken into consideration the priority of reproduction as a necessary
premise becomes limited.
However, although Hollis and Nell put choice as "the most
37
obvious and widely canvassed alternative" , I think that the neo¬
classical concepts of scarcity and rationality and therefore exchange,
are more important contenders (or perhaps choice might be seen as an
outcome of scarcity and rationality). They dispense with these
assumptions by claiming that, "Exchange depends on having something
38
to exchange, so must be placed in a context of production" . The
question is, however, that if exchange implies scarcity, then how can
one be certain that reproduction is more primary and necessary than
scarcity in defining the nature and scope of economic theory? If
resources are assumed scarce and if wants are assumed insatiable,
then exchange is necessary, whereas it is not obvious why, under these
assumptions, reproduction should be primary to scarcity. If-one
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accepts these assumptions, then scarcity will exist irrespective of
whether the bearers of these insatiable wants reproduce or do not
reproduce themselves. (It will exist as a logical first principle.
Obviously, exchange cannot presuppose reproduction as reproduction
cannot presuppose exchange.) Thus, in these circumstances scarcity
may be more primary than reproduction. On the other hand, one could
argue that if the continuation or the reproduction of the system is
assumed as necessary then scarcity will depend upon the depletion of
resources necessary for this reproduction. Thus, in these circum¬
stances reproduction may be more primary than scarcity. As far as
rationality is concerned, it is argued that it is an assumption
which is more or less contingent on the social context and it might
not have existed prior to any social formation; for instance people
might not have exchanged their surpluses in any rational, i.e. maxim¬
izing, manner but, according to Hollis and Nell, might have lived in
39
self-sufficient units and with fixed allocatory rules . But to
argue that reproduction is logically prior to scarcity is almost the
same as saying that the egg made the chicken and not the other way
around. Moreover, though exchange needs reproducing traders, goods
and skills, one might also argue that reproduction, in order to be
realized, needs exchange. It seems that the economic process is
more dialectical than deterministically necessary. Reproduction
might determine scarcity but also scarcity might determine reproduct¬
ion. It should be noted however that I do not justify the alternatives
of choice and exchange as the more suitable or necessary ones, but am
only pointing out the conceptual possibility of alternative assumptions
for economics, and the difficulty of delineating first principles
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either conceptually or historically. I do not believe that one
assumption is more necessary than another, but their necessity and
primacy is manifested in a dialectical way. Although in a dialect¬
ical sequence you neeci to have a thesis, nonetheless at a point in
this sequence the synthesis becomes a new antithesis that takes the
place of the thesis in the renewed sequence.
Thus, if we accept Hollis and Nell's epistemological
definition of 'necessary truths', then a different alternative than
the one they propose may be the dialectic between reproduction and
ixehange. Since it incorporates as one part reproduction it fulfils
all the requirements for a 'necessary truth' put forward by Hollis
-- 40
and Nell . It follows that if the above dialectical alternative
is a 'necessary truth' then it must be incompatible with either ex¬
change or reproduction (as independent units) since they also may be
viewed as 'necessary truths'. That is to say if, according to
Hollis and Nell, reproduction constitutes one 'necessary truth',
and scarcity another logically incompatible with it, then an assumption
incorporating the dialectic of the two constitutes a third possible
'necessary truth' incompatible with the other two (and this is true
even if exchange is not considered a 'necessary truth' since it is
sufficient for reproduction to be recognized as such). This dialectic,
therefore, becomes the premise for an economic theory different than
the ones^based on either scarcity or reproduction. If this is allowed,
then Hollis and Nell's position is indeed "in jeopardy". This follows
From their own assumption that they "cannot allow the possibility of
- 41 •-
different fundamental concepts" . The point is that a dialectical
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alternative is conceptually and logically a possible alternative and
fundamental 'necessary truth'.
However, Hollis and Nell are more interested in the way
that these 'necessary truths' are reached. For example, Robbins'
postulates about ends and means and scarcity are derived from intro¬
specting about the nature of economic reality. They contain a
synthetic element which, according to Hollis and Nell, forbids them
to be used as laws or axioms from which necessary theorems are gener¬
ated. In addition since they are "reasoned about" or they "are
42
disputable" they "are open to more than one interpretation" and
therefore are not necessary. The sense with which Hollis and Nell
want to use self-evident truths is epistemological rather than intro¬
spective. By epistemological they mean that 'necessary truths' are
"'known without proof of evidence'. Here it matters not whether
43
all mankind assents but whether it can be proved self-evident"
Proof of self-evidence lies in accepting an epistemology which admits
£i priori truths. In choosing therefore a_ priori necessary truths
they choose the epistemology of Rationalism. However, what makes it
self-evident that Rationalism is necessarily true and self-evident?
For instance Keynes argued that,
propositions in which our rational belief is both certain
and direct, are said to be self-evident . . . But we
must admit, I think, that this too is relative to the con¬
stitution of the human mind, and that the constitution of
the human mind may vary in some degree from man to man.
What is self-evident to me and what I really know, may be
only a probable belief to you, or may form no part of your
rational beliefs at all. And this may be true not only.of
such things as my existence, but of some logical axioms also.44
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Furthermore, if one asks for the way by which the a_ priori truths are
derived, Mollis and Nell would answer that "real definitions are
45
reached only after 'close observation' and analysis" . Surely, I
hope, that by "close observation" they do not mean induction, because
this would bring them against their own criticism. Also it cannot
be claimed that "close observation and analysis" are the exclusive
prerogatives of Rationalism. It could be hypothesized that with
different a_ priori real definitions and "close observation and analysis"
a different set of epistemologically self-evident concepts, other than
production and reproduction, could be devised. What, then, are the
criteria for choosing between alternative necessary truths about
reality and knowledge? To provide an answer with <1 priori real
definitions is simply to beg the question.
A different resort would be to argue that a sound theory
rests on a sound epistemology which, according to Hoilis and Nell,
would solve the Inductive and Deductive Problems. It is true that
the Inductive Problem was solved with deduction, but how was the
Deductive Problem solved? "so we are at an impasse, unless we take
a theory of knowledge which admits the existence of self-evident
46
necessary truths" . Thus, since Deduction cannot be solved with
Induction one has to turn to another process of Deduction, namely
Rationalism. However, it seems to be a contradiction to try to
solve Deduction with Deduction. One always needs another Deduction
47
which will solve the one Deduction before the last one . Further¬
more, what makes the rationalist theory of knowledge necessary?
Certainly not real definitions about knowledge as this would create
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an infinite regress. What then makes the acceptance of axiomatic
truths compelling? Is it self-evident that Rationalism is the
only epistemology good for economics? It may be necessary so far
as a solution and a reaction to Positivism is concerned (in the same
manner that Positivism used its epistemology to offer a solution to
the Deductive Problem inherited by Scholasticism and Rationalism).
However, as soon as Positivism is obliterated, then how is one to
know that one knows correctly through Rationalism?
Finally, one cannot even compare Positive and Rational
economics because even if Hollis and Nell say that the latter is
48 /r-\
more realistic , nevertheless one does not have neither Inductive
nor Deductive criteria to determine 'realism'. So, without scope
for choosing between alternative theories of knowledge, as Hollis
and Nell admit, "economics as a scientific discipline is still
49




1. I write this Appendix on Hollis and Nell's "Rational Economic
Man", (op.cit.) after chapters 6 and 7 because of the use made
of some of the ideas and concepts developed in chapter 7.
2. Hollis and Nell, "Rational Economic Man", op.cit., p.240.
3. Ibid., oo o
4. Ibid., p.248.




9. "Our strategy depends on being able to pick out what is
conceptually essential and then to insist that what is essential
is therefore to be found in practice", Hollis and Nell, ibid.,
p.254.
10. See M. Hollis, The Light of Reason: Rationalist Philosophers
of the 17th Century, 1973, p.34.
11. Hollis and Nell, op.cit., p.172 and p.170. See also Hollis,
ibid., p.19. It is difficult to see, however, what Hollis and
Nell mean by, "independent theory", when already they have main¬
tained that theories and facts are interrelated in order to
criticize Empiricism. It seems illegitimate, therefore, to
claim independence of theory when they admit that theory is
dependent on fact and vice versa.
12. Hollis, ibid., p.20.
13. Ibid., p.20. See also Lazerowitz, "Philosophy and Illusion",
op.cit., p.30.
14. A similar diagram as in Figure VIII could be drawn for Rationalism.
As the separation between epistemology and ontology is maintained
- in fact it is indispensable if one wants to act scientifically
and seek knowledge - so is the relation between them. However,
this relation between the opposition is transposed: the ration¬
alist ontology is the one which is now necessary, while the
epistemology is contingent. The ontology is necessary because,





14. (cont.) because it is conditional upon the concepts used.
According to Hollis and Nell, "The Rationalism we propose is
conceptual and the necessary truths it relies on are conditional"
although "these are genuine necessities involving real defini¬
tions and true axioms", (op.cit., p.195 also p.172). The
contingency in Rationalism is found in the conditional form
knowledge takes. Although a conceptual definition contains
a necessary truth, it also depends on a set of concepts that
are contingent and form the basis for the necessary truth.
A different set of concepts would produce a different necessary
truth. Accordingly, Rationalism seems to be a reaction and a
reversal of Positivism, solving the problems and contradictions
inherent in it and creating its opposites. (For a discussion
of necessity and contingency in Rationalism see Lazerowitz,
ibid., pp.28-30.)
15. Hollis and Nell, ibid., p.195.
16. Ibid., p.250.
17. However, if this definition of 'praxis' is accepted, then even
Marxism falls within a contradiction as soon as it attempts to
postulate a ubiquitous concept of 'praxis' or a necessary truth
of science which transcends the contingent boundaries of modes
of production. According to Marxism most of the ideological
systems, including science - and especially social science -
reflect the prevailing mode of production. Thus, although
Marxism explains all other ideological systems, it fails to
explain itself and that it belongs to no mode of production
while remaining aloof from any such contingent dependency.
18. Hollis, op.cit., p.9.




23. "By a 'sound theory' we mean a set of true axioms, including
real definitions and their logical consequences", Hollis and
Nell, ibid., p.181.
24. Ibid. , p.172
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44. Keynes, "Treatise on Probability", op.cit., p.18.
45. Hollis and Nell, ibid., p.204.
46. Ibid., p.181.
47. As Winch says, "a form of human activity can never be summed
up in a set of explicit precepts. The activity 'goes beyond'
the precepts. For instance, the precepts have to be applied
in practice and, although we may formulate another, higher-
order, set of precepts prescribing how the first set is to be
applied, we cannot go further along this road without finding
ourselves on the slippery road pointed out by Lewis Carroll in
his paper . . . 'What the Tortoise said to Achilles'", "The
Idea of a Social Science", op.cit., p.55.
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